How Not To Tackle Insurgency

India has long been one of the most vocal advocates of the position that terrorism, as a global threat,must be confronted with coherent and cooperative responses across the world, and has long faulted the US-led'global war on terror' for its selectivity and internal inconsistencies. Regrettably, the Indian Government'sown actions and positions on matters relating to terrorism and armed separatist insurrections within thecountry have remained highly ambivalent, even contradictory. 

New Delhi's ambivalence on the issue of tackling insurgencies in the country's Northeast have now beenbrought into sharp focus by Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Mukut Mithi, who contends that the VajpayeeGovernment has "ignored and rejected" his persistent pleas for central paramilitary forces to launcha special counter-insurgency operation to flush out and neutralize heavily-armed Naga militants wreaking havocin his state.

In a lengthy telephone conversation from Itanagar, the capital of the hill state of Arunachal Pradesh thatborders Myanmar and China's Tibet region, with this writer, Mithi disclosed that Naga rebels, particularly theIsak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-IM), have been indulging in rampantextortion, kidnappings and killings in the districts of Tirap and Changlang, and have generally created areign of terror. He put the number of NSCN-IM cadres operating in the two districts - strategically located atthe tri-junction of the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Nagaland, and, of course, Myanmar - at about500. Rebels owing allegiance to the rival NSCN faction headed by S.S. Khaplang are also present in thearea. 

The Chief Minister said it was because of the prevailing security situation in Tirap and Changlangdistricts, that his Government had to put off the panchayat (local body) elections in the area, which were tohave been held in April. An idea of how the rebels are terrorizing the people, including political leaders,Mithi observed, can be had from the fact that the NSCN-IM cadres had even kidnapped his (Congress) party'sTirap district vice-president.

It was under these circumstances that Mithi's Congress Government convened a meeting of the State SecurityCoordination Committee (SCC) at Itanagar in May and decided to launch 'Operation Hurricane', a specialoffensive by the security forces to combat the Naga rebels in Tirap and Changlang. Since the SCC is aCommittee notified by the Government of India two years ago, it is apparent that New Delhi was, and still is,aware of the fact that a serious insurgency situation was developing in otherwise peaceful Arunachal Pradesh,a state that has not been witness to a local militant movement so far. 

Mithi disclosed that, at that meeting in May, apart from the state Chief Secretary, who is the chairman ofthe Committee, and representatives of federal intelligence agencies, the Joint Secretary of the Ministry ofHome Affairs (Northeast), was also present. "Although the MHA official was himself present at thatmeeting, we intimated the Home Ministry of the decision to launch Operation Hurricane and sought threeparamilitary battalions for the purpose," the Chief Minister said. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Mithiadded, initially agreed in writing to send one battalion of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) for aperiod of 45 days to carry out the operation, but later went back on its promise. Speaking to this writer forthe second time in a week on Saturday, Mithi said Operation Hurricane eventually could not be launched"due to New Delhi's non-cooperation."

It is clear that the Union Government is not in favor of any military offensive against the Naga rebels at thepresent juncture, since there is a ceasefire agreement in place and the Government of India is engaged in'peace negotiations' with the NSCN-IM, and to an extent with the rival NSCN-K. New Delhi's reasons for notcoming to Mithi's aid were let out by the visiting Minister of state for Home, Swami Chinmayananda, when hequestioned the Arunachal Pradesh Government's urgency in pushing for Operation Hurricane at a time when the centerwas engaged in a dialogue with 'both factions of the NSCN.' The Minister made these remarks on Friday at aBharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-sponsored public rally at Khonsa, in the militant-infested Tirap district.

But a peace process can hardly be legitimate grounds to obstruct action to expel or contain the criminalactivities of the NSCN in Arunachal Pradesh, and the center's attitude raises several serious questions. Witha ceasefire deal in place with the NSCN-IM, the Vajpayee Government should have been able to prevail upon theNaga rebel group to stop its cadres from operating in Arunachal Pradesh, and to prevent them from indulging inviolent activities there. 

Apart from clearly exposing the fact that New Delhi does not, in fact, have much of an influence over therebels, it brings to the fore the ticklish issue of the ceasefire jurisdiction. Are the NSCN-IM cadressupposed to adhere to the ceasefire ground rules only in the state of Nagaland where the truce is actually inforce? But, again, if the ceasefire is not applicable anywhere else in the Northeast, outside Nagaland, thenhow can New Delhi ignore pleas or attempts by another state to launch counter-insurgency operations againstmembers of this rebel group who are engaged in a range of violent and criminal activities in that state? 

Answers may not be forthcoming from the Government, but by giving the Naga rebels a broader playing field,New Delhi could be indirectly conceding a measure of legitimacy to the NSCN-IM's dream of a 'Greater Nagaland'which would bring the Nagas populated areas in the entire region under a single political and administrativeumbrella.

The lack of a transparent policy on insurgency has created enormous scope for confusion over the issue of howsecurity forces, state Governments, political leaders, the media or even the common people are expected toconduct themselves in an insurgency situation. 

In Arunachal Pradesh, Chief Minister Mithi surprised everyone in April when he okayed the arrest of two ofhis ruling Congress legislators - Tongpong Wangham, a cabinet minister, and another legislator, T.L.Rajkumar -on charges that they had links with the NSCN-IM. They were booked under the state's new anti-crimelegislation, the Arunachal Pradesh Control of Organised Crime Act, 2002 (APCOCA), but were freed on bail.Mithi indicated that the duo had since been 'pardoned' by the Court, after they turned approvers in thecase. 

The Chief Minister insists that such problems or charges of a politician-insurgent nexus have come up inArunachal Pradesh only because New Delhi has 'permitted' the Naga rebels to operate freely in his state, andto threaten and intimidate one and all. Mithi takes this position to reject any need for a federalinvestigation into allegations regarding the militant-politician links in his state, declaring, "We areacting on this on our own under the provisions of APCOCA." With neither the center nor the state bound bya clear counter-insurgency posture and policy, the shadowy world of insurgent politics in India's Northeastcan only be expected to get murkier.

Wasbir Hussain is Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, TheSentinel, Guwahati. This article appears courtesy, South Asia Intelligence Review of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal.