Navnita Chadha-Behera

Thank you. I was going to address the three or four main questions, trying togive at least an Indian perspective and in my personal opinion, what I understand to be Indian perspective.

One is that we do see a dramatic change in the Indian position. India has traditionally been very rigidlyalmost opposed to any role players, national players, or intervention in any bilateral issues, Kashmir beingone in that. For the last few years we have seen, and culminating so often described as the whole assumptionbeing sort of turned around.

We've kind of not only accepted but sometimes even welcomed the role played by outside players. Andespecially U.S. I think plays a very critical role in there because of what Steve earlier mentioned. There isan emerging strategic partnership between India and U.S. on a larger sort of horizon [inaudible], and that's,how does it process into partition, framework is what we need to understand.

One quick point I want to say is that India's policy of denying a role for international affairs was rootedin '50s. 1950s we had a bit of experience in United Nations, but this is 2002. Fifty years have passed. It's awhole different world that we are facing today. It's post Cold War, post September 11th, it's a differentworld.

The fact that international players and U.S. will play a role is a given. The point Indian diplomacy isgrappling with this, how do you use the role to your advantage. I think that is two lessons we have learnedfrom the Kargil crisis and from the current crisis.

In the Kargil crisis, U.S. as Steve put it, tilted toward India. The U.S. publicly held Pakistan as theaggressor and almost forced the Pakistani forces, the intruders to go back across the Line of Control. And inthe current diplomacy also I think India has made substantial political gains because about two months back itwas only India that was arguing that cross-border terrorism in Kashmir is the nub of the problem in SouthAsia, but in last three weeks we have seen this argument being made by Washington, by Tokyo, by Paris, byLondon, by Europe. It's a resonating voice across the world capitols which has come around to accept theIndian viewpoint that yes, cross-border terrorism has to be taken if you want to avoid a larger crisis in theregion.

So I think my answer to the main question that a lot of people ask is why didn't India go to the war?Because war was an option, but not a first option. If India can achieve its political goals, what was apolitical goal? This meant [inaudible] infrastructure that has been bleeding India. If India can achieve itslarger political goal through diplomatic means why go to a war?

The idea was to convey a message to the international community and Pakistan. We achieve this. If we do notachieve it politically, we will go to the war but it's not our first option. I think that's the point we haveto understand.

The flip side is I think after this crisis India cannot revert back to my mind to a pre-1989 position.India cannot sort of sever the diplomatic means and say that put Kashmir on the back burner. That might nothappen any more. You will still have to deal with Kashmir.

I think here too, it depends on how you make the international community turn around you. In Kargil wegained sanctity of Line of Control against territorial aggression. In the current crisis we gain sanctity ofLine of Control against terrorist attacks. And as Steve says, who knows? The permanent solution to Kashmirproblem might also lie around Line of Control. We might just be moving in that direction. I think the[inaudible] diplomacy is to sort of take this opportunity, take this challenge into an opportunity and in factsort of take the bull by its horns and negotiate a final resolution of Kashmir dispute and sort of put itbehind you.

The second I wanted to address was the nuclear question. There is a whole defense parameters of the nuclearquestion in South Asia. We're not talking about nuclear proliferation anymore. We are talking about the realthreat of use of nuclear weapons. I think that's what brought U.S. into the equation because this time theysaw that there was a real threat of nuclear weapons being used in the region.

Again, from an Indian point of view I think what's happened is the nuclear bluff, as we call it, forPakistan has been called. So far the policy was that we would use a policy of [inaudible] leading India. Ifyou threaten us with a conventional deterrence we will nuke you because we will use nuclear weapons as a firstkind of strike. That policy has been turned around on its head because of two factors. Two things that havechanged in the current crisis.

One, I think India turned around and said there is a face of a limited war between proxy war and betweennuclear war, conventional space, and we will use that space unless you stop cross-border terrorism.

And second thing was there was an unstated assumption that we are willing to bear the risk of a nuclear warbut we will not tolerate cross-border terrorism any more. But what really has changed is the internationalcommunity has turned around and said we are not willing to bear the risk of a nuclear war and see thesituation where [inaudible] says that we understand Pakistan's policy of first strike but we can't tolerateit.

Nobody wants to see a nuclear war and I think that's where the United States stakes are also very high. Youdon't want to see a nuclear war no matter what the reason is, no matter who the protagonists are. The worlddoesn't want to see a nuclear war and that's where I think the [inaudible] statement by Mr. [Munir Akrom] andthe pressure was so much that President Musharraf had to put the fears at rest by saying that it would beinsane to talk about the use of nuclear weapons and nobody is reaching that threshold in South Asia.

And the third question is the war on terrorism, where does the war on terrorism go. Again, I think there isa convergence of interests between India and U.S. on the war of terrorism also. The goals were always similar.Both India and United States post September 11th wanted to see if this [inaudible] off the terrorist networkin the region. The differences made in approaches and in metrics of achieving this objective. The UnitedStates felt it was al Qaeda first, Afghanistan, India third, it should not stop there and the real [base lies]in Pakistan, the terrorist networks which are targeting India in Kashmir. The difference I think essentiallywas in methods and in approaches, not in terms of goals, and that difference, also to my mind, is being[inaudible] now because there is a realization on both sides.

In India there is a realization that you need to cooperate with the United States because your larger goalsare the same. And in the United States there is a realization to my mind that you cannot vanquish al Qaeda, inmy mind, until you also take out the supporting structure of al Qaeda. After all, out of 22 leaders of alQaeda, Pentagon has only got two so far. Twenty of them are still at large, including Osama bin Laden. Soobviously they are getting logistical support somewhere, and you have to address that logistical support alsoto be able to sort of eliminate the threat of al Qaeda in the region and that's where I see the convergence ofinterest happening between India and the United States.

Why would the U.S. continue to play a role, and if U.S. would move back, briefly responding to Steve'squestion, I think there should be a realization here in Washington that so far the U.S. policy of pure crisismanagement hasn't worked.

In 1990 you went in to solve the crisis, came out; 1999, you went in to solve the crisis, came out; same inDecember 2001. It's not working. It's like firefighting operations. A, it's not working because the situationkeeps reoccurring. And B, what is more dangerous is the gap between these crises is sharply narrowing. Between1990 and 1999 we had nine years. Between December 2001 and May 2002 you had five months. So the gap betweenthe reoccurring crises is very very sharply narrowing. That's why I think the U.S. has to come to aconclusion, to my mind, that you have to embark upon a sustained engagement with region, addressing all thekey players and the issue at hand. I'll stop there.

James Steinberg: Let me ask you a quick question before we move on.

If in fact because of India's threat the Kashmir militant card has been taken out of the Pakistani handsand the nuclear bluff has been called, what incentive does India now have to negotiate?

Navnita Chadha-Behera:  India does have to negotiate because we do have a real problem in Kashmir. Kashmiris areunhappy with you, there is no doubt about that. I have never been in doubt that initially when the movementstarted it was an indigenous movement. It's changed in its character. It's turned into terrorist movement. Andyou do have to resolve the political aspirations of your people in Kashmir. That to my mind is the prime[reach of India and its homework] and unless Pakistan is brought, involved in the final resolution, ten yearsdown the line you might again see this problem and India needs to put this problem behind it once and for all.That's why I think India does still have to primarily address its own people in Kashmir and be also involvedPakistan in the negotiating process so it's a fine resolution, and just put it behind you. That's why.

James Steinberg: Brigadier Khan?