"We are certainly winning, that's my assessment."
President Pervez Musharraf voiced his confidence during a panel interview with Dawn at his Rawalpindicamp office on August 4, 2004, declaring that Pakistan was winning its war on terrorism, which, he said, themilitary regime was 'confronting frontally'.
But within the current churning process within Pakistan and the rising portents of trouble, such optimism mayjust be the mirage that the military regime chooses to project. Among others, events of the past week in theBalochistan province, the site of a revitalized insurgency - three previous guerrilla wars have been fought inBalochistan since the creation of Pakistan, the last of these in 1973-77 - suggest that such sanguinity maywell be incompatible with the realities of the ground.
Amidst a series of rocket attacks on vital installations in the recent past, Balochistan witnessed two majoracts of violence in just the last week. On August 1, 2004, five soldiers and a civilian were killed when threeunidentified gunmen attacked their vehicle near Zinda Pir road at Khuzdar, a military cantonment. Mir AzadBaloch, representing the little known Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), has claimed that the Khuzdar attackwas a reaction to the ongoing military operations in Turbat and the construction of a new military cantonment.
On August 2, Balochistan Chief Minister Jam Muhammad Yousaf escaped unhurt when his cavalcade was attacked byunidentified terrorists near Surab, about 180 kilometers south west of Quetta, the provincial capital. Apolice constable and one of the attackers were reportedly killed during the incident.
Located in western Pakistan, Balochistan is bordered by Afghanistan on the northwest and Iran on the west,with the Arabian Sea to its south. With a geographical spread of approximately 347,641 square kilometres,Balochistan is the largest province in Pakistan covering almost 43 per cent of the country's total area, butaccounts for just six per cent of the country's population.
The contours of insurgency in Balochistan envelop the familiar loop of underdevelopment, discrimination by theFederal Government, and political grievances - real or perceived. There is a concurrent and intense resentmenttowards the presence of the Army in the province, as well as vivid public memories of the brutal repression ofthe military campaigns in the region in 1973-77. The underdevelopment matrix includes the absence ofinfrastructure and basic facilities like clean drinking water, health and educational facilities. The provincehas the largest proportion - 55 per cent - of the population living below the poverty line, and the lowestliteracy rates in the country (Men: 34 per cent; Women - 14.1 per cent). The prevailing circumstances havelong led the Balochis to protest against the 'hegemony' of the Punjab province. For instance, Balochistan hassome of the largest gas reservoirs in Pakistan at Sui, Pir Koh, and Marri, and while the province accounts forapproximately 40 per cent of the country's total gas production, it exports 80 per cent of its output toPunjab. Utilization within Balochistan is a mere17 per cent of its output. The province is also rich in ironore and copper, among an extended range of other minerals of great economic value, but this wealth isexclusively 'managed' by the Federal Government.
Protests against the Federal Government's acquisition of vast tracts of land for mega military ventures, suchas the Gwadar Port and City project, are snowballing, and feed the insurgency. The strategically located port,scheduled to be operational by 2005, is intended to handle transit trade with Central Asia, Afghanistan andwestern China. However, a relatively large section of the Balochis believe that the benefits willoverwhelmingly be cornered by the Pakistani Army and non-Balochis, while Balochis will emerge the principallosers, as is in part the already the case as large tracts of land are acquired by outsiders, primarily fromPunjab.
While Islamabad debates the best course of action in Balochistan, recent reportage from the province indicatesa broad acceptance and justification of anti-state violence. Voicing popular discontent, Nawab Akber KhanBugti, chief of the Jamhoori Watan Party, in his August 1 interview to the BBC said, "They force you totake up arms, and you are compelled to put up resistance. After all nobody quarrels or dies eagerly."
The current outbreak of violence has also generated a critique of the continuing dualism in the militaryregime's understanding of terrorism and sub-conventional conflict. Habib Jalib, Secretary General of theBalochistan National Party (BNP) and a former Senator, states, "They are terming it [the August 1 attackat Khuzdar] as a terrorist incident but I do not agree... I think the Pakistan Government does not recognisenational political and economic sovereignty of the people. It demands (the) right of self-determination ofKashmir but is not granting it to Balochistan…" He added, further, "Military operations areunderway at the moment in Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Gwadar and Turbat district."
While outfits like the BLA seek to demonstrate their capacity for violence in areas like Khuzdar, there arealso reports of a broad understanding emerging between the disparate Baloch political groups. While afour-party Baloch alliance, led by the Bugti and Mengal tribes in Balochistan, has protested in Turbat, Gwadar,Kalat, Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Nushki, the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM) has accused the Musharrafregime of launching an 'unannounced military operation' in Balochistan.
Gas pipelines in Sui have been under constant attack from the local tribes over the past years. In May 2004alone, approximately 140 rockets were fired in Sui, while at least 120 rocket attacks were reported in June.Attacks have also targeted the Gwadar project, with the most recent among significant attacks on May 3, 2004,when three Chinese engineers were killed and 11 persons, including nine Chinese nationals, sustained injuriesin a car bomb attack. Other notable incidents of violence in 2004 were:
July 18: Islamist leader and Member of National Assembly, Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani, survives an attempt on hislife at Chena Baratkhel in the Qilla Saifullah district.
July 2: Seven Frontier Constabulary personnel are wounded during a landmine blast at Dera Murad Jamali in the Suiarea.
June 27: At least two police personnel and three tribesmen are killed during an encounter at Maiwand.
June 19: Terminal of the Sui airport was destroyed after a bomb blast.
June 6: Two persons are killed and two others sustained injuries during a landmine explosion in Kohlu district.
As a result of the escalating violence, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees decided to limit itsoperations on June 7, 2004, while other foreign non-governmental organisations have closed their offices inQuetta, despite assurances from the Home Department regarding the provision of security to them.
Increasing violence at sensitive locations has been used by the Federal Government to justify its decision toestablish new military cantonments inside Balochistan, including three at Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu, addingto the existing cantonments at Quetta and Khuzdar.
The fact that Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, who hails from Balochistan was recently forced to resign as PrimeMinister, has evidently not had a positive impact on the insurgency dynamic. Jamali was at least partlyresponsible for the delayed decision to send in troops to the province, and his 'removal' has reportedly beenreceived very unfavourably in Balochistan.
While Pakistan's economic capital, Karachi, and the borders with Afghanistan are already under siege, renewedviolence encompassing the protracted insurgency in Balochistan can only cause further apprehension in militarycircles. The provincial capital, Quetta, has long been wracked by sectarian bloodshed, and any immediateexpansion of the sphere of violence across the rest of the province can be expected to provoke larger militarycommitments of the kind currently being witnessed in South and North Waziristan along the Afghan border. Butmilitary operations to quell dissidence, insurgency and terrorism, irrespective of the nature of grievances,have been riddled with complexities in Pakistan.
Musharraf may seek to portray the operations in Balochistan as targeting 'terrorists' affiliated to AlQaeda. However, the Baloch groups have insisted on their identity as 'Baloch nationalists' and haverejected the label of Islamist extremists. There is evidence, moreover, that the Islamists have, till nowchosen not to get involved in the ongoing insurgency. However, given the recent trajectory of terrorism in theregion, it is likely that the Islamists will eventually try to appropriate the 'Baloch cause', and to exploitthe discontent in the province in order to further undermine the beleaguered Musharraf regime. Balochistancould, in such a scenario, emerge as a new staging post for Islamist extremists.
The linkages, in this context, are already crystallizing. The Islamist alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal,deeply sympathetic to the Taliban, is a coalition partner in the Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid-e-Azam (PML-QA)led Government in Balochistan. A substantial number of Al Qaeda operatives have been arrested from theprovince since 9/11, and Pushtun nationalism has created significant spaces for the Taliban presence in theprovince.
However, a deep divide between the Pashtun-dominated northern areas, and the Baloch south, remains a barrierto a unification of Islamist Pashtun elements and nationalist Baloch factions in the immediate future.
Nevertheless, US intelligence is reportedly concerned that, after earlier Pakistani Army operations in SouthWaziristan, some Al Qaeda operatives relocated to the Balochistan ranges. Islamabad-based writer MohammadShehzad told South Asia Intelligence Review on August 7 that there are a substantial number of jehadispresent in the province, waiting to harness the operational possibilities that may be created by anescalating Baloch insurgency, and the current violent situation has the potential to worsen rapidly. Sectionsof Balochis have also accused Islamabad of masterminding terrorist acts in the province to justify plans tobuild Army cantonments and increase troop deployment.
With the arc of instability widening in Pakistan, there are grave dangers that what is currently a low-levelconflict in Balochistan, may be transformed into a full-scale conflagration.
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Kanchan Lakshman is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines:Writings on Conflict & Resolution. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South AsiaTerrorism Portal
