'Musharraf Is Clearly Hedging'

Therecent upsurge in Taliban attacks against coa­lition forces inAfghanistan and continuing links of global terrorist networks to groupsbased in Pakistan are leading many in the United States to questionIslamabad’s commitment to fighting the global war on terrorism.Washington should review Pakistani efforts to deny terrorists safehaven and its overall policy toward Pakistan, which is at the center ofinterna­tional anti-terrorism efforts.

Pakistan hasmade invaluable contributions to combating al-Qaeda over the past fiveyears by cap­turing scores of key leaders and helping to foil numerousdeadly plots. However, Islamabad will need to adopt a morecomprehensive policy against violent extremism to fully deny groups andindi­viduals the use of Pakistani territory as a base for global jihad.

Pakistan hastraditionally relied on violent extremists to accomplish its strategicobjectives in both Afghanistan and India. Although President PervezMusharraf has articulated his desire to turn Pakistan into a moderateand modern Islamic state, his government has taken little concreteaction to make the country inhospitable for individuals and groupsseek­ing to destabilize Afghanistan or India and plotting internationalacts of terrorism. Reports of links between those involved in thefoiled London airliner bomb plot in mid-August and Pakistani terroristgroups that traditionally operate in Jammu and Kash­mir demonstrate thedangers of not cracking down on violent extremism in Pakistan.

Washington needsto strengthen its policy toward Pakistan in ways that both demonstratelong-term U.S. commitment to the relationship and press Pakistan toexpand its efforts against violent extremists. The best chance forsuccess against vio­lent extremism in Pakistan lies in a strategy thatprioritizes economic and democratic development and the pursuit ofbetter relations with neighboring countries, namely Afghanistan andIndia. Washing­ton should support these objectives and encouragegreater economic interdependence among these three South Asiancountries.

Pakistanand the Taliban

Beforethe terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Pakistan supported andrecognized Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Although Pakistani officialslargely disagreed with the Taliban’s harsh interpreta­tion of Islam,they viewed the Taliban as their best chance to achieve their ownstrategic objectives in the region and believed that the internationalcom­munity would eventually accept Taliban rule in Kabul as inevitable.Pakistan continued to support the Taliban into the late 1990s, longafter Osama bin Laden took refuge there in 1996 and despite the growingproblems that it created in Pakistan’s rela­tions with Washington.Pakistan’s high-stakes policy vis-à-vis the Taliban derived from itsaims of denying India, as well as Iran and the Central Asiancoun­tries, a strong foothold in Afghanistan and ensuring a friendlyregime in Kabul that would refrain from making territorial claims onPakistan’s Pashtun areas along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border.[1]

The9/11 attacks and their impact on U.S. foreign policy quickly changedPakistan’s earlier cal­culations on the benefits of supporting the Taliban. President Musharraf broke off official ties with the Taliban,supported the U.S. invasion of Afghani­stan, and contributedsubstantially to breaking up the al-Qaeda network in the region.Pakistan has captured and turned over to the U.S. scores of senior al-Qaeda leaders and has helped to disrupt terrorist plots that wouldhave resulted in hun­dreds, possibly thousands, of deaths.

Despitethe official break with the Taliban, Islamabad has failed to crackdown forcefully on Taliban leaders or actively disrupt their activitiesin Paki­stan. Officials of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelli­genceDirectorate maintain relationships with Taliban leaders and may seebenefits in keeping good ties with the Taliban in the expectation thatthe Taliban might again play a role in Afghanistan’s politics. Talibanleaders apparently roam freely in Quetta, Baluchistan, and Talibanfighters shelter in Pakistani border areas after attacking coalitionforces in Afghanistan.[2]

Pakistan’slax attitude toward the Taliban has contributed to renewed Talibanattacks in Afghani­stan, but other factors are also facilitatinginstabil­ity. U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negropontesays the Taliban is exploiting local grievances on issues such ascorruption and poor governance to attract recruits and reestablish itspower base. He also attributes the recent increase in Taliban attacksto more NATO operations along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.[3]

Estimated Coalition FatalitiesIn Afghanistan

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AlthoughPakistan is not solely responsible for the increased Taliban attacks,it could help to stem them by denying Taliban forces rest and safeharbor on Pakistani soil. Washington should therefore make the issue ofdenying terrorists safe haven in the border areas a focal point of itspartnership with Pakistan. The importance of denying terrorists safehaven as part of an overall counterterrorism strat­egy is welldocumented. In its July 2004 report, the National Commission onTerrorist Attacks Upon the United States highlighted the need todevelop a “realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists inse­cure andon the run.” [4] The March 2006 National Security Strategy says that “we must prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned areas,”[5]and the 2005 State Department counterterrorism report indicates that“[d]enying terrorists safe haven plays a major role in underminingterrorists’ capacity to operate effectively, and thus forms a keyelement of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.” [6]

Musharraf’s Tribal Areas Deal: Curtailing or Emboldening Terrorism? 

Since2004, the Pakistan military has deployed some 80,000 security forces tothe area to disrupt the terrorists, but these military operations havealso damaged traditional tribal institutions, increased radicalism inthe region, caused the deaths of several hundred Pakistani soldiers,and met with increasing opposition from the broader Pakistanipopulation. Public opposition to the mil­itary operations in the FATAspiked in late August following the Pakistan military’s unpopularassassi­nation of an elderly Baluch politician who had spearheaded arebellion in Baluchistan province.

Becauseof the growing problems with the FATA military operations, PresidentMusharraf on Sep­tember 5 announced a “peace deal” with tribal lead­ersof the North Waziristan Agency that includes an end to offensivePakistani military operations in exchange for the tribal rulers’cooperation in restricting Taliban and al-Qaeda activities. ThePakistan government wants to restore the tradi­tional form ofgovernance in the region and co-opt the tribal elders and politicalrepresentatives through an infusion of economic assistance for newroads, hospitals, and schools. The U.S. supports Pakistani efforts tobring more government services to the region and to turn it into aregularly admin­istered province. Washington is also providingassistance to help Pakistan control the region by equipping Pakistan’sparamilitary Frontier Corps, funding the construction of more than 100border outposts, providing high-tech equipment to help Pakistani forcesbetter locate terrorists attempting to cross the border, and funding anair wing with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. [8]

Thenext several months will be crucial in deter­mining whether Musharraf’sWaziristan deal will advance U.S. interests by denying safe haven toter­rorists or enhance Taliban and al-Qaeda influence in the region,making it easier for terrorists to plot, organize, and train. AlthoughPresident Musharraf denies that the pact was made with the Taliban,reports that scores of Taliban militants were recently released fromPakistani custody are worrisome.

Tomake the pact effective, Islamabad will have to enforce its termsstrictly, which means com­ing down hard on any elements that are foundprotecting or shel­tering Taliban or al-Qaeda. This may requireMusharraf to punish lower-level individuals within his own intelligenceand security ser­vices who have helped Taliban leaders evade capture byU.S. forces in the past. This is a tall order for Musharraf, given thedeep institutional links between the intelligence and securityser­vices and the Taliban. He has already faced at least twoassassi­nation attempts because of his counterterrorism cooperationwith the U.S. Although the U.S. sees an urgent need to deny safe havento terrorists along the Paki­stan–Afghan border, President Musharrafcarefully calculates each counterterrorism step that he takes to ensurehis own survival.

If,as Musharraf claims, the Waziristan pact is aimed at increasingcooperation from the local tribes against the terrorists, Pakistanshould find it increasingly easier to close in on Taliban and al-Qaedahideouts. The U.S. will need to monitor the situation closely and judgethe merits of the pact based on whether it results in fewercross-border attacks into Afghan­istan and more information on Taliban/al-Qaeda activities and hiding places. Washington needs tofocus all of the tools and resources at its disposal on dealingeffectively with this troubled region. Fail­ure to do so will furtherdestabilize Afghanistan and make it easier for terrorists to plan andexecute their next international attack.

Tripartite Meeting: A Step in the Right Direction

Therecent tripartite meeting of Presidents George W. Bush, Hamid Karzai,and Musharraf in Washington is a first step in defusing tensionsbetween the Afghan and Pakistani leaders result­ing from the increasedTaliban attacks. It is now widely acknowledged that the fate ofAfghanistan is closely linked to Pakistan and the policies that itpursues over the next several years. Therefore, the U.S. needs tocontinue these high-level three-way meetings to bring the countriesinto greater align­ment and to build economic and security linkagesbetween their governments that will make them increasinglyinterdependent and interested in their mutual stability and security.

TheAdministration is already moving in this direction with the pursuit ofreconstruction oppor­tunity zones (ROZs) in the Afghan–Pakistan borderareas, which would allow products produced in these remote areas toreceive trade preferences in the U.S.[9]The U.S. Congress would need to pass legislation to implement the ROZprogram. The Bush Administration and the next U.S. Congress should worktogether to fast-track implementation of the ROZs so that Afghan andPakistani leaders will immediately begin to benefit from workingcooperatively on peaceful trade-related projects.

Duringthe tripartite meeting, Presidents Karzai and Musharraf also agreed toestablish tribal jirgas (gatherings) of Pashtun local leaders from bothsides of the border. President Karzai has commented that he hopes thejirgas will provide assurances to both Islamabad and Kabul that eachcountry’s peace and prosperity is good for the other.[10]

Links Between Kashmiri Militancy and International Terrorism

Linksbetween Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant groups and internationalterrorist incidents further demonstrate the need for Islamabad to adopta zero-tolerance policy toward violent extremism. Reports surfaced inmid-August that one of the prime suspects in the London airliner bombplot had family ties to Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), a radical Kashmiri terrorist group.[11]Indian security forces captured Azhar in Kashmir in the early 1990s andthen released him in 1999 during a hostage swap to free 155 passengerson a hijacked Indian plane that flew to Kandahar, Afghanistan. TheIndian govern­ment also released two other suspected terrorists—British-born Omar Sheikh and Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar—to end the hijackingcrisis.

TheJEM had apparently made an earlier unsuc­cessful attempt to free Azharby kidnapping five Western tourists, including American citizen DonaldHutchings. One of the tourists was beheaded, and the others were neverfound and are presumed dead. Pakistan officially banned the JEM in2002, but Azhar has never been formally charged with a crime.[12]

The JEM has also been linked to the kidnapping and brutal murder of Wall Street Journalreporter Daniel Pearl in January 2002. Pearl’s kidnappers demanded therelease of Pakistani prisoners from Guantanamo Bay, an immediate end tothe U.S. presence in Pakistan, U.S. delivery of F-16 fighter jets toPakistan, and the release of Mullah Zaeef, the former Afghan ambassadorof the Taliban regime to Pakistan. Omar Sheikh later con­fessed toPakistani authorities that he masterminded Pearl’s kidnap­ping. Sheikhwas also involved in the kidnappings of Westerners in India in 1994that were aimed at freeing Masood Azhar. In July 2002, Sheikh wassentenced to death by an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan.[13]

TheJEM has roots in the Afghan war against the Soviets, and its cad­restrained at Taliban camps in the late 1990s. The JEM (then called the Harakat-Ul-Mujahideen) reportedly suffered several casualties duringthe U.S. strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in 1998 inretaliation for al-Qaeda bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa.

Terrorist Attacks Jeopardize Indo–Pakistani Talks

Indianallegations of Pakistani involvement in the July 11 Mumbai trainblasts, which killed nearly 200 people, are severely strainingPaki­stan–India relations. On September 30, the Mumbai policecommissioner told a news conference that the authorities had finishedtheir investiga­tions into the Mumbai blasts and had concluded that theattack was planned by Pakistan’s intelli­gence service and carried outby the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET) and their opera­tives inIndia. He also said that the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)had assisted in the attacks. India has said that it will test Pakistaniresolve in countering terrorism through a joint mechanism agreed to bythe Indian and Pakistani leaders in Havana, Cuba, in late September.President Musharraf has so far been reluctant to take concrete stepsto rein in jihadists that fight in Kashmir, mainly because hisgovernment believes the militancy is Islamabad’s only way to keeppressure on India and to force New Delhi’s hand in negotiations overthe contested territory.

TheU.S. considered labeling Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism for itssupport to militant groups fighting in Kashmir in the early 1990s.Although the Kashmir militancy erupted indige­nously in Srinagar—theMuslim-dominated sum­mer capital of Jammu and Kashmir on the Indianside of the Line of Control (LOC)—over griev­ances related to politicalrepresentation of the Muslim community, Pakistan quickly tookadvan­tage of the situation and provided support to Kashmiri militantgroups.

TheU.S. again pressured Islamabad on its sup­port to militants fighting inKashmir during the 2001–2002 military crisis between India andPaki­stan, in which a total 1 million troops were mobi­lized on bothsides of the border. To defuse that crisis, then Deputy Secretary ofState Richard Armitage secured a commitment from President Musharraf inearly June 2002 to end the infiltration of militants across the LOC,which divides Kashmir. Armitage conveyed the Pakistani pledge to IndianPrime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee, who subse­quently agreed to pullback Indian forces, ending the military standoff. [14] Despite reduced military tensions, India did not agree to resume official dia­logue until 18 months later in January 2004.

PresidentMusharraf would find it politically challenging to pursue a broadercrackdown on domestic terrorists that strike in India and abroad. Thereligious parties would label such a crackdown as a surrender to Indiaover Kashmir. However, he could draw support for such a crackdown fromother parts of Pakistani society, such as the secular politicalparties, the business community, and Pakistanis who have been involvedin people-to-people exchanges with Indians over the past few years.

Amore serious dialogue on Kashmir between India and Pakistan and deeperengagement by the U.S. would help to give Pakistan confidence that itsviewpoint has been taken into account. The U.S. should not try toinvolve itself directly in resolving the dispute, but it shouldcontinue to talk about the issue separately with both sides and injectideas into their dialogue process. President Musharraf is clearlyhedging in talks with India by allowing Kashmiri militant groups tocontinue to operate. The U.S. needs to convince Musharraf to insteadput his faith in the India–Pakistan dialogue.

Agenuine peace process between New Delhi and a wide spectrum of Kashmirileaders that addresses political grievances and human rights issueswould also help to temper the Pakistani public’s emotional reactions toKashmir and widen public support for a genuine crackdown on violentgroups. Encourag­ing travel back and forth across the LOC (started bythe Muzaffarabad–Srinagar bus link) and greater interaction andcooperation between officials from both sides of the LOC will widen theconstituencies for peace and help to isolate violent extremists.

Weakening Extremism by Promoting Democracy

Promotinga more open and transparent political process in Pakistan will alsohelp to curb the influ­ence of extremist groups, thereby reducingsupport for terrorism. Before the 2002 elections, religious partiesthat backed the Taliban traditionally received less than 8 percent ofthe popular vote and had been marginalized in the 1988, 1990, 1993, and1997 national elections.[15]In the 2002 elec­tions, however, the religious parties performed wellin the areas bordering Afghanistan and increased their total vote shareto about 11 percent, partly because of changes in election rules thatfavored them over the secular parties and partly because ofanti-American sentiment in the Afghanistan–Paki­stan border provinces.[16]The secular Pakistan Peo­ple’s Party (PPP), which is led in exile byformer Prime Minister Benazir Bhuto, grabbed about 25 percent of thepopular vote in the 2002 elections.

Thefull participation of the main secular demo­cratic parties, includingthe PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), in the 2007 electionswould provide more political choices to Pakistani voters and instillgreater confidence in Pakistan’s democratic process. Charges ofcorruption leveled against Benazir Bhutto and her husband have taintedher personal reputation, but the PPP as a party con­tinues to attractindividuals who support secular-based policies. The PPP recently ledefforts in the Pakistani parliament to repeal the controversial Hudoodordinances that discriminate against women. The Musharraf governmenthas since put efforts to repeal the controversial ordinances on hold asa result of pressure from the religious parties.

ThePakistan military’s pervasive involvement in civilian affairs hasstifled the development of civil society and the establishment ofdemocratic insti­tutions. Pakistan has been ruled by the military forover half of its existence. Even during periods of civilian rule, themilitary has wielded tremendous power over decision-making. Althoughthe military is unlikely to submit fully to a civilian government inthe near term, Washington should set bench­marks that begin to restrictthe military’s role in Pakistani politics. U.S. legislation preventsWash­ington from providing assistance to a government put in place by amilitary coup, but the Bush Administration has permitted assistance toPaki­stan since 9/11 under a waiver to this law. The annualrecertification of this waiver should be tied to free and fairelections in 2007 and a return to civilian rule.

The Role of U.S. Assistance in Countering Extremism

Carefullytargeted U.S. aid programs can also help to counter anti-Americansentiment and limit the influence of radicals who use hatred of theU.S. to mobilize political support. A visible U.S. aid presence in thecountry will reassure the Pakistani population that Washington iscommitted to aver­age Pakistanis, not just to the military leadership.U.S. assistance programs that focus on building institutions andpromoting human rights and democracy would also show that the U.S. iscom­mitted to Pakistan’s success as a stable and prosper­ous countryand deflate extremists’ arguments that Washington is interested only inexploiting Paki­stan for its own purposes. Washington must work toovercome the suspicions of Pakistanis who remember when the U.S.abruptly cut off its large-scale aid program because of Pakistan’snuclear program in the early 1990s.

Pollingin Pakistan and other parts of the Muslim world has demonstrated thesignificant impact that U.S. humanitarian aid has on peoples’perceptions of America. A poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a U.S.nonprofit organization, indicated that favorable attitudes towardAmerica doubled following the U.S. response to the October 2005earthquake in Pakistan.[17]The U.S. should search for ways to emulate the kind of humanitarianprograms that were employed following the earthquake on a morepermanent basis and to publicize more effectively the assistance thatWashington has already pro­vided. Regrettably, security concerns haveforced the U.S. to limit the size and scope of its assistance projectsin the country. Most U.S. assistance to Pakistan over the past fiveyears has been in the form of budgetary support and debt relief, whichhas helped Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators but has limited thedirect impact of U.S. aid on the broader Pakistani population’sattitudes toward America. [18]

What the U.S. Should Do

Tostrengthen U.S. policy toward Pakistan and to press Islamabad toaddress the roots of violent extremism, the United States should:

• Maintain a robust U.S. assistance program but make it more visible to the Pakistani peo­ple. TheU.S. should target more of its assis­tance to development, health, andeducation projects that affect the grassroots of society. Since 9/11,most U.S. economic assistance has gone either to debt relief or todirect budget support of the Pakistan government. While this aid hasimproved Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators, it has had little impacton the aver­age Pakistani’s perception of America. The U.S. embassy andaid mission in Islamabad should work together to develop programs thatdem­onstrate Washington’s interest in promoting economic developmentand democracy. The embassy’s public diplomacy office should sub­mitregular stories to the local press detailing U.S. assistance programsand their impact on the lives of average Pakistanis. Implementing moreU.S. assistance programs that focus on economic development andpromoting human rights and democracy will demonstrate that the U.S. iscommitted to the success of Pakistan as a stable and prosperous countryand help to deflate the extremists’ arguments that Washing­ton isinterested only in exploiting Pakistan for its own purposes.
  
  

• Provide a consistent message regarding denying safe haven to all terrorists,regard­less of whether they attack coalition forces in Afghanistan orinnocent civilians in India or elsewhere. Washington should privatelyacknowl­edge the links between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, andPakistan-based groups that target India and should convey U.S.expectations that Islama­bad develop an equally uncompromising policytoward all three groups. This means that Paki­stan must shut downtraining facilities associ­ated with international terrorist incidents,including institutions run by the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in Muridke and the Jaish-e-Moham­med in Bahawalpur. Washington should emphasize thedangers of Islamabad’s maintain­ing a permissive attitude toward groupsthat commit terrorism and remind Pakistani offi­cials that U.S. lawsrequire sanctions against states that support terrorist groups.
  
  

• Develop a more proactive U.S. policy to sup­port the restoration of democracy.Washing­ton should convey a consistent public message that calls forfree, fair, and transparent elections in 2007 and emphasizes theimportance of democracy as a way to lessen the influence of extremistforces. The U.S. should also discour­age further changes in theelection rules or other government manipulations of the elec­toralprocess. The full participation of the Paki­stan People’s Party and thePakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), the two main secular demo­craticparties, in the 2007 elections would pro­vide more political choices tothe Pakistani voter and instill greater confidence in the dem­ocraticprocess. Despite legislation that gener­ally prohibits providing U.S.assistance to any government put in place by a military coup, U.S.assistance to Pakistan is permitted under a waiver to this law. Theannual recertification of this waiver should be tied to free and fairelec­tions in 2007 and a return to civilian rule.
  
  

• Highlight the F-16 sale and how it demon­strates American support for Pakistan’s long-term security in the region. Therecent announcement of the resumption of U.S. F-16 sales to Pakistanpassed without much fanfare, even though Pakistani officials hadrepeatedly told U.S. officials over the past several years thatreleasing the F-16s was crucial to building confidence in Pakistanabout the U.S. commit­ment to the relationship. A senior U.S. officialshould deliver a major speech on the U.S. inter­est in Pakistan’slong-term security and describe how the F-16 sale fits into thiscontext. Pakistan’s reluctance to crack down on the Tal­iban andKashmiri militant groups is driven largely by Islamabad’s perceptionthat it needs an insurance policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India. TheU.S. should search for ways to dem­onstrate that Washington wants along-lasting and broad-based relationship with Islamabad and willremain committed to a secure and sta­ble Pakistan, thereby enhancingIslamabad’s perceptions of its own security in the region.
  
  

• Maintain and fortify U.S. diplomatic efforts to facilitate the building of peace between India and Pakistan. NewDelhi’s allegations that a Pakistan-based terrorist group andPakistan’s intelligence agency were involved in the Mum­bai bomb blastscould derail Indo–Pakistani bilateral talks unless Pakistan takesconcrete steps to crack down on domestic terrorist groups. WhileWashington should encourage such a crackdown, it will also need toacknowl­edge Pakistan’s interest in seeing substantive movement onIndia–Pakistan talks on Kashmir. In this context, Washington shouldencourage New Delhi to take additional confidence-build­ing measures onKashmir and to involve the Kashmiris in a peace process that addresseshuman rights concerns and political grievances.
  
  

• Institute regular trilateral meetings with senior U.S., Pakistani, and Afghan officials,such as the Bush–Musharraf–Karzai meeting held in late September. TheU.S. needs to take the lead in mediating differences between Kabul andIslamabad and injecting ideas into the discussions to help to overcometheir mutual mistrust. The U.S. should support the idea of establishingtribal jirgas on both sides of the border as a way to build confidencebetween the two governments. Washington should also strongly discouragefurther mud­slinging between Kabul and Islamabad of the sort thatoccurred in mid-September. Clearly, Pakistan has a role to play inachieving a stable and prosperous Afghanistan. Washington needs toconvey to Islamabad both the priority that it places on ensuringstability in Afghanistan and that the U.S. will remain committed tothis goal over the long term.
  
  

• Encourage economic integration among Paki­stan, Afghanistan, and India sothat each has a vested interest in overall stability in the region.Washington should vigorously pursue trade, development, and investmentinitiatives that mutually benefit all three countries. The BushAdministration and the next U.S. Congress should fast-track legislationimplementing ROZs along the Afghan–Pakistan border. The U.S. shouldalso actively encourage trade between Pakistan and India and considerinitiatives that would bring Indians and Pakistanis together incooperative efforts to reconstruct and rehabili­tate Afghanistan.Greater economic interdepen­dence and integration among the threecountries will contribute to stability in the region as each countrybegins to view good relations with its neighbors as benefiting its owneconomy. Imple­menting the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) wouldfurther this process.
  
