There was little reason to doubt that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) proposals in terms of
the interim administration they sought for the contested North East of the country would be ambitious. This
was to be expected, as in the case of any first offer in a negotiation. The surprise was not that the LTTE
did, in fact, make such maximalist demands. The surprise is that they did it so well.
The long awaited LTTE proposals on the type of interim administration they seek for the North East made their
appearance on October 31, 2003, on which day the proposals were handed over to the Norwegian facilitators to
be forwarded to the Government. This action underlined the central role that Norway continues to play in the
Sri Lankan peace process. The preamble to the LTTE's proposals, described as proposals on behalf of the Tamil
people, also acknowledged with appreciation the services of the Norwegian Government and the international
community.
The immediate reaction of journalists covering the release in Kilinochchi was neither negative nor emotional.
A key reason for this was that the proposals had been prepared with a great deal of thought about how they
would be perceived by the world at large. Hence, there were no immediate red flags that could set anyone's
blood boiling upon a quick reading.
The LTTE has clearly refrained from frontally addressing emotive issues. They made no mention either of their
own military or of the right of the Sri Lankan military to be present in the North East; or of the Sinhalese
settlements in the North East. The LTTE's proposals also did not call for a change in the national flag or
anthem or the special place accorded to Buddhism in the Sri Lankan Constitution. Any mention of these could
have generated an emotional response from Sinhalese nationalists.
However, a closer scrutiny of the LTTE proposals would reveal that they are maximalist in spirit, as indeed
could have been anticipated from an organisation that has waged a long war for the cause of complete Tamil
separation from Sri Lanka. The proposals, in sum, call for the establishment of an Interim Self Governing
Authority (ISGA) for the North East in which the LTTE would have an absolute majority of members. Thereafter,
the proposals indicate that complete autonomy is sought in virtually every aspect of the political and
economic life of the people.
The LTTE proposals call for separate institutions to be set up for the North East in respect of the police,
judiciary, elections, taxation, local and foreign grants and loans, and trade, among others. There is an
assurance that internationally mandated standards of human rights, accountability, multi-ethnic representation
and free and fair elections will prevail. But all the institutions that are to be set up to ensure such
practices of good governance will be under the sole control of the ISGA which will have an absolute LTTE
majority.
In a society where the spirit of power sharing is yet to be learned and practiced, obtaining an absolute
majority is a potential license for unilateralism. When this potential is coupled with autonomy, the result
can be a high degree of control. It is noteworthy that the LTTE's proposals make no provision for integration
with nationally prevailing structures. Viewed in this context, it is not surprising that the Sri Lankan
Government's response to the LTTE proposals was cautious and restrained. The Government's immediate reaction
was to say that there were fundamental differences between the LTTE's proposals and those submitted several
months earlier by the Government itself.
In its own proposals regarding an interim administration for the North East, the Government specifically
excluded matters pertaining to police, land, revenue and security from the purview of the interim
administration. But in the LTTE's counter proposals, all the above with the exception of security are
specifically considered to be the domain of the ISGA. Further, in the Government's proposals, while an
absolute majority is conceded to the LTTE, provision was made for a minority veto on matters that affected the
interests of the Muslim and Sinhalese communities living in the North East.
On the ground the Muslims and Sinhalese of the East, who presently constitute over 60 percent of the
population in this region, have strongly protested their inclusion into an LTTE dominated administration. The
Muslims in particular have been vociferous about their opposition, as in the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)
they have a political party that draws virtually all its strength from the East. The SLMC's first response to
the LTTE's proposals has been to say that they do not meet Muslim aspirations.
The Government's cautious response to the LTTE's proposals could also be due to its apprehensions about a
backlash against them from Sinhalese nationalists bolstered by opposition political parties. Pro-war Sinhalese
nationalists who call for the military subjugation of Tamil nationalism last week physically attacked leading
Sinhalese and Tamil cultural artistes who had gathered together for an inter-ethnic cultural festival in
Colombo. What this increasingly frustrated minority needs is the politically motivated backing by the major
opposition parties to run amok and riot on the streets, as has happened on past occasions when Governments
appeared to make concessions to Tamil demands for regional autonomy.
The unfortunate history of post-independence Sri Lankan politics is that opposition parties have repeatedly
seized upon Governmental concessions to Tamil parties as betrayals of the Sinhalese to mobilise popular
opposition to the Government. The last occasion for this unsavoury practice was in Parliament itself in August
2000, when many members of the present Government behaved like louts, hooted and burnt copies of the Draft
Constitution that President Chandrika Kumaratunga sought to present before Parliament. Today, alas, it is the
turn of President Kumaratunga and her party to get even with those who wield the reins of the Government.
There is much to commend in the LTTE's proposals, in particular their willingness to give weight to the
principles of good governance, representative democracy and accountability. They are the result of a great
deal of effort and provide a basis from which to engage in dialogue with other parties to the conflict, such
as the Government and the Muslims. The fact that the LTTE has invested so much time and effort in a political
endeavour is to be appreciated by those who seek a peaceful solution to the ethnic conflict.
For nearly six months the LTTE focused its attention on the production of its interim administration
proposals, holding a wide range of consultations with local and international experts in its capital of
Kilinochchi and also in numerous foreign countries, including France, Northern Ireland, Denmark, Norway and
Switzerland. The document they have produced is a concise exposition of Tamil thinking over which there is, of
course, the final authority of the LTTE. There is no doubt that the proposals are maximalist in spirit; but
they are an opening offer in negotiations in which there has got to be give and take.
With its proposals for an Interim Self Governing Authority the LTTE has given concrete form to its
expectations in a manner that is essentially compatible with peaceful coexistence in a united Sri Lanka. The
fact that the LTTE has recognised the right of the Sri Lankan Government to appoint members to the ISGA, and
has not challenged the right of the Sri Lankan security forces to be present in the North East, are specific
indicators of a preparedness to accept a united country.
Further, even with regard to the new regional institutions they have proposed, such as the police and
judiciary, there appears to be an openness to dialogue with the Government on how to set them up and on their
composition. It is unlikely that the Government will either have the ability or the intention to set up new
institutions that supersede the existing ones during an interim administrative period. New institutions that
require legal and constitutional change are more appropriate for the final political settlement.
It is noteworthy that, in the Sri Lankan Government's immediate response to the LTTE's proposal, the
Government's chief negotiator, Prof. G.L. Peiris, noted that the international community had strongly
supported the peace process and emphasised the principle of partnership. He also pointed out that the joint
statement issued in New Delhi at the end of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's visit to India earlier this
month had "made a definitive statement about the parameters within which a negotiated political solution
should be arrived at." The joint statement made mention of the fact that the two Governments expected the
LTTE to be reasonable and comprehensive in the proposals it made regarding the interim administration, and
stressed that its proposals should be linked to the final settlement.
The linkage of the interim administration to the final solution is important because it implies that there
will be a progression towards a federal and democratic system. At present, neither of these exists in the
North East. The interim administration that is permissible, and realistic to achieve, at this stage, will
necessarily have less powers and democracy in it than the final solution, which must see the full flowering of
democracy and sharing of power at all levels and for all communities.
Perhaps the Ceasefire Agreement signed in February 2002 between the two parties with Norwegian facilitation
can be a model in respect of creating new working arrangements during the period of the interim
administration. It is an agreement between the two sides that has enabled the LTTE to take on new roles and
work in Government-controlled territory without the need for constitutional changes. There is certainly a need
for an ISGA until the final political settlement is reached, but it will need to be compatible with a united
framework of governance.
Jehan Perera is Media Director, National Peace Council of Sri Lanka. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
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