Still At Sea

The attack, stated to be by Al Qaeda, on the USnaval ship USS Cole at Aden in October,2000, and the subsequent investigationinto that incident gave birth to concerns that international terrorists mightexpand their acts of terrorism from the land to the sea. Terrorist groups ofWest Asia and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had indulged in acts of maritime terrorism even before October,2000, and the LTTE, through itsfleet of ships, ostensibly used for legitimate commercial purposes, had beenusing the sea for the clandestine transport of arms and ammunition and othermaterial required for its acts of terrorism on the land. However, such uses hadlimited tactical objectives and did not think in terms of mass casualties ormass damage to be inflicted on the global economy as a whole.

The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US and the precisionand the evil ingenuity with which they were planned and executed created a waveof alarm about the likelihood of similar strikes at coastal and maritimetargets. Since 9/11, there is hardly any discussion, governmental ornon-governmental, on threats to national security and to international peace andsecurity in which possible threats from maritime terrorism do not figureprominently.Post-9/11, scenario-building exercises have invariably includedscenarios involving possible catastrophic acts of maritime terrorism. Four ofthese possible scenarios are or should be of major concern to national securitymanagers:

First, terrorists hijacking a huge oil or gas tanker and exploding it in mid-sea or in a major port in order to cause huge human, material and environmental damage. There were 67 reported attacks on oil and gas tankers by pirates during 2004. This despite the stepped-up patrolling by the Navies of different countries. What pirates with no ideological motive and with no suicidal fervour can do, ideologically-driven suicide terrorists can do with equal, if not greater, ease.

Second, terrorists hijacking an oil or gas tanker or a bulk-carrier and exploding it or scuttling it in maritime choke-points such as the Malacca Strait in order to cause a major disruption of energy supplies and global trade. There were 52 reported attacks on bulk carriers by pirates during 2004. If the pirates can do it despite naval patrolling, so can the terrorists.

Three, terrorists smuggling weapon of mass destruction material such as radiological waste or lethal chemicals or even biological weapons in a container and having it exploded through a cellular phone as soon as the vessel carrying the container reaches a major port.

Four, sea-borne terrorists attacking a nuclear establishment or an oil refinery or off-shore oil platforms.

First, the presence in this region of terrorist or insurgent organisations with proved or suspected capabilities for maritime operations. Amongst the organisations coming to mind are the LTTE of Sri Lanka, with proved capabilities for maritime operations, conventional as well as unconventional; and the Abu Sayyaf of Southern Philippines, with its proclaimed readiness to extend its operations from the land to the sea.
Second, the wide networking of Al Qaeda across this region---either through its own members or through surrogate jihadi terrorist organisations, which are members or associates of the International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People formed by it in 1998. The existence of this networking had been suspected since the discovery of a Manila-based plot under Ramzi Yousef in 1995 for spectacular acts of terrorism directed at civil aviation. Corroboratory details emerged after 9/11---particularly during the investigation of the Bali explosion in October, 2002.
Third, the long-known reputation of this area as the world's leading producer and supplier of heroin from the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent and its recent emergence as a producer and supplier of synthetic drugs. Drug money, which was first allegedly used by the US' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for funding their operations against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s, has since become an important source of revenue for insurgent and terrorist organisations in the Latin American and Asian regions. Amongst organisations of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean region, which are known or suspected to be using drug money to finance their operations are the Hamas, the Hizbollah, Al Qaeda, the various Pakistani jihadi organisations, the LTTE, the United Wa State Army of Myanmar and the jihadi terrorist organisations of the Southern Philippines.
Four, the continuing availability in this region--in Pakistan as well as in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia--- of large quantities of arms and ammunition to anyone with the means to pay for them and with the capability for their clandestine transport to areas of intended use.
Five, the presence in this region of terrorist organisations such as the LTTE with a commercial shipping capability, which can be diverted for the clandestine transport of narcotics and arms and ammunition.
Six, the presence in this region of trans-national mafia groups such as the one headed by Karachi-based Dawood Ibrahim with vast financial resources, a capability for clandestine shipping and a willingness to place their resources and shipping at the disposal of Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist organisations operating across the region.
Seven, the long-known (to India), but only recently admitted role of Pakistan as the region's leading supermarket for nuclear weapon-capable material and equipment and the nexus of some of its scientists, enjoying the protection of its Army, with Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist organisations. Recent investigations into the proliferation activities of A.Q.Khan & Co have brought out how they had outsourced proliferation responsibilities to others in countries such as Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates, thus possibly sowing the seeds for nuclear or radiological terrorism. The detailed post-9/11 investigations have brought out as to how there was a Pakistani involvement in all major acts of international jihadi terrorism since the New York World Trade Centre explosion of February,1993. Recent investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of Vienna have brought out an ubiquitous Pakistani hand in all clandestine proliferation commerce across the Asian and the African regions.
Eight, the presence in this region of tempting choke-points such as the oft-mentioned Malacca Strait through which pass a half of the world's oil and a third of its trade. The annual shipping traffic across the region rose from 44,000 in 1999 to over 62,000 in 2003. It is since believed to have risen further. There is a large volume of container traffic originating in this rapidly developing region. It has been estimated that 48 per cent of the global container traffic passes through this region.
Nine, the reputation of this area as one of the most piracy-prone in the world. There has been an increase in the tactical sophistication of pirates. The International Maritime Bureau has been quoted by the media as saying that pirates now break into freight companies' computer systems, change order forms, arrange for changes in shipping, and then intercept the shipment. This is especially a problem in the South China Sea and around Indonesia. There is still no conclusive evidence of the nexus of any group of pirates with terrorist organisations, but fears that the pirates of today may turn into accomplices or mentors of terrorists of tomorrow strongly influence threat perceptions.
Ten, the presence of a large number of uninhabited islands in the region, which serve as sanctuaries and operational bases for the pirates and could similarly serve for the terrorists tomorrow.

