India’s widening stealth-fighter gap is as much a consequence of delayed decisions as well as import dependence as it is of China’s technological progress. Closing it will require improvements in combat capability now, alongside an indigenous aircraft programme protected from the administrative drift that has repeatedly held back Indian defence development.
China has had a head start since inducting the J-20 in 2017 and has continued expanding its stealth-fighter capabilities. India is still awaiting the first prototype of its advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA), with service entry expected around 2035—leaving a substantial gap between its requirements and available aircraft.
Pakistan could complicate that picture through its proposed acquisition of Chinese J-35 fighters, although an offer is not a delivery, and neither guarantees combat readiness. Even so, Islamabad’s June 2025 announcement of an offer covering 40 aircraft gives India reason to prepare for stealth threats on both its northern and western fronts.
Bangladesh requires a more measured assessment because its documented negotiations concern China’s Chengdu J-10CE fighters, which are not fifth-generation aircraft. Any future interest in stealth aircraft deserves attention, but available evidence does not justify describing Dhaka as an established stealth competitor or an inevitable adversary.
The challenge also goes beyond how easily a fighter appears on the radar and how effectively it gathers information and shares it with other platforms. Sensors, electronic-warfare systems, weapons and communications must work together, allowing a fifth-generation aircraft to strengthen the wider force rather than operate in isolation.
Why Control Over Technology Matters
That interconnectedness makes ownership and control of technology a security concern, not simply an industrial ambition. A country must understand what information its aircraft collects, how that information moves through military networks and who can modify the systems handling it.
“Network-centric warfare makes it imperative that a country, particularly one of India’s size and economic strength, exercises complete control over the technologies, systems, subsystems and software integrated into its combat aircraft,” says Ravi Kumar Gupta, a former scientist at the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). His argument shifts attention from specifications and price tags to the freedom to operate and improve an aircraft independently.
“When we purchase foreign platforms and attempt to integrate them into our systems, we risk creating vulnerabilities not only within the aircraft themselves but also across our entire defence network,” says Gupta. “There is no substitute for indigenous development.”
This does not make every imported platform suspect, but it establishes a demanding standard for procurement. India needs the engineering knowledge and contractual authority to scrutinise interfaces, protect sensitive data, update mission systems and integrate weapons without repeatedly seeking another government’s permission.
India must improve the availability of existing fighters and accelerate the domestic programmes to sustain the IAF over the coming decades.
The importance of AMCA makes the delays surrounding it harder to defend, particularly when measured against earlier expectations. In December 2019, the Aeronautical Development Agency envisaged a first flight in 2024–25 and series production from 2028–29, yet development approval arrived only on March 7, 2024.
Describing this as an “acceptance of necessity” granted exactly five years late would conflate separate decisions, although the broader criticism of lost years remains valid. Parliament was informed on March 14, 2022, that the approval process had begun; development sanction followed in March 2024 and approval of the execution model on May 27, 2025.
The request for proposals came in May this year, which added another stage between political approval and industrial execution. Each step may have its procedural justification, but the cumulative delay matters more to the Indian Air Force (IAF) than the explanation for any individual file.
“Who is responsible for the years lost in granting the necessary approvals?” asks Gupta. “And who is accountable for the delays in awarding development and production contracts?”
These questions reach beyond the manufacturer to the institutions approving projects, releasing funds and placing orders. Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) must answer for the shortcomings within its control, but it cannot reasonably bear responsibility for every failure across the acquisition system. “It is not enough to blame HAL or any other individual organisation,” says Gupta. “We must examine the system as a whole and ask who is responsible for its functioning.”
The Engine Problem Runs Deeper
Propulsion shows how quickly dependence on a critical imported component can disrupt an otherwise domestic programme. The Tejas-Mk1A experience is a reminder that factories, trained workers and aircraft orders cannot compensate for engines that fail to arrive on schedule.
The initial AMCA is planned around General Electric’s F414, while later variants require a more powerful engine developed through an international partnership. France’s Safran has proposed collaboration with the Gas Turbine Research Establishment, while Rolls-Royce and Reliance Industries announced their intent to offer a combat-engine partnership on August 14.
