Long Talks To Nowhere

On August 31, 2006, at the end of a four-day meeting betweenthe two border forces at Shillong, Border Security Force (BSF) Inspector GeneralS.K. Dutta and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) Deputy Director General, Brigadier S.M.Golam Rabbani, tried to bring about some ‘forward movement’ to their routinemeet, which would otherwise have ended without any tangible result, as always.

The two delegations drew up a list of confidence buildingmeasures (CBMs) which they thought would result in a much needed breakthrough,particularly in so far as maintenance of tranquility along the border isconcerned. Some of the proposed CBMs included: sports and cultural exchanges,with the respective BSF and BDR sector commanders deciding on the performancesby cultural troupes; honouring of decisions taken at Flag Meetings between thetwo border forces; and non-interference in the execution of development worksalong the border on both sides like road and bridge construction or renovationetc.

Hardly had Brigadier Rabbani and his delegation crossed overto their country, driving through the Indian border post of Dawki, in Meghalaya,when men of the BDR and the BSF were locked in a gunbattle near the BSF post ofLabourpota, in Southern Assam’s Cachar district. "There was a 15-minuteexchange of fire between the BSF and the BDR on the evening of August 31, butthere were no casualties," Cachar District Magistrate Gautam Ganguly told thiswriter. A BSF official in the area, close to the border, disclosed that his menopened fire after a group of Bangladeshi farmers sneaked in and tried to harvestpaddy, ignoring warnings from the soldiers to leave the area which ‘belongs toIndia.’ The action by the Indian border guards invited a volley of gunfirefrom the BDR men posted across the border. It was the third time in August 2006alone that the BSF and the BDR were engaged in firing at each other, the lastbeing on August 10 when two women, both civilians, were killed on the Indianside after being hit by 82 mm mortar shells used by the BDR men.

While a kind of military adventurism by the BDR towards India– despite the fact that this paramilitary force as well as the Bangladesh Armyhave not really tasted war yet – has become routine, it is nonethelesssurprising that the BDR should have allowed the Bangladeshi farmers to proceedto the area of dispute at a time when senior officials were meeting at Shillong,and then to engage in an exchange of fire. It is interesting at this point tolook at the tenor of the statement that the Indian Ministry of Home Affairsreleased on August 27, 2006, at the end of the four-day 7th Indo-Bangladesh HomeSecretary-level talks in Dhaka. The statement notes: "The talks took place inan atmosphere of utmost cordiality, candour and friendship. It was noted by bothsides that India and Bangladesh enjoyed the friendliest of bilateral relationsthat were multifaceted and rich in both content and scope…" If this is thebond between the two South Asian neighbours, why is it that fire-fights betweenthe BSF and the BDR take place at the slightest of provocations?

During the latest talks, on most of the contentious issues,the BDR delegation – indeed, Bangladesh – fell back on flat denial, asusual. The BSF presented the BDR team with a list of 172 Indian insurgent campsor hideouts inside Bangladesh territory and a list of 103 militants, includingthe chairman and the ‘chief of staff’ or military chief of the outlawedUnited Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), Arabinda Rajkhowa and Paresh Baruahrespectively. The BDR reiterated the official that no Indian insurgent campsexist inside Bangladesh nor were any Indian militants operating from thatcountry. Nothing surprising so far. But, significantly, a fact the may havesurprised the BSF team, was that the BDR, contrary to earlier practice, did nothad over a list of criminal elements from Bangladesh allegedly in India or alist of camps supposedly used by Bangladeshi criminal elements inside Indianterritory – a reflexive practice long adopted by Bangladesh in the face ofIndian allegations. In the past, Bangladesh would promptly come up with a‘counter-list’ the moment Indian authorities brought up details of Indianmilitants or Indian militant camps inside Bangladeshi territory.

Another significant point was the ease with which thevisitors admitted the fact that global terrorism was affecting Bangladesh."The BDR team agreed that the menace of terrorism needs to be fought andtackled jointly by the two neighbours," Inspector General Dutta, who headedthe BSF delegation at the talks, told this writer. During the Dhaka talksbetween the Home Secretaries, New Delhi had pointed out that recent terroristincidents in India have revealed clear links with Bangladeshi individuals oroutfits like Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HUJI). Concern was also expressed byIndia with regard to growing anti-India activities of the PakistaniInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from Bangladeshi soil. It was agreed by bothsides that terrorism posed a threat to both countries and that there was a needto cooperate closely to tackle this menace. One of the important decisions takenby both sides at the Dhaka meeting was to examine the possibility of quicklyinstituting a bilateral mechanism to combat terrorism and organized crime, withthe BSF-BDR meet picking up the issue from where the two Home Secretaries hadleft it.

Why is India finding it so difficult to tackle Bangladesh?Why is India’s eastern frontier, particularly the 4,000 kilometre-long borderwith Bangladesh spiked with problems? Dhaka denies the presence of Indianmilitant camps or militants on its territory; it claims there has been noillegal migration of its citizens to India; it refuses to give India access tothe Chittagong Port to service the landlocked northeastern states, and generallypursues a blow-hot-blow-cold relationship with India. New Delhi’s predicamentis understandable: a country that is the undisputed ‘super power’ in thesub-continent cannot be expected to acknowledge its problems and its failure toresolve such problems, with a small neighbour. That perhaps explains NewDelhi’s so-called magnanimity towards Dhaka despite the irritants.

The shrill anti-India campaign in Bangladesh, on the otherhand, conforms to domestic political pressures. With New Delhi seen to beovertly or covertly supportive of the Awami League, the other major politicalformation, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has always viewed India witha great deal of suspicion. India also needs to shake off its 1971 hangover andnot expect Dhaka to be still grateful for Delhi’s contribution in securing thecountry’s freedom. With national elections forthcoming in Bangladesh, a freshbout of anti-India sentiments may be mobilized for electoral ends by variouspolitical formations. Under the circumstances, it remains improbable that NewDelhi will succeed in bending Dhaka to make it change some of its statedpositions on contentious issues in the near future.

Wasbir Hussain is Guwahati-based Political Analyst andAssociate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi. Courtesy, the SouthAsia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal