In Isolation Ward Again

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva ended on June 28 with India refusing to budge from its decision not to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in its present form. This provoked severe condemnation from the West, which portrayed India as a stumbling-block to the successful completion of the test ban treaty. Despite being isolated, there was an across-the-board domestic consensus on India staying outside the treaty and keeping its nuclear options open. India is unlikely to change its stand when the CD reassembles on July 29.

ON March 21, 1996, Foreign Secretary Salman Haider told the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that India does not believe the "acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential for national security and we have followed a conscious decision in this regard". Exactly three months later, on June 20, India's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Arundhati Ghose, announced in the CD India's decision not to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for "national security considerations". "India cannot accept any restraint on its (nuclear) capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons," she stated.

Naturally, the clear contradiction between what Haider and Ghose said surprised many. It reflected a certain confusion in the Indian policy formulation at a time when the CTBT negotiations were coming to an end. Caught on the wrong foot, the Indian Government tried to argue that everybody had wrongly interpreted what was a general statement by Haider. Even Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral, who was in the Opposition when Haider made the remark in March, was forced to defend it. He told Outlook that when Haider said "nuclear weapons are not necessary for the world, he meant for everybody".

Any neutral observer would be sceptical of the explanation New Delhi is now offering. Many people believe Haider's was not a casual slip. They allege it was worked out along with A.N. Verma, then principal secretary to prime minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, to suit US designs. Verma is widely considered to be close to the Americans.

There's a school of thought that India should have long ago invoked its national security interests instead of talking in moral and normative terms when articulating its stand on nuclear issues. "The major advantage of the security argument is that there is no counter-argument to it. The Israeli case is there for all to see," says Savita Pande, fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The director of the same institute, Jasjit Singh, totally endorses the Indian line: "For the last 27 years our argument has been built on principles and morality. Nuclear disarmament is a moral issue since it involves international peace and security." Singh feels what India has now done is itself unusual because the West doesn't think it talks like that.

US officials in Delhi express surprise at India suddenly telling the world about its national security interests. "All these years India has talked of N-disarmament in a larger context," says one of them, observing that it was only a couple of months ago that India started changing tack. This is a naive interpretation because the security policies of a country are always based on its vital national interests, however these policies may be garbed. When the US defends the retention of its N-arsenals, it always speaks of its security interests first.

What did India mean when it said it could not sign the CTBT? Signing the CTBT, as India sees it, will close its nuclear option. India has always spoken of its nuclear capability in ambiguous terms. Says Brahma Chellaney, defence analyst at the Centre for Policy Research: "The CTBT is not about technology transfer or other issues. All it seeks to do is ban tests and India has made it very clear that it needs to retain the option to test.

 "But what is this option? And is India in a position to carry out tests? India has retained this option since it carried out its first and only nuclear test at Pokharan in 1974. Chellaney feels Pokharan isn't enough: "We must follow it through to its logical conclusion, which means testing because testing is essential for us to retain a credible option." It will be very stupid for India, he feels, to not sign the treaty and then not to test either. Pande also argues that if tests have to be conducted, it has to be done before the CTBT comes into force. Which, going by the present schedule, seems to give us a minimum of two years. Even if India stays out of the treaty, Pande argues that conducting tests after the treaty comes into force would be difficult since it would "violate codified international law". 

Former foreign secretary A.P. Venkateswaran too pushes for a test. "Unless we exercise it, it makes no sense to talk of an open option. By merely saying we haven't used the option is not going to convince people to abolish nuclear weapons," he says. A strong critic of India's decision not to sign the CTBT, Kanti Bajpai, associate professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, feels otherwise. He contends that a test would lead to India's isolation. "If we do so, we will be inviting major trouble since we will be then targeted by all the nuclear weapon states as well as Germany and Japan."

MOST analysts in India, who support India's distance from the CTBT, dismiss fears of isolation or sanctions. Says Venkateswaran: "We've decided to stand firm, we should stand firm. Sanctions are unlikely." Even US officials say sanctions are not possible. But yes, everyone is aware that sanctions may follow if India conducts a test. Singh agrees, but feels sanctions "can't be on a scale which will be a serious problem. India can live with it".

Singh says the popular perception is that India has been isolated in the world. "It's a psychological thing with us. In our society, for centuries, being ostracised has been considered the worst fate possible." It was clear by January-end that the type of treaty being drafted would leave India isolated. "But by May, India had been invited to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which came ahead of time," observes Singh. He refers to an article written by former US secretary of state Zbigniew Brzezenski in International Herald Tribune on June 26, six days after India's announcement, calling upon the G-7 to invite Russia, China, India and Brazil to join the group. "So what is the isolation you are talking about," he asks.

