Arab-led parties could influence government formation if neither major bloc secures the 61 Knesset seats needed for a majority
Ra’am and the Joint List are contesting the election separately, making turnout, vote distribution and the electoral threshold consequential
Their ability to influence policy or coalition negotiations will depend on whether other parties are willing to accept their support and negotiate over their demands
With Israel set to elect its 26th Knesset on October 27, Arab-led parties could become important to the formation of the next government if neither major political bloc secures a parliamentary majority. Their influence will depend not only on how many seats they win, but also on the electoral threshold and whether other parties are willing to work with them.
Israel’s 120-member Knesset requires a majority of 61 seats to form a government. Arab citizens account for about 20.9% of Israel’s population, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics’ 2025 estimate, but their demographic weight does not automatically translate into equivalent parliamentary representation. Voter turnout, the division of votes between competing lists and the willingness of larger parties to negotiate with Arab-led representatives will all shape the outcome.
What Does The Previous Election Show?
The November 2022 election demonstrated both the potential and the limits of Arab-led parties’ electoral strength. Ra’am, also known as the United Arab List, won five seats, while Hadash-Ta’al secured five. Balad received 2.91% of valid votes, falling below the 3.25% electoral threshold and winning no seats, according to the official results.
The threshold is consequential because votes for a list that fails to clear it do not translate into parliamentary representation. Even relatively small differences in turnout or the distribution of votes between lists can therefore affect the number of Arab-led representatives elected.
The 2022 results also showed why the way parties organise themselves matters. Arab voters can support different political lists, but fragmentation may prevent some votes from contributing to representation. Conversely, an electoral alliance can help participating parties cross the threshold, although its success ultimately depends on how many votes it receives.
What Has Changed In 2026?
The current election has brought the relationship between Ra’am and the Joint List into focus. The two are contesting the election as separate lists, meaning their electoral performances will be counted independently rather than automatically combining their votes.
The campaign has also included a legal challenge to the participation of Arab-led parties. On October 2, Israel’s Supreme Court overturned the Central Elections Committee’s decisions to disqualify both the Joint List and Ra’am, allowing them to contest the election. The committee had cited allegations that the lists rejected Israel’s character as a Jewish and democratic state or supported armed struggle against it.
The court also ruled that Ofer Cassif, a Joint List candidate, could stand in the election. Sami Abu Shahadeh, another candidate whose disqualification had been approved by the committee, withdrew his candidacy before a final ruling in his case.
The judgment settled the immediate question of the two lists’ eligibility. It did not determine how many seats they would win or whether other parties would rely on their support after the election. Legal eligibility and political influence are separate questions: the first determines who can contest, while the second depends on the results and subsequent negotiations.
What Are Arab Voters Asking For?
Personal security, organised crime, public spending and representation in state institutions are among the issues raised by Arab representatives and community leaders. These concerns feature in parliamentary debates and public statements, although Arab citizens are not a politically uniform electorate and may prioritise different issues.
Crime and violence have become a prominent public concern. During a February 2026 Knesset committee discussion on crime statistics, a police representative said 241 of the 309 murder victims recorded by police in 2025 were from the Arab sector. President Isaac Herzog separately cited approximately 250 people murdered in Arab society that year during a visit to Sakhnin in January. The figures differ, underscoring the importance of attribution and the varying ways such totals are compiled. Both statements highlighted the scale of concern over personal security and organised crime.
Arab-led representatives have also raised questions about access to decision-making positions in the public sector and government companies. In May, Ra’am and Hadash-Ta’al submitted a no-confidence motion alleging systematic failure to integrate Arab citizens into these institutions. The motion did not secure the majority required for adoption.
Budgets and public services are another area of dispute. In June, a Knesset committee discussed the proposed diversion of approximately NIS 1.5 billion from the government’s five-year development plan for Arab society towards enforcement mechanisms. Hadash-Ta’al MK Ahmad Tibi criticised the proposed change, arguing that it would harm civilian services and young people.
These issues give Arab-led parties a policy agenda they can take into negotiations. But their ability to secure concessions will depend on the seats they win, the demands they prioritise and the willingness of potential partners to negotiate.
Can They Translate Votes Into Political Power?
Winning seats is only the first step towards influence. If neither major bloc secures the 61 seats needed for a majority, Arab-led parties could become relevant to coalition arithmetic, provided their representatives are willing to support a government and another party or bloc is prepared to accept that support.
There are several possible routes to influence. A party could join a governing coalition, support a government from outside it or negotiate backing for particular legislation and budget measures. These arrangements carry different political costs and offer different degrees of control over policy.
The obstacles are equally important. Other parties may refuse to form a coalition with Arab-led lists or accept their parliamentary support. Arab-led parties themselves may reject arrangements that do not meet their policy demands or that conflict with their positions on security, civil rights and the conduct of the government.
The election’s outcome will also depend on whether Arab-led lists cross the threshold and how votes are distributed among the other parties. A strong combined vote does not automatically make the lists kingmakers: their leverage depends on whether the final seat totals leave a plausible route to a majority that requires their support.
Israel’s October 27 election will therefore test the gap between the demographic weight of Arab citizens and the political influence their representatives can exercise. The final results will establish how many seats the lists secure; only the negotiations that follow will show whether those seats can translate into a role in government formation or concrete policy concessions.