  

• Establish an interagency working group on Pakistan thatmeets regularly to assess the cur­rent status of aid programs,counterterrorism operations, democratic development, and Paki­stan’srelations with Afghanistan and India. The working group should be ledby the State Department and be tasked with developing a more integratedU.S. policy toward Pakistan. It is becoming increasingly clear thatPakistan is at the center of the international fight againstter­rorism, and the U.S. needs a stronger inter­agency process todevelop its Pakistan policy. In the past, the different U.S. agenciesthat deal with Pakistan have often argued over issues related to theextent of Pakistani counter terrorism cooperation. The arguments havedeveloped between those who have a vested interest in con­tinuing toreceive the Pakistani cooperation that is forthcoming and those who seean urgent need for greater cooperation. The bureaucratic infighting hasoften polarized the two camps of opinion and stifled the development ofa care­fully crafted approach toward achieving U.S. counterterrorismgoals in the region.

Conclusion

Stabilityin Afghanistan and in South Asia more generally is closely linked tothe policies that Islamabad pursues over the next few years, includingactions that limit the Taliban’s ability to operate on Pakistani soil,peace efforts with neighboring India, exploration of trade andinvestment opportunities in the region, and a return to democraticpolitics. The U.S. needs to pursue these objectives with equal vigor tohelp Pakistan address the roots of violent extremism and begin tocontribute to greater stabil­ity and peace in the region and beyond.

Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

[1] Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 185–189.

[2] Dr. Barnett Rubin, “Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink,” testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, September 21, 2006, (October 2, 2006), and Daniel Benjamin, America and the World in the Age of Terror (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2005), p. 117.

[3] Gary Thomas, “Coalition, NATO Forces More Proactive in Southern Afghanistan,” interview with Ambassador John D.Negroponte, transcript, Voice of America, October 4, 2006 (October 6, 2006).

[4] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004, p. 367, at www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (October 2, 2006).

[5] The WhiteHouse, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” March 2006, p. 12,(October 2, 2006).

[6] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism2005, April 2006,p. 16 (October 18, 2006).

[7] Ibid., p. 20.

[8] Ibid. and news release, “Fact Sheet: Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strong Allies in the War on Terror,” The WhiteHouse, September 29, 2006 (October 18, 2006).

[9] News release, “President Bush and President Musharraf of Pakistan Discuss Strengthened Relationship,” The WhiteHouse, March 4, 2006 (October 18, 2006).

[10] Ahmed Rashid, “Karzai for Jirga to Crush Taleban,” BBCNews, October 11, 2006  (October 11, 2006).

[11] “The Radical with a Perfect Cover,” Sunday Times (London), August 20,2006 (October 18, 2006), and Stewart Tendler, Sean O’Neill, and Zahid Hussain, “Suitcase Full of Bomb Equipment Found by Police,” The Times (London), August 18,2006 (October 18, 2006).

[12] Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi, “British Case Renews Focus on Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, August 13, 2006, p. A9, and “Profile: Maulana Masood Azhar,” BBCNews, December 16, 2002  (October 11, 2006).

[13] Husain Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol.1, May 19, 2005  (October 18, 2006).

[14] Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon,“US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” Henry L. Stimson Center Report No.57, September 2006  (October 16, 2006).

[15] Aitzaz Ahsan and Meghnad Desai, Divided by Democracy (New Delhi: Lotus Collection Roli Books, 2005), p. 134.

[16] Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 187.

[17] Terror FreeTomorrow, “Dramatic Change of Public Opinion in the Muslim World: Results from a New Poll in Pakistan,” November 2005, p.1 (October 18, 2006).

[18] U.S. Agency for International Development, “Pakistan,” in Congressional BudgetJustification, Fiscal Year 2007 (October 18, 2006).

Dates in brackets denote the date the linkswere accessed