These arrests only reconfirm the fact that the cadres of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) areincreasingly using Indian territory and working closely with Naxalite groups, particularly the MaoistCommunist Centre (MCC and the People's War Group, to achieve their larger goal of the creation of a'Compact Revolutionary Zone' (CRZ) extending from Nepal through Bihar and the Dandakaranya region to AndhraPradesh. The establishment of this CRZ is conceptualized as a prelude to the further expansion of Left Wingextremism in the subcontinent.
In Patna, Bihar, on February 25, 2003, police unearthed a hideout of the MCC and arrested five NepaleseMaoists and three cadres of the MCC. MCC leader Pramod Mishra's son Subhash alias Suchit was among thosearrested. Interrogation of the arrested Maoists, led to the arrest of another four Maoists from the GandhiMaidan area, Patna on February 27, 2003. One of the arrested extremists was believed to be the chief of thePoorvanchal Zonal Bureau of the CPN-M.
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Again, during a raid on February 28, 2003, police recovered a huge cache of arms belonging to the NepaleseMaoists from Lalji Tola, Patna. The seized arms included automatic rifles and 8,000 live cartridges. Policesources said the arrested Maoists were engaged in arranging finances for the CPN-M by extorting money andprinting and circulating Naxalite documents in Bihar. Before this arrest, the Bihar police had earlierarrested 18 activists of the CPN-M, of whom 15 had already been handed over to the Nepalese authorities.Following the recent arrests in Patna, a senior Bihar police official stated that the Left Wing extremistgroups had already secured an approximate '60 per cent success' in their mission to create the CRZ.
In West Bengal, four Maoist insurgents were arrested from Howrah railway station on February 26, 2003, forallegedly distributing inflammatory literature in support of the Maoist insurgents in Nepal. They had beenstaying in Kolkata for some time and were involved in propaganda and recruitment activities targeting youth ofNepalese origin. Their interrogation led to the discovery of a Maoist network operating from Kolkata. Thearrested Maoists revealed that they had recruited 30 youth from the city in January 2003 and sent them toNepal to join the Maoist insurgency there.
There is growing concern within India over the growing nexus between Nepalese Maoists and Indian Naxalitegroups. Addressing a Chief Minister's conference in New Delhi on February 8, 2003, Prime Minister Atal BihariVajpayee voiced concern over the problem of Left Wing extremism from the Nepal border to Andhra Pradesh.Earlier, on January 2, 2003, Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani said Nepalese Maoists had been attempting tostep up Naxal violence in some Indian States close to Nepal. He added that, as after increasing politicalinstability in Nepal, Maoists from that country had begun to infiltrate into India to increase Naxaliteviolence in Bihar, Jharkhand and other States.
The Naxalites have long been active in parts of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh,West Bengal, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. Apart from their traditional strongholds,there has been a significant expansion of Naxalite activities into new areas such as North Bihar, North andWest Orissa, central Chhattisgarh, eastern Uttar Pradesh and parts of West Bengal.
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The Naxal groups feel that expansion in these areas could hasten the process of crystallizing the CRZ, thatis, creating a 'Red corridor' stretching from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh as a 'liberated zone'. This expansionhas been reflected in a significant growth of Naxalite related violence as well. The continuous decline inviolence between 1996 and 2001 was reversed in 2001 and the upward swing continued through 2002 and into thecurrent year.
The linkages between Left Wing extremist groups in the region are not new, though the idea of the CRZcrystallized in August 2001, when leaders of the Nepal Maoists and the Indian Naxalites had a meeting inSiliguri. The leaders discussed various ways to make the CRZ a continuous zone to facilitate the easy movementof extremists from one area in the proposed zone to another. There were, however, two roadblocks to thedevelopment of the CRZ: the first was the discontinuities in areas of Left Wing activities, which requiredtheir expansion and consolidation into new areas; the second was the fragmentation and factionalism within theLeft Wing movement, which required greater unity among hitherto warring groups such as the MCC and the PWG.Earlier, in July 2001, extreme Left Wing (Maoist) groups in South Asia formed the Coordination Committee ofMaoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). Subsequently, some time in December 2001 the MCCand PWG reportedly held a summit in the forest areas of Jharkhand to discuss support to the Nepalese Maoistmovement.
A consolidation in West Bengal and Bihar is key to the achievement of the CRZ. The Naxalites plan to use WestBengal as a corridor between their areas of domination in India and Nepal, and are, consequently,consolidating their presence in West Midnapore district, Bankura and Purulia. The Nepalese Maoists have alsoinfiltrated the border areas of Darjeeling and Siliguri. In Siliguri, they have been trying to consolidatetheir position in North Bengal by establishing links with the insurgent Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO.In Darjeeling and surrounding areas, moreover, the Maoists have been instigating people of Nepalese origin toassert their 'right to self