An Action Plan

(This incorporates some of the points coming to my mind, but is by nomeans a totally comprehensive list. I have deliberately not touched upon thePakistan dimension. I would like to wait for some more details before commentingon the action that needs to be taken) 

1:  Set up a National Commission of professionals with no politicalagenda, in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, to enquire into allthe major terrorist strikes that have taken place in the Indian territoryoutside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) since November,2007, and task it to submitits report within four months, with no extensions given. Its charter will be notthe investigation of the  criminal cases arising from these terroriststrikes, but the investigation of the deficiencies and sins of commission andomission in our counter-terrorism agencies at the Centre and in the States,which made these strikes possible. 

2: Induct proved experts  in terrorism and counter-terrorism from theIntelligence Bureau (IB), the State Police and the Army into the R&AW atsenior levels. Presently, the R&AW does not have any such expertise atsenior levels. Of the four officers at the top of the pyramid, two aregeneralists, one is an expert in Pakistan (Political) and the other in China(Political). 

3: A similar induction from the State  Police and the Army  wouldbe necessary in the case of the IB too. Since I have no personal knowledge ofthe officers at the top of its pyramid, I am not in a position to be specific. 

4: Make the IB the nodal point for all liaison with foreign intelligence andsecurity agencies in respect of terrorism, instead of the R&AW.Give the IBdirect access to all foreign internal intelligence and security agencies,instead of having to go through the R&AW. 

5: Have a common data base on terrorism shared by  the IB and theR&AW directly accessible by authorized officers of the two organizationsthrough a secure password. 

6: Make the Multi-Disciplinary Centre of the IB function as it was meant tofunction when it was created-- as a centre for the continuous identification ofgaps and deficiencies in the available intelligence and for removing them andfor effective follow-up action. 

7: Revive the covert action capability of the R&AW and strengthen it. Itscharter should make it clear that it will operate only in foreign territory andnot in Indian territory. Give it specific, time-bound tasks. All covert actionsshould be cleared and co-ordinated by the R&AW. Other agencies should not beallowed to indulge in covert actions. 

8: The National Security Guards (NSG)  was created as a specialintervention force to deal with terrorist situations such as hijacking andhostage-taking. Stop using it for VIP security  purposes. Station onebattalion each of the NSG in Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bangalore. Ensure thatits regional deployment does not affect  its  in-service training.Review the rapid response capability of the NSG in the light of the Mumbaiexperience and remove loopholes. In handling the Kandahar hijacking of 1999 andthe Mumbai terrorist strikes, the delay in the response of the NSG would appearto have been due to a delay in getting an aircraft for moving the NSG personnelto Mumbai from Delhi.  

9: Give the police in Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bangalore a specialintervention capability to supplement that of the NSG. 

10: After the series of hijackings by the Khalistani terrorists in the early1980s, Indira Gandhi had approved a proposal for the training of Indian expertsin dealing with hostage situations and hostage negotiation techniques by foreignintelligence agencies, which have acknowledged expertise in these fields. Thetraining slots offered by the foreign agencies have been largely monopolized bythe IB and the R&AW. The utilization of these training slots and theselection of officers for the training should be decided by the NSA-- withone-third of the slots going to Central agencies, one-third to the NSG andone-third to the State Police. It is important to build up a core of terrorismand counter-terrorism expertise in all metro towns.  

11: The IB’s Multi-Disciplinary Centre should have a constantly updateddatabase of all serving and retired officers at the Centre and in the States,who had undergone overseas training, and also of all serving and retiredofficers and non-governmental figures who have expertise in terrorism andcounter-terrorism so that their expertise could be tapped, when needed. 

12: Strengthen the role of the police stations in counter-terrorism in allmajor cities. Make it clear to all Station House Officers that their record inpreventing acts of terrorism, in contributing to the investigation andprosecution of terrorism-related cases and in consequence management after aterrorist strike will be an important factor in assessing their suitability forfurther promotion. Revive and strengthen the beat system, revive and intensifythe local enquiries for suspicious activities in all railway stations, bustermini, airports, hotels, inns and other places and improve police-communityrelations. An important observation of the UK’s Security and IntelligenceCommittee of the Prime Minister, which enquired into the London blasts ofJuly,2005, was that no counter-terrorism strategy will succeed unless it isbased on the co-operation of the community from which the terrorists havearisen. The UK now has what they call a community-based counter-terrorismstrategy. The willingness of different communities to co-operate will largelydepend on the relations of the police officers at different levels with theleaders and prominent members of the communities. 

13: Adopt the British practice of having Counter-terrorism Security Advisersin Police Stations. Post them in all urban police stations. Their job will be toconstantly train the PS staff in the performance of their counter-terrorismduties, to improve relations with the communities and to closely interact withowners of public places such as hotels, restaurants, shopping malls etc andvoluntarily advise them on the security precautions to be taken to preventterrorist strikes on soft targets and to mitigate the consequences if strikes dotake place despite the best efforts of the police to prevent them. 

14: Stop using the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) as a dumpingground for retired officers, who are favoured by the Government. The NSCS cannotbe effective in its role of national security management if it is not lookedupon with respect by the serving officers. The serving officers look upon theretired officers of  the NSCS as living in the past and in a make-believeworld of their own totally cut off from the ground realities of today innational security management. The NSCS should be manned only by serving officersof acknowledged capability for thinking and action. 

15: Strengthen the role of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) as aGovernment-sponsored think tank of non-governmental experts in security mattersto assist the NSCA and the NSA. Give it specific terms of reference instead ofletting it free lance as it often does. It should be discouraged fromundertaking esoteric studies. 