The value of either arrangement will depend on what India actually acquires: design knowledge, manufacturing processes, testing expertise and independent modification rights. Building components under licence can strengthen industry, but it does not automatically create the ability to design and improve an engine. “Developing a fighter engine requires specialised facilities for flight testing, high-altitude testing and other demanding validation procedures,” explains Gupta. “It also requires advanced manufacturing infrastructure, including large forging presses.”
India should secure engine supplies for the initial AMCA while funding the higher-thrust programme against separate, coordinated milestones. Making the first operational aircraft wait for an entirely new indigenous engine would expose both programmes to additional delays.
Other technical challenges remain formidable, including maintaining low observability through aircraft shaping, materials, embedded sensors, engine signatures and internal-weapons carriage. Sensor fusion, electronic warfare and weapons integration must work reliably under operational conditions, with maintenance requirements considered from the beginning.
Where the Su-57 Fits
India’s immediate choices are narrower than the international fighter market might suggest. Chinese aircraft are not a credible procurement option given the strained relationship, while the American F-35 remains an uncertain possibility rather than an assured route to capability.
On October 10, the former chief of the IAF, Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh, said Washington had made no formal F-35 offer. A future sale, acceptable conditions and meaningful technology access, therefore, cannot be assumed, particularly when India seeks control over software, weapons integration and operational decisions.
India also lacks an established F-35 manufacturing ecosystem, making domestic production a separate undertaking requiring American agreement and substantial investment. Planning around a comprehensive technology transfer that Washington has not offered would be an insecure basis to address an urgent requirement.
Against that background, the Su-57 is arguably the most practical foreign option for serious consideration. Russia’s offer of local production and full technology transfer gives the proposal an industrial dimension beyond the purchase of finished aircraft. Air Marshal Anil Chopra, a former IAF officer and former director general of the defence think tank Centre for Air Power Studies, favours an interim acquisition. His recommendation is direct: “Procure 40 Su-57.”
India’s manufacture of 222 Su-30MKIs under licence provides a substantial base for facilities, trained personnel and experience with Russian aircraft. HAL’s aircraft operations in Nashik and engine capabilities in Koraput offer a stronger starting point than establishing an unfamiliar production system from scratch.
However, that foundation does not mean a Su-57 production line is already available. Aircraft-specific tooling, low-observable manufacturing processes, testing facilities and training would still be needed and their cost and schedule must form a part of the assessment.
Chopra’s proposal deserves examination against delivery dates, operational performance, serviceability and lifetime expenditure, with technology-transfer promises converted into enforceable commitments. An interim fleet would justify itself only if it arrived substantially before AMCA and strengthened the IAF’s capability without absorbing the resources needed for indigenous development.
Accelerating the Indigenous Alternative
The answer to the capability gap cannot rest on one imported aircraft, however attractive its terms may appear. India must simultaneously improve the availability of existing fighters and accelerate the domestic programmes expected to sustain the IAF over the coming decades.
Chopra’s recommendation links those immediate and long-term requirements rather than treating them as competing choices. “Accelerate LCA-Mk1A and Mk2 and AMCA development and production,” he says.
That means addressing supply constraints, stabilising requirements and giving programme leaders the authority to coordinate designers, manufacturers, suppliers and the IAF. Funding should support prototypes, testing facilities and manufacturing preparation concurrently wherever technically sound, instead of requiring every activity to await another administrative clearance.
“If we repeatedly delay indigenous projects and then turn to imports, we risk creating a cycle in which domestic programmes remain underfunded, production capabilities weaken and foreign purchases become the default choice,” warns Gupta. Protecting AMCA’s funding and prospective production orders is, therefore, essential before committing to an interim fleet.
Predictable demand matters just as much as development funding because companies cannot retain specialist teams and expensive facilities indefinitely without orders. Gupta puts it plainly: “Companies cannot maintain their capabilities indefinitely without assured demand.”
His references to DRDO’s Pinaka, ATAGS and other indigenous programmes underline the need for a reliable production pipeline. Developing alternative suppliers for critical components, wherever feasible, would also improve resilience without unnecessarily duplicating the entire aircraft programme.
Meanwhile, stronger airborne surveillance, refuelling, electronic warfare, secure communications, weapons stocks and realistic training can make today’s force more effective. The Su-57 could help bridge an interim deficit, but India’s lasting answer lies in delivering AMCA and sustaining the industrial capability to manufacture, maintain and improve it independently.
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Anish Kumar is Strategic Affairs Editor, Outlook