Venkateswaran goes further, arguing India needn't worry and should go ahead and declare its nuclear status: "A nation of 900 million can't tolerate that it's bound hand and foot by a weak, pusillanimous leadership". Chellaney's viewpoint is even more interesting. He says India will have to pay the cost of testing, "but we have been paying the cost of not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) anyway". Besides, India—as an N-power and a major regional power—can't be isolated forever. "So the cost we pay in terms of sanctions will be a short-term affair. A country with one-sixth of the world's population can't be ignored," argues Chellaney.

Indeed, India's June 20 announcement appears to have taken many by surprise. Little did anyone expect that India will announce its decision eight days before the CTBT negotiations were to end. This was odd. Anyone following the domestic debate and careful official leakages on the issue would have realised that no Indian government, especially not a weak one like Deve Gowda's, would have been in a position go along with the CTBT.

The reaction in Geneva was swift. The discussion at that time was centred around the vital issue of how the treaty would come into force. The British ambassador at the CD, Sir Michael Weston, in an uncharacteristically vicious attack savaged the Indian stand and said a "recalcitrant" India "wriggling on a hook" should not be  allowed to opt out of the CTBT. Ghose responded that India wouldn't be bullied into accepting a treaty that doesn't address its security concerns. Earlier, it was India's great friend, Russia, which had told the 61-member CD that it found New Delhi's stand "unacceptable" and that it did not favour letting India off. A similar statement emanated from Moscow, and a demarche was simultaneously issued to the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi.

The Indian worries about the CTBT revolve around the nuclear programmes of China and Pakistan and their close cooperation in this field. According to western reports, China has given atested weapon design to Pakistan. Early this year, the Chinese were accused of supplying ring magnets for Pakistan's nuclear programme. This was a clear violation of the NPT, but the sole superpower, the US—busy trying to apply a diplomatic dressing on the wounds inflicted on its ties with Beijing by trade and copyright issues—ignored it.

If India signs the CTBT, theoretically it will be unable to develop a nuclear deterrent to China because its programme will have been effectively capped and its N-installations will be open to intensive inspections. Both Singh and Chellaney stress that India should work on an "operationally reliable" weapon delivery system and therefore start testing the Agni missile. Adds Singh: "We must also develop a doctrine to explain why we require this nuclear capability. It is to defend ourselves against nuclear coercion politically and diplomatically and against actual use of nuclear weapons."

Those opposed to this line cite China's assurance that it won't be the first to use the nuclear option against any country. In fact, it's the US and other nuclear powers which refuse to give such an assurance. Had India agreed to sign the treaty, Bajpai feels it would have ensured that the N-programmes of both Pakistan and China were capped. "We would also be sending out signals that the disarmament agenda should move on and that there would be no chance for anyone to say that some recalcitrant states were still out there making it necessary for them to continue testing," he adds. Pakistan, interestingly also finds the treaty unequal and discriminatory, but is willing to sign it if India does so!

That India's demurral troubled enough countries became evident when the Americans and the Japanese des-patched some senior officials to India as soon as the negotiations in Geneva ended. They met a cross-section of people to see which way the wind may blow now on this issue.

What worried the Americans most was what an official here termed as the "unravelling process" of the consensus the moment India announced its decision. The UK, China, Russia and Pakistan—who were seemingly agreeable to signing the treaty—suddenly realised India could be used as a ploy to delay the whole process. Their own qualms came to the fore. The other American worry now, because of which they are willing to let India stay out, is that, if forced, India might veto the treaty. As Bajpai says: "the Americans, while reconciled to India not signing the treaty, now have a minimalist agenda—to see that India does not wreck the treaty by not agreeing to the consensus".

India is not opposed to a test ban treaty per se. It simply does not think the draft CTBT presented on June 28 by the Dutch chairman of the CD, Jaap Ramaker, fulfils what it set out to do. The negotiations began in January '94, when the CD adopted a mandate to negotiate a CTBT "which would contribute effectively to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security". The CD meets again in July-end to decide how to resolve the deadlock and when to open the treaty for signatures.

India's fundamental objections can be broadly categorised under four heads: the scope of the CTBT; the verification regime; the lack of linkage to time-bound nuclear disarmament; and the 'entry into force' clause. 

The scope of CTBT:
Ghose told the CD that the basic prohibitions in the draft CTBT which define the scope remain "very narrow and do not fulfil the mandated requirement of a comprehensive ban". The Ramaker text says every country which becomes a party to this treaty "undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control". India's objection, reiterated many times, is that the treaty bans only N-weapon test "explosions" or any other N-explosion. It wanted the word "explosion" dropped so that no N-test of any kind could be carried out. This would have brought under the ban's ambit non-explosive, subcritical or laboratory tests, including computer simulation. Hence, Ghose's statement to the CD that the draft CTBT IS only a "nuclear weapon test explosion ban treaty and not a comprehensive test ban treaty". The five N-powers—the US, UK, France, Russia and China—have repeatedly shot down India's demand for a time-bound disarmament clause. Said Ghose: "How can we escape the conclusion that the nuclear weapon states are determined to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security and visualise the CTBT not as a serious disarmament measure but merely as an instrument against horizontal proliferation?"

