Iran was enriching uranium to 60% before US-Israeli strikes damaged its nuclear facilities.
More than 200 kg of 60%-enriched uranium may remain, but Iran’s current enrichment capacity is unclear.
JD Vance says Tehran must make a meaningful reduction in enrichment capacity to end the war.
US Vice President JD Vance has said Iran must make a “meaningful” reduction in its uranium enrichment capacity for Washington to accept a deal to end the countries’ seven-month war. The demand comes as the Trump administration seeks to push Iran towards denuclearisation through slow-moving negotiations.
At the centre of the dispute is Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, what remains of its nuclear infrastructure after US and Israeli strikes, and whether Tehran still has the ability to produce weapons-grade uranium.
What Did Iran Have Before The US-Israel Strikes?
Israel began airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 13 last year, with the United States joining the campaign soon after. Over 12 days, the strikes destroyed or severely damaged Iran’s three known operating uranium-enrichment facilities.
The strikes were based on concerns that Iran was getting close to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said it had no credible indication of a coordinated nuclear weapons programme.
Iran was nevertheless enriching uranium to up to 60% purity — well above the level generally needed for civilian nuclear energy and relatively close to the roughly 90% level considered weapons-grade.
The IAEA estimated that Iran had 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to up to 60% when the attacks began. Under an IAEA yardstick, that amount would be enough, if enriched further, for about 10 nuclear weapons.
Iran also held stocks enriched to lower levels. No other country has enriched uranium to such a high level without producing nuclear weapons. Iran has consistently maintained that it does not want or seek nuclear weapons.
What Remains Of Iran’s Nuclear Programme?
Iran has not told the IAEA how much of its enriched uranium survived the strikes or where the material is located. It has also not allowed IAEA inspectors to return to the sites that were bombed.
Of the three enrichment facilities, the above-ground plant at Natanz was destroyed, according to the IAEA. The other two facilities — one at Natanz and the Fordow site — were badly damaged and are widely believed to be out of operation.
Just before Israel’s attack, Iran informed the IAEA that it was opening a new enrichment plant at Isfahan. Diplomats say the facility is part of a tunnel network that appears to have largely survived the US bombing. However, the IAEA does not know the plant’s current status or whether it contains nuclear material.
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi said in March that the agency believed “a bit more than 200 kg” of Iran’s uranium enriched to up to 60% remained in the Isfahan tunnel complex, with some material also still at Natanz.
Is Iran Still Enriching Uranium?
There is currently no indication, including from Israel, that Iran is actively enriching uranium.
The bigger question is how quickly Tehran could restart enrichment. As long as a significant amount of its 60%-enriched stock remains, Iran could theoretically enrich it further to weapons-grade levels without needing a large number of centrifuges.
However, the current number and location of Iran’s centrifuges are unknown.
Under the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and major powers, the IAEA received additional inspection powers, including oversight of Iran’s centrifuges and their components. But US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018, contributing to its collapse and leaving the IAEA without a clear picture of Iran’s centrifuge inventory.
What Exactly Is Vance Demanding?
Vance has argued that Iran cannot convincingly claim it does not want nuclear weapons while maintaining the ability to enrich uranium to 60%.
“If you don't want a nuclear weapon, then why do you need 60% enriched fuel?” Vance told Reuters.
He said Washington was looking for an actual reduction in Iran’s enrichment capacity rather than assurances that Tehran might reduce its nuclear capabilities in the future.
For Vance, a “meaningful” reduction would demonstrate Iran’s commitment to not developing a nuclear weapon and would be a condition for reaching an agreement to end the war.
How Could Iran Reduce Its Enrichment Capacity?
Because Iran is not currently known to be enriching uranium, any reduction would likely be measured against the capacity it had before the attacks.
That reduction could take several forms. Iran could reduce the purity of the uranium it is permitted to enrich, lower the amount it produces, reduce the number of centrifuges it operates or limit the number of sites where enrichment can take place.
The central issue for Washington is therefore not simply whether Iran is enriching uranium today, but how much of the infrastructure and material needed to restart enrichment remains available to Tehran.
Iranian officials, however, have indicated that Washington’s “requests and ideas” about the nuclear programme are at odds with Tehran’s demands, leaving the issue unresolved as negotiations continue.
(With inputs from Reuters)
