BRICS now accounts for nearly 40% of global GDP but intra-group trade remains limited.
China anchors BRICS trade, while deeper investment, business and institutional links remain a major challenge.
At 20, BRICS has strengthened Global South representation without fundamentally replacing the Western-led economic order.
Twenty years after the BRIC grouping took shape, BRICS is one of the clearest signs of a changing global economy. What began as a Goldman Sachs acronym for Brazil, Russia, India and China has grown into a wider grouping with economic and geopolitical heft.
Its role has widened too — from an informal conversation among emerging powers to a platform that addresses trade, finance, development, technology, supply chains and global governance.
Its scale is already hard to ignore. BRICS economies accounted for almost 40% of global GDP on a purchasing power parity basis in 2024, according to IMF data, against about 29% for the G7.
That gives the bloc weight in the global economy even if it has not yet built the kind of deep internal integration seen in older groupings.
The most significant transformation associated with BRICS is therefore not necessarily the creation of an alternative financial system, but the changing geography of global production and trade.
Trade inside the bloc has surged. UN Trade and Development estimates that trade among BRICS members rose more than 13-fold from $84 billion in 2003 to around $1.17 trillion in 2024. Even so, intra-BRICS trade still accounts for only around 5% of global trade.
The bloc's export rise has been sharper still. UNCTAD estimates that BRICS members' global merchandise exports climbed from nearly $1 trillion in 2003 to around $6 trillion in 2024. Their share of global exports doubled from about 12% to 24% over the same period.
The grouping gradually acquired institutional form. South Africa joined in 2010, followed by Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The expansion reflected the shifting economic centre of gravity, as emerging economies became increasingly important contributors to global growth, trade, manufacturing, commodities and investment.
Trade And Production
China sits at the centre of this trade network. A 2026 UNCTAD study found that China is the largest exporter and importer within intra-BRICS trade, while several other members remain heavily dependent on BRICS markets for both exports and imports. Seven members also rely heavily on primary products for exports to other BRICS economies.
That concentration shapes how the bloc works. Prof Manoj Pant, economist, visiting faculty at Shiv Nadar University and former vice chancellor of the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, made that point directly. “China is central to the world trade,” Pant told ANI.
Size alone is not integration. For Pant, the rise in intra-BRICS trade is real, but it does not by itself show the emergence of a deeply integrated economic bloc. Much of that trade still flows through China’s place at the centre of global supply chains.
Pant draws a sharper test from investment. In his view, investment shows whether companies really see another member economy as part of a long-term economic ecosystem, not simply as a market or a trading route. On that count, BRICS still falls short of being a tightly linked internal market.
Institutional Integration Limits
The institutional gaps are part of the problem. The absence of deeper institutional, telecommunications and business links - especially among smaller industries has limited the growth of a truly integrated BRICS market. “There are no institutional links among small-scale industries of BRICS countries,” he told ANI.
That helps explain the contrast within BRICS. The bloc has amassed economic weight and trade volume, but it still lacks the dense web of everyday business links that usually support stronger integration.
BRICS' most concrete contribution to the global economic architecture has arguably been the creation of the New Development Bank. Established in 2014, the NDB created a development financing institution outside the traditional Bretton Woods framework, with founding membership centred on the original BRICS economies. It has since expanded membership and placed greater focus on infrastructure, sustainable development and local-currency financing.
Dollar And India
The dollar debate has also moved to the foreground. It has become one of the most visible political themes around BRICS as members discuss alternatives to a system centred on the US currency. Use of sanctions, financial restrictions and the dollar-based financial system as instruments of geopolitical pressure has strengthened the case for countries to seek alternatives.
India's line has stayed more measured. New Delhi has consistently backed greater representation for emerging economies in global institutions while keeping close links with Western markets, investment and technology. During India's 2026 BRICS chairship, that approach has centred on practical economic cooperation rather than direct confrontation with the existing system.
That was visible in Jaipur. At the 16th BRICS Trade Ministers' Meeting, India pushed for a WTO-centred multilateral trading system, resilient and diversified global value chains, MSME internationalisation, trade finance and greater cooperation in digitally delivered services. The meeting also advanced the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2030, covering trade, investment, services, the digital economy, innovation, financial cooperation and sustainable development.
Political Weight And Order
The grouping's most consequential contribution may ultimately be political rather than economic. BRICS has helped turn the demand for greater Global South representation into an organised institutional agenda. For India, early participation also aligned with its long engagement with the Global South and its interest in playing a leadership role among developing countries.
That agenda was clear in the 2025 Rio Declaration. It called for reforms to the governance structures of the Bretton Woods institutions to reflect the increased weight of emerging-market and developing economies. It also called for greater voice and representation for developing countries in the IMF and World Bank while reaffirming support for a WTO-centred multilateral trading system.
BRICS has not replaced the Western-led global economic order. It has, however, made that order less exclusively Western. Its economic weight is already large enough to influence global trade and investment patterns, while its institutions are beginning to provide alternatives at the margins.
The unfinished task is converting that collective weight into deeper economic integration.
At 20, BRICS has therefore changed the global economic conversation faster than it has changed the global economic architecture. The next twenty years will determine whether it remains a powerful platform for a multipolar world or develops into the integrated economic force that its numbers increasingly suggest it could become.
(with agency inputs)