 Horizontal proliferation, the bugbear of the West, refers to the spread of N-arms to more countries whereas vertical proliferation means technological improvement of weapons with N-powers. By not banning non-explosive testing, Jasjit Singh says, the CTBT sets a framework for a new qualitative arms race. "That's why France con-ducted a series of tests, China continues to do so and the US has agreed to provide France with technological assistance to sustain better arsenals." The US has such an arrangement with the UK too and had offered simulation technology to China in '94.Says Pande: "India wanted a universally verifiable, comprehensive, non-discriminatory treaty, which the CTBT isn't." 


Linkage with time-bound N-disarmament: This has become an article of faith with the Indian establishment. India had tried to introduce various amendments to the treaty's preamble and other articles to get this included. However, right from the outset it was clear that none of the N-powers were going to commit themselves to this. In the world of realpolitik, no N-power wants to give up its weapons, which are not only a source of security but also a source of power. Says Michael Krepon of the Stimson Centre, Washington: "Nuclear weapons are like a drug they (the nuclear powers) have been taking for fifty years. It will be difficult for them to get off it easily".

US officials say it's impractical for India to expect the US or the other N-powers to give up their weapons. In fact, after the Cold War, the N-powers are developing new doctrines and targeting strategies for N-arms. "A doctrine has been developed that nuclear weapons are required as a precaution against future errant behaviour and threat from unspecified states," Ghose noted. An unambiguous rejection of the goal of N-disarmament was evident from the way France and China carried on testing while the CD was negotiating the CTBT. It's true that there was no legal bar on their tests. But France and China vindicated themselves, as Ghose noted, by saying the tests were "essential for national security and for permitting completion of work on new designs and gathering of data to enable computer simulation and modelling to preserve and refine capabilities into the distant future". In an earlier statement to the CD, India had said that while the Partial Test Ban Treaty of '63 drove nuclear testing underground from the atmosphere, outer space and underwater, the CTBT will drive nuclear testing into the laboratories.

The US, the UK and France are late converts to a comprehensive test ban. In '91, the US had said it did not support negotiations on the CTBT. It contended that further legal constraints on N-testing wouldn't demotivate states seeking to acquire N-arms or inhibit their ability to do so. Having conducted over 2,000 tests since 1945, the five N-powers have come around reluctantly to the CTBT because they don't need more tests. Still, France was testing till very recently and China has said it will conduct some more. They can't be prevented till the CTBT comes into force. Which is what India meant when it told the CD that "the CTBT we see emerging seems to be shaped more by the technological preference of the N-powers than the imperatives of nuclear disarmament". The five 'haves' possess differing N-technology levels. It's been argued that through the CTBT, the US is attempting a 'technological cap' on the Chinese N-programme. While shutting the door on the three threshold states—India, Pakistan and Israel—is one of the CTBT's main goals, the Chinese angle can't be ignored. The Japanese, ever wary of Chinese intentions, too are keenly pursuing a non-proliferation and disarmament agenda.

The verification regime: This is one of the most contentious aspects. The treaty sets forth an elaborate system of verifying that the signatories don't renege on their commitments. A highly technical matter, the regime involves an international monitoring system, consultation and clarification, confidence-building measures and on-site inspections. The last is the most contentious one. It had, says Pande, "emerged as a battleground for fundamentally differing political approaches. India feels on-site inspections would be the most intrusive part of the regime". China, Russia, the UK and Pakistan concur. The first two, specially, have serious reservations about the way on-site inspections can be sought, through the use of 'national technical means'—that is, technical expertise available to a country. They both fear the US will use on-site inspections to spy around their N-sites and get vital information. Neither has as advanced techniques of verification as the US. India, having distanced itself from the treaty, as a corollary withdrew the offer of allowing its technical means to be used as part of the global monitoring system.

Entry into force: The latest sticking point is the 'entry into force' clause—which determines how the CTBT comes into effect. The Ramaker text makes it incumbent on the five N-powers and the three threshold states to sign and ratify the treaty (through their legislatures) for it to come into effect. Rejecting this line, Ghose told the CD it is India's sovereign right to decide "in the light of our supreme national interest, whether we should or should not accede tosuch a treaty". Signals from Washington are that the US may still be flexible on allowing India (and, consequently, Pakistan) to stay out, if only because it will let the treaty go through unhindered.