16:  Set up a separate Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to deal withinternal security. Assessment of intelligence having a bearing on internalsecurity requires different expertise and different analytical tools thanassessment of intelligence having a bearing on external security. In 1983,Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister, bifurcated the JIC and created a separateJIC for internal security. Rajiv Gandhi reversed her decision. Her decision waswise and needs to be revived. 

17: Set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) under the NationalSecurity Adviser (NSA) to ensure joint operational action in allterrorism-related matters. It can be patterned after a similar institution setup in the US under Director, National Intelligence after 9/11. The NationalCommission set up by the US Congress to enquire into the 9/11 terrorist strikeshad expressed the view that better co-ordination among the various agencies willnot be enough and that what was required was a joint action command similar tothe Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Armed Forces. Its tasks should be to monitorintelligence collection by various agencies, avoid duplication of efforts andresources, integrate the intelligence flowing from different agencies andforeign agencies, analyse and assess the integrated intelligence and monitorfollow-up action by the Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and otherconcerned agencies. Every agency is equally and jointly involved and responsiblefor the entire counter-terrorism process starting from collection to action onthe intelligence collected. If such a system had existed, post-Mumbai complaintssuch as those of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing(R&AW) that the advisories issued by them on the possibility of a sea-borneattack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on Mumbai were not acted upon by the MumbaiPolice would not have arisen because the IB and the R&AW would have been asresponsible for follow-up action as the Mumbai Police. 

18: The practice of the privileged direct access to the Prime Minister by thechiefs of the IB and the R&AW, which came into force under Jawaharlal Nehruand Indira Gandhi, should be vigorously enforced. This privileged direct accessis utilised by the intelligence chiefs to bring their concerns over nationalsecurity and over inaction by the agencies responsible for follow-up on theirreports to the personal notice of the Prime Minister and seek his intervention.If the intelligence chiefs had brought to the notice of the Prime Minister thealleged inaction of the Mumbai Police on their reports, he might have intervenedand issued the required political directive to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. 

19: Either create a separate Ministry of Internal Security or strengthen therole of the existing Department of Internal Security in the Union Ministry ofHome Affairs and make it responsible for dealing with internal securityoperationally under the over-all supervision of the Minister for Home Affairs. 

20: Either create a separate federal terrorism investigation agency orempower the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate all casesinvolving terrorism of a pan-Indian dimension. It need not take up cases whereterrorism is confined to a single state or a small region such as terrorism inJammu & Kashmir or the Al Umma in Tamil Nadu. It should be able to take upthe cases for investigation without the need for prior permission from theGovernments of the States affected. It should not have any responsibility forinvestigating crimes other than terrorism. If its charter is expanded to coverother crimes too, there will be political opposition. There is a lot ofconfusion about this concept of a federal terrorism investigation agency. Manycritics ask when the IB is there, what is the need for another central agency.The IB is an intelligence collection agency and not an investigation agency. TheIB has no locus standi in the Indian criminal laws. It collects intelligence andnot evidence usable in a court of law. It cannot arrest and interrogate asuspect or search premises or perform other tasks of a similar nature, which canbe performed only by police officers of the rank of Station House Officers. TheIB officers are not recognized as equivalent to SHOs. 

 21: Set up a task force consisting of three senior and distinguishedDirectors-General of Police (DGPs) and ask it to come up with a list ofrecommendations for strengthening the powers of the police in respect ofprevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related offences and thecapabilities of the Police in counter-terrorism and implement itsrecommendations. This is the only way of getting round the present politicaldeadlock over the revival of the Prevention of Terrorism ACT (POTA). 

22: Expedite the erection of the border fence on the border with Bangladeshwithout worrying about opposition from Bangladesh. 

23: Start a crash programme for the identification of illegal immigrants fromBangladesh and for deporting them. Ban the employment of immigrants fromBangladesh anywhere in Indian territory. 

24: Strict immigration control is an important part of counter-terrorism Thepost-9/11 safety of the US is partly due to the tightening up of immigrationprocedures and their strict enforcement. Among the best practices adopted by theUS and emulated by others are: Photographing and finger-printing  of allforeigners on arrival, closer questioning of Pakistanis and persons of Pakistaniorigin etc. We have not yet adopted any of these practices. Hotels and otherplaces of residence should be banned from giving rooms to persons without adeparture card and without a valid immigration stamp in their passports. Theyshould be required to take Xerox copies of the first page and the pagecontaining the immigration stamp of  the passports of all foreigners andalso the departure card stapled to the passport and send them to their localPolice Station every morning. All immigration relaxations introduced in the caseof Pakistani and Bangladesdhi nationals and persons of Pakistani and Bangladeshiorigin should be cancelled with immediate effect. The requirement of policereporting by them should be rigorously enforced. It should be made obligatoryfor all persons hosting Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to report to the localpolice about their guests. A vigorous drive should be undertaken for tracing allPakistanis and Bangladeshis overstaying in India after the expiry of their visasand for expelling them. 

25: The MEA’s capability for terrorism-related diplomacy should bestrengthened by creating a separate Division for this purpose. It shouldcontinuously brief all foreign governments about the role of Pakistan andBangladesh in supporting terrorism in Indian territory and press for actionagainst them.  

26: The Mumbai strikes have revealed serious gaps in our maritime security onour Western coast. This is partly the result of our over-focus on the Look Eastpolicy and the neglect of the Look West dimension. This was corrected earlierthis year. Despite this, there are apparently major gaps and an alleged failure by the Naval and Coast Guard authorities to act on the reports of the IBand the R&AW about likely sea-borne threats from the LET. The identificationand removal of the gaps need immediate attention. The Mumbai off-shore oilinstallations and the nuclear and space establishments on the Western coast arealso vulnerable to sea-borne terrorist strikes.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.