The Old Fox Trot

"First, whatever it takes. Talks,yes, but first we have to beat down this challenge." union defence ministerA.K. Antony's announcement in Guwahati on January 9, 2007, ended speculationsregarding the resumption of the dwindling peace process and signaled thebeginning of a major military offensive in upper Assam, hailed as the biggestever since the early 1990s, against the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).The offensive followed nearly 70 killings within a span of four days, betweenJanuary 5-8, 2007, in a systematic and xenophobic campaign, by ULFA terrorists,targeting Hindi-speaking people in five districts of Upper Assam: Tinsukia(which accounted for a majority of the deaths) Dibrugarh, Dhemaji, Sivasagar,and Golaghat.

ULFA had provided sufficient indication of an obdurate andviolent campaign through a succession of statements preceding the killings. Thesubsequent military build up entailed the movement of Army and ParamilitaryForces (PMFs) stationed in the Lower Assam districts and from other states, tothe violence-torn areas of upper Assam. Some 20 companies of the Army andparamilitary forces, comprising 2,000 personnel, arrived in upper Assam onJanuary 10 to reinforce the already gigantic security force (SF) set up there.Another 3,000 jawaans (soldiers) from the Army's 2^ndMountain Division were sent to Sivasagar and Dhemaji districts. Similarly,reports indicate that six to seven companies of the Border Security Force (BSF),comprising about 500 personnel, will soon be withdrawn from north Bengal areasto be deployed in Assam. The Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, had, in fact,asked for the deployment of 90 companies of personnel, of which 20 were to bedeployed to provide security to the National Games to be held in Guwahati fromFebruary 9, 2007.

The euphemistically named 'Operation Clear', involvedtroops aided by helicopters executing simultaneous operations in several areasof Assam, including as Lakhipathar, Saraipung, Namsai, Upper Dihing,Dibru-Saikhowa National Park, and the river islands in the Sadiya sub-divisionof Dibrugarh district. Operations were also launched in Arunachal Pradesh's Bhismaknagar, Manabhum Reserve Forest and Sonpura in Lohit, the Namchik area inChanglang and Dambuk in Lower Dibang Valley. Army sources also spoke of asimilar offensive in the Garo Hills region of Meghalaya, which has traditionallybeen used by the ULFA as a transit route to and from Bangladesh. On January 9, defenceminister A.K. Antony, also stated, rather optimistically, at least givenBangladesh's track record, "We will seek the help of Bangladesh andMyanmar in addressing the issue of ULFA cadres operating from thesecountries." The BSF has already rushed four of its battalions to Meghalayaand Assam to man the sensitive border between the two states as well as theinternational border with neighbouring Bangladesh.

The achievements of the relatively massive militarymobilization, till January 12, were, however, at best modest. On January 7,2007, two-days prior to the commencement of the Operation, two ULFA militantswere killed in an encounter with SF personnel in the Sivasagar district. Threeunidentified ULFA militants were killed and three others arrested during acounter-insurgency operation in the Darrang district on January 12. Earlier, onJanuary 11, an ULFA militant was killed at a village in the Baska districtbordering Bhutan, far from the upper Assam districts, where 'OperationClear' was ongoing. Five ULFA militants/ linkmen were also arrested from theTinsukia, Karbi Anglong and Udalguri districts.

There has been some euphoria regarding the Army operations inthe national media and the decisive dominance these are projected to achieve, vis-a-visULFA, but this euphoria is not shared by the Army. The Army Chief, GeneralJ.J. Singh, has disclosed himself to be a votary of the 'root causes'thesis, and argues that a 'military solution' to the ULFA problem is notpossible. Speaking at a Press Conference at New Delhi on January 12, he said:"All out operations are being undertaken to put the terrorists on the backfoot. But there is no purely military solution. There can never be a time whenwe could task ourselves with finishing off the ULFA entirely, wherever theyare." He elaborated, further, "Any counter-terror campaign has to bemulti-pronged. There are political and socio-economic dimensions to the problem.If we can compel them to come back to the negotiating table, there can beprogress." The fact that the operations to 'smoke out' ULFA cadreswouldn't be easy, had earlier been underlined by an Army official on January9, who stated: "Practically no intelligence on their movements is availablefrom where they are holed up now, given the fact that there is hardly any humanhabitation in these places."

The resumption of all-out hostilities in Assam has reversedthe achievements of the past four years. Beginning 2003, when 505 terrorismrelated deaths were reported in Assam, fatalities have registered a steadydecline. According to the Institute for Conflict Management database, 174terrorism related deaths were reported in 2006, a 39 per cent decline from theprevious year. With 40 deaths, Kamrup, in which the state capital Dispur islocated, remained the most violent district. Three districts, Kamrup, Tinsukiaand North Cachar Hills, accounted for 111 deaths. And among multiple terroristoutfits operating in Assam, ULFA remained the most violent accounting for 64 percent of the total terrorism-related fatalities. ULFA also accounted for 65 percent of the civilian killings and 51 per cent of SF fatalities registered in2006.

The Congress Party led by Tarun Gogoi was returned to powerin the State Legislative Assembly elections in May 2006. In a statement onDecember 11, forest and environment minister Rockybul Hussain disclosed in theAssembly that 114 civilians and 27 SF personnel had died in militancy-relatedviolence in Assam since Gogoi took over as Chief Minister for his second term.The civilians killed include 57 persons who were killed in explosions triggeredby militants. A total of 1,214 persons, including 1,031 civilians, 121 personnelbelonging to Assam Police, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and other para-militaryforces and 62 Army personnel, were killed by various militant outfits sinceGogoi first became Chief Minister in May 2001. Minister Hussain also mentionedthat as many as 1,051 cadres of various militant outfits, including the ULFA,had been killed in encounters with the SFs since May 2001.

Peace efforts with the ULFA appeared tohave got off the blocks with the August 13, 2006 decision by the union governmentto announce a unilateral ceasefire, confining the SFs to barracks. Prior tothis, in September 2005, after the ULFA formed an 11-member People'sConsultative Group (PCG), to prepare the groundwork for dialogue with the government,New Delhi called off a tactically important operation in upper Assam'sDibru-Saikhowa National Park, when the Army had surrounded key ULFAfunctionaries of the '28th Battalion', the only functioning 'battalion'of the outfit, believed to consist of 350 cadres. Amidst strong objectionsexpressed by the Army, who believed that the group was exploiting the truce toreinforce, no operations of strategic consequence were undertaken by the SFsafter September 2005, as New Delhi hoped to wean ULFA away from violence throughits 'magnanimity'. ULFA, however, continued to attack, kill and extortwithout pause.

Subsequently, on September 22, 2006, National SecurityAdvisor M. K. Narayanan conveyed to the ULFA-backed PCG member, Indira Goswami,that the union government would not extend the suspension of counter-insurgencyoperations against the outfit any further. The subsequent official announcementof September 24 declaring resumption of counter-insurgency operations againstthe ULFA drew down the curtain on a year-long process in which both the governmentand the ULFA were, at best, reluctant partners. The tardy and laboriousexperiment, which at no point of time in its year-long existence, demonstratedany signs of success, did, however, end up revitalizing a dwindling ULFA, muchas the Army had warned.

There is significant evidence that ULFA continues to operateunder the grip of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and theBangladeshi Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). Investigationsinto the November 21, 2006, blast in Jalpaiguri in North Bengal, which killedseven persons and injured over 60 others, revealed that ULFA 'commander-in-chief' Paresh Baruah had visited Pakistan in recent months tofirm up a training schedule for the outfit's cadres. Subsequently, a team of15 cadres visited Pakistan in October and received training. Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh himself confirmed these ominous linkages in his November 28-statementto a 12- party delegation from Assam led by former Chief Minister Prafulla KumarMahanta, when he stated that New Delhi was ready for talks with the ULFA as andwhen it comes out of the clutches of the ISI.

Peace efforts with the ULFA didovershadow the peace process with the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)which, since May 25, 2005, has been under a cease-fire agreement with the government.The process of negotiations has, however, been delayed. While the Assam governmentmaintains that the outfit is yet to provide a charter of demands, the NDFBaccuses the state government of a lackadaisical attitude towards the outfit. Thestalemate, however, has led to an institutionalization of a racket of extortion,abduction and terrorist activities by the NDFB cadres who are, under thecease-fire agreement, supposed to have been confined within the limits ofdesignated camps. On May 27, the first round of talks between the union governmentand the NDFB was held in New Delhi where both parties agreed to extend theircease-fire beyond May 31, 2005. Further, on November 29, both sides met again toextend the cease-fire beyond December 1, 2005. This, however, appeared to havelittle impact on the activities of the outfit. The following incidents reportedin 2006 provide an index of the NDFB's activities in the state under the 'cease fire agreement'.

January 16: Hindi-speaking villagers, under the bannerof the Assam Bhojpuri Yuba Chhatra Parishad, sought the protection of the state governmentagainst the extortion drive by NDFB militants who allegedly had distributeddemand notes, ranging from Rupees 30,000 to Rupees 50,000, signed by aself-styled "collection-in-charge" 'Lt.' D. Dethsrang, along theborder of Nagaon and Karbi Anglong districts.

April 22: Eight NDFB cadres, who were arrested fromGuwahati in the Kamrup district, confessed during interrogation of theirinvolvement in extortion from state officials.

April 25: NDFB cadre B. Daithan was killed and fiveother militants wounded at Sapatgram in the Dhubri district of lower Assam, whenthe police retaliated against militants who were enforcing closure of shops andother business establishments in the area.

May 22: The dead body of a villager, Babul Kalita,suspected to have been killed by the NDFB, was recovered by the Police fromDaudwigami under Harisingha police outpost in the Udalguri district.

May 29: Five SF personnel, who were abducted bysuspected NDFB cadres on May 21 from the Udalguri district, were found dead atBelsiri Nala under Bhairabkunda police outpost in the dense jungle of WestKameng district of Arunachal Pradesh bordering Assam and Bhutan.

June 25: Civilians in the Daranga area of Baska districtcaptured two NDFB extortionists. A branch of the state Bank of India in the samelocality had closed down following NDFB threats and extortion notices.

June 26: Two NDFB cadres, while attempting to extortmoney from a businessman, were killed in an encounter with SF personnel at anunspecified place under Dokmoka Police Outpost in the Karbi Anglong district.

July 5: Suspected NDFB militants killed two cadres ofthe erstwhile Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), Thanderu Basumatary alias Hargilaand Bijoy Basumatary, at Langhing in the Karbi Anglong district.

November 16: Two unidentified NDFB cadres were shotdead by Assam Police at Langkin Manikpur in the Karbi Anglong district.

The January 6 attack by the KarbiLongri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF) in which seven pollingpersonnel were killed and another 10 injured, including four policemen, in theremote Donghap area under Howraghat Police Station, brought back attention tothe peripheral insurgencies in Assam, mostly confined to district limits ofKarbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills. KLNLF militants exploded an ImprovisedExplosive Device (IED) and opened fire during a bid to influence the electionsto the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council. KLNLF is a breakaway faction of theUnited People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), which is under a ceasefireagreement with the union government since May 2002. Both the UPDS and KLNLFaccounted for five militancy-related deaths in 2006. Delay in substantivedialogue with the government has frustrated the UPDS which, on September 11,2006, announced the suspension of peace talks. The outfit, however, maintainedthat it would honour the cease-fire. Militancy-related incidents involving theUPDS/KLNLF in 2006 included:

January 9: UPDS 'Publicity secretary', TongeehNongloda, was arrested from Dilai in the Karbi Anglong district for reportedlycarrying a 9mm pistol.

April 10: The UPDS 'defence secretary', Thong Teron,was killed during an exchange of fire at Satgaon under the Dongkamokam PoliceOutpost in the Karbi Anglong district, by security personnel guarding Sing Teron,an executive member of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council. Subsequently, theUPDS militants killed two persons in retaliation in the Tongkory area of the district.

June 15: The Bokajan Police recovered the dead body ofa KLNLF cadre, Mirjeng Teron alias Bhupen Teron, from an interior village in theKarbi Anglong district. Teron had been abducted by at least six UPDS militantsfrom his residence at Japarajan.

November 13: At least seven suspected UPDS militantswere arrested in a counter-insurgency operation at Kaniya Bey Village near Diphuin the Karbi Anglong district, for violating cease-fire rules.

The Dima Halim Daogah (DHD)and its renegade group, the Black Widows, accounted for 31 fatalities in theNorth Cachar Hills district in 2006. Headed by Jewel Garlossa, the Black Widowsremained the most violent peripheral militant outfit in Assam. On October 6,2006, at least 13 Railway Protection Force personnel were killed in an ambush byBlack Widow militants in the North Cachar Hills district. Previously, on July26, 2006, Black Widow militants triggered a grenade explosion targeting CRPFpersonnel, killing three civilians and injuring three others at a railwaystation at Maibong in the North Cachar Hills district. These incidents were adirect fallout of the growing sophistication in the quality of weaponry in thegroup's possession. On March 28, 2006, the North Cachar Hills district policerecovered three rocket launcher shells, two pistols, nine magazines, onerevolver and an unspecified amount of ammunition from a married couple,Afhringdaw and Dipali Warisa, linked to the Black Widows. Internecine clashesbetween the DHD and the Black Widows continued. On April 28, the 'deputycommander-in-chief' of the DHD, Naizing Daulagapu, was shot at and wounded bysuspected Black Widow militants at Upper Dibbarai under the Haflong PoliceStation.

Islamist militancy remained at a lowebb. No fatalities in 2006 were attributed to the groups like the Muslim UnitedLiberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA). However, periodic intelligence inputs didprovide details of a 'silent mobilization' by the Islamists. On July 18,2006, Guwahati City Police arrested a self-styled 'commander' of the MULTA,Nur Islam alias Lambu, from the Ambari area. He confessed subsequently that 20MULTA cadres had used Shillong and Lad Rymbai in the Jaintia Hills of Meghalayaas their routes to escape into Bangladesh in recent past. Similarly, on December24, an arrested Black Widow militant made revelations about the linkages betweenthe People's United Liberation Front (PULF), a Manipur-based Islamist outfitand the MULTA.

In all, Assam continues to demonstrate conflicting trendstowards some of its multiple insurgencies, and of deterioration in others. Suchdivergence is a natural reflection of the vacillation and uncertainty that hasmarked government policies and initiatives, both at the centre and in the state.

Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute forConflict Management. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of theSouth Asia Terrorism Portal.