An investigation examined 40 attacks by the Houthis and Iraqi militias between July 1 and October 19, identifying repeated Russian reconnaissance satellite activity over locations subsequently targeted
Saudi officials, a senior Houthi figure and intelligence analysts said that Iran-backed groups had benefited from Russian intelligence, potentially transmitted through Iranian intermediaries
The investigation identified patterns of satellite surveillance but questions remained on how intelligence was transferred or prove that Moscow supplied targeting information for individual attacks
An investigation into missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia has raised questions about whether Russia’s satellite surveillance capabilities are helping Iran-backed groups identify targets across the kingdom.
An AP investigation examined 40 attacks by Yemen’s Houthis and Iraqi militias between July 1 and October 19. Researchers at Geneva-based AURORAH Geosignal Intelligence identified 72 Russian reconnaissance satellites among more than 11,000 spacecraft tracked in their analysis. They found repeated Russian satellite activity over locations subsequently targeted by the groups.
AURORAH reported a 100% correlation between satellite activity and the attacks examined, including increased activity around September strikes on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and King Fahd Air Base in Taif. The findings suggest that satellite-derived information could have helped the groups monitor military and energy infrastructure.
What Do The Russian Satellite Findings Reveal?
Several Russian satellite systems were identified, including Bars-M military mapping satellites, Persona optical reconnaissance satellites, Lotos-S1 electronic intelligence satellites and Kondor-FKA radar-imaging satellites.
These systems have different capabilities. Optical and radar satellites can monitor installations and changes to infrastructure, while electronic intelligence systems collect information from electromagnetic signals. Together, they can provide a picture of strategically important locations and activity around them.
Saudi Foreign Ministry deputy minister for public diplomacy Rayed Krimly said that Iran and the Houthis receive intelligence from elements in Russia and China, including commercial entities. He said Riyadh regularly discusses these concerns with Moscow and Beijing.
Is Iran Acting As An Intermediary?
There are several possible routes for such information. Moscow could share intelligence with Tehran, which could pass it to allied groups. Iranian organisations could also obtain imagery or related services through commercial providers, or use technical and intelligence intermediaries.
There is separate evidence of Houthi procurement involving Russian-origin goods. In March and April 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned Houthi-linked networks that it said had negotiated Russian weapons purchases and procured commodities, including weapons and sensitive goods, for shipment to Yemen. These designations document alleged procurement activity; they do not prove that the Russian government supplied satellite intelligence.
This points to a wider Russia-Iran-Houthi relationship worth examining, but direct Russian transfers of targeting information remain unproven.
How Did The Houthis Build Their Military Arsenal?
The Houthi arsenal developed through access to Yemen's military stocks, Iranian assistance, external training, local manufacturing and international procurement.
Iranian support subsequently became an important part of the group's weapons development. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen's October 2024 report identified ballistic and cruise missiles, anti-ship weapons, drones, surface-to-air missiles and other advanced systems in the Houthi arsenal. It assessed that the group lacked the independent capacity to develop and manufacture many of these complex systems without external support, and documented similarities with weapons manufactured or operated by Iran and other groups aligned with Tehran.
The panel also reported that Houthi combatants had received training at Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps facilities, Hezbollah training grounds in Lebanon and through members of Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces.
The group has also developed local production capabilities. UNODC has documented the import of engines, electronic components, servo actuators and chemicals used in weapons production. Missile systems can be transported in separate components and assembled inside Yemen.
The UN Panel's 2025 report, the latest full public report identified in the source pack, documents continuing procurement and diversified supply chains. In July 2025, US Central Command announced the seizure of more than 750 tonnes of Iranian weapons and military equipment intended for the Houthis, including missiles, drone engines, radar systems and communications equipment.
The group's capabilities are thus the result of several sources of support and adaptation, rather than a single stream of weapons supplied by Iran.
Which Saudi Targets Have Been Attacked?
The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi airports, military installations and energy infrastructure. But attacks by other Iran-aligned groups must be distinguished from Houthi operations.
In May 2019, armed drones struck pumping stations on the East-West Pipeline. Saudi Aramco confirmed damage at one station and a temporary shutdown as a precaution. The Houthis claimed responsibility, although Aramco's statement did not independently identify the attackers.
In September that year, attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities temporarily interrupted an estimated 5.7 million barrels per day of Saudi crude supplies, according to the Saudi energy minister. The Houthis claimed responsibility, but Saudi-led coalition officials disputed that the attack originated in Yemen.
Subsequent attacks included a 2021 drone strike at Abha airport, in which debris injured eight workers and damaged an aircraft, and missile and drone attacks against several Saudi locations in March 2022.
The latest escalation has affected civilian aviation and energy infrastructure. A UN Security Council statement condemned Houthi attacks on October 10 and 11 affecting King Khalid International Airport, other airports and Saudi Aramco facilities. It recorded 13 deaths and more than 300 injuries.
Two more recent pipeline incidents require careful attribution. On September 10, 2026, drones struck three East-West Pipeline pumping stations. Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council officials said the drones originated in Iraq, not Yemen. The Houthis separately claimed on Monday to have attacked the pipeline and Riyadh airport, but Saudi Arabia had not immediately confirmed successful strikes.
Saudi authorities reported intercepting ballistic missiles over Riyadh on Thursday, a cruise missile over western Saudi Arabia and drones in the Makkah, Riyadh and Eastern regions on Friday and Saturday. These reports confirm interceptions, not successful strikes on the targets claimed by the Houthis on Monday.
Why Has Saudi Arabia Struggled To Stop The Attacks?
Saudi Arabia is a major arms importer, with the US accounting for 77% of its major arms imports in 2021–25, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. In January 2026, the US approved a possible sale of 730 Patriot PAC-3 interceptors to the kingdom, estimated at about $9 billion. Approval of the sale does not mean all the missiles have been delivered.
The challenge is the variety of weapons used against Saudi targets. Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles differ in speed, altitude, flight path and radar signature, requiring different detection and interception capabilities.
A 2020 Centre for Strategic and International Studies study of the Yemen missile conflict identified several difficulties: small drones can be hard to distinguish from radar clutter, low-altitude flight paths can challenge radar coverage, and attacks from multiple directions complicate interception. Simultaneous launches can also force operators to prioritise threats.
There is an economic imbalance as well. Interceptors are expensive, while drones and some other weapons can be produced or acquired at relatively low cost. Protecting airports, military bases, energy facilities and long-distance infrastructure across a large country requires extensive surveillance and air-defence coverage.
Saudi Arabia has intercepted numerous incoming missiles and drones, including those reported in the final days of October. The problem is not that its systems are ineffective, but that no air-defence network can guarantee protection of every target against every combination of weapons.
Why Is The East-West Pipeline Important To Oil Markets?
The East-West Pipeline, also known as Petroline, runs approximately 1,200 km from Abqaiq in eastern Saudi Arabia to Yanbu on the Red Sea. It allows the kingdom to move crude to export terminals without sending tankers through the Strait of Hormuz.
The International Energy Agency puts the pipeline's design capacity at 5 million barrels per day. Aramco increased this to 7 million barrels per day in March 2025, although the IEA has said sustained operation at the higher level has not been fully tested.
The route is particularly important during disruptions to Hormuz. Around 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and oil products passed through the strait in 2025, accounting for approximately a quarter of global seaborne oil trade, according to the IEA. The Saudi pipeline and the UAE's pipeline to Fujairah are among the main alternatives for moving crude without using the strait.
Damage to pumping stations can interrupt oil flows even if the pipeline itself is not destroyed along its entire length. The IEA reported in October 2026 that attacks on the East-West Pipeline in early September had resulted in its shutdown and further curtailed alternative export flows through the Red Sea. It also noted that Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping had affected oil movements through Saudi and UAE bypass routes.
The September pipeline attack was attributed by Saudi and GCC officials to drones originating in Iraq. The Houthis' claim remained unconfirmed by Saudi authorities. The broader concern is the possibility of simultaneous disruption to Hormuz, Red Sea shipping and Saudi export infrastructure.
What Could The Russia-Iran-Houthi Connection Mean For Regional Security?
If Russian satellite-derived information is reaching Iran-backed groups through Iranian advisers or other intermediaries, it could improve their ability to monitor installations, identify targets and assess damage. Combined with Iranian weapons technology, local production and international procurement networks, such information could make attacks more precise and difficult to anticipate.
The risks extend beyond Saudi Arabia. Houthi threats to shipping in the Red Sea and around Bab el-Mandeb affect a route connecting the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal.
The satellite investigation adds a potential intelligence dimension to the Houthis' expanding capabilities. But the extent of Russian state involvement in individual attacks remains uncertain. The available evidence points to repeated satellite activity before strikes and reports of Iranian intermediaries, not a verified record of Moscow supplying target coordinates.
The better-documented picture is that the Houthis have developed their military capabilities through captured Yemeni equipment, external assistance, local manufacturing and international procurement. Whether Russian surveillance is now being incorporated into that network remains the central unanswered question.