Despite such misgivings among sections of thepolicy-makers, senior intelligence officials of the countries of the South-EastAsian region take seriously the possibility of a major act of maritime terrorismin the region. According to them, terrorist organisations active in the regionhad contemplated such acts in the past, though they might not have carried themout. In August,2004, the "Jakarta Post" quoted Hendropriyono, of Indonesia's State Intelligence Agency, as saying :"Senior JemaahIslamiyah terrorists now in detention have admitted that attacks on Malaccashipping traffic had been contemplated in the recent past."

The growing concern over the likelihood of acatastrophic act of maritime terrorism has led to measures for increasingphysical security. Amongst such measures, one could cite the co-ordinatedpatrolling by the navies of the region, the strict enforcement of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code adopted in December,2002,which went into effect globally in July, 2004,and attempts towards asimilar strict enforcement of the Container Security Initiative.

The concern is also reflected in the frequent jointexercises by the Navies of the region with maritime counter-terrorism as animportant objective of the exercises and the large number of conferences andseminars held on the subject in the countries of the region during the last twoyears. The role of non-governmental experts in creating a better awarenessof the threat and in proposing measures for meeting it has also beenincreasingly recognised.

At the same time, the still lingering misgivings thatthe threat is being magnified by the US to serve its strategic objectives in theregion have come in the way of regional countries such as Malaysia and Indonesiaagreeing to a greater participation by the US in the regional initiatives suchas joint or co-ordinated patrolling of the Malacca Strait. Their contention isthat any such US participation or assistance should be at their instance whenthey feel the need for it and not at the instance of the US. These have alsocreated doubts about the real purpose of other US ideas such as the RegionalMaritime Security Initiative (RMSI).

Amongst the countries of the region, the policy-makingcircles of India, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan and Australia have shown thegreatest awareness of the threat of catastrophic maritime terrorism and of theneed to develop the required maritime counter-terrorism capabilities,individually as well as through mutual assistance. The policy-making circles ofIndonesia too have shown a considerable awareness of the threat, buttheir capability to translate this awareness into the required action is stillweak. In the case of maritime terrorism too, as in the case of land-basedterrorism, Bangladesh continues to be in a denial mode-- showing neither anawareness nor a willingness to co-operate with others.

Maritime counter-terrorism has received considerableattention in India, but till recently the focus was naturally and mostly on maritime counter-terrorism and security in the waters off Sri Lanka and inthe Malacca Strait. There was till last year inadequate attention to terroristthreats of a strategic nature from the seas to the West of India-- whether fromthe Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Strait of Hormuz or the Mediterranean.

Over 80 per cent of the terrorist organisations with acapability for maritime terrorism operate in the areas and seas to the West ofIndia. Over 90 per cent of successful maritime terrorism strikes have takenplace in the areas and seas to the West of India. Israel has been the largestsingle victim of maritime terrorism in the Mediterrannean, with nearly 60strikes by organisations such as the Hamas, the Hizbollah, the Popular Front forthe Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) etc. The only two successful strikes and oneunsuccessful attempt by Al Qaeda were off Aden. Almost our entire energysupplies come from this area. The security of the Malacca Strait has limitedrelevance for our energy security, whereas our entire energy security depends onmaritime security in the areas to the West of India.

There have been many instances of maritime terrorism inthe waters to the West of India since 1985 carried out by the Palestinians, theLTTE and the Chechens. The acts of maritime terrorism carried out by thePalestinians and the Chechens were confined to acts such as hijacking of ferriesand holding the passengers in custody in order to achieve demands of a tacticalnature, attacks from the sea on coastal military targets etc. The LTTE developeda dreaded Sea Tigers wing, which specialised in suicide tactics such as rammingexplosives-laden boats against chosen targets on the coast, in ports or on thesea. The Al Qaeda attacks on the US Naval ship, USS Cole, in October,2000, andon the French oil tanker Limberg in October,2002---both off Aden--- were inemulation of the tactics developed by the LTTE and involved ramming a boatladen with explosives.

Among other illustrative incidents of maritimeterrorism in the waters to the West of India before 9/11, one could mention thefollowing:

The hijacking of the Italian-flagged cruise ship P/V Achille Lauro in 1985 off Port Said, Egypt, by terrorists of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), who held the ship with 180 passengers and 331 crew members on board, hostage, demanding the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. They killed an invalid Jewish American passenger, before negotiating the release of the rest of the hostages. .
In 1994, the LTTE shipped 50 metric tons of TNT and ten metric tons of RDX explosives on board one of their own freighters, operated by a front company called Carlton Trading, from a Ukrainian Black Sea port via the Turkish Straits to Sri Lanka. It also hijacked in 1997 a freighter called "Stillus Limassul", loaded with more than 30,000 81mm mortar rounds, worth over three million dollars. The owning and operation by the LTTE and by the PKK, the Kurdish organisation, of ocean-going ships, which were normally used for legitimate commercial activities and, when needed, also for facilitating acts of terrorism like hijacking, arms transport and seizure.
In January 1996, nine pro-Chechen gunmen (six Turks of Abhkaz origin, two Chechens, and an ethnic Abkhaz from Georgia) hijacked a Turkish ferry in the Black Sea and kept 255 passengers and crew hostage for three days. They threatened to blow up the vessel and their hostages, but released the ferry and the passengers after negotiations with the Turkish authorities. The Turkish authorities had alleged that in order to draw attention to the Chechen cause, the hijackers had earlier considered blowing up one of the two suspension bridges over the Bosphorus with explosives in order to block the Strait to traffic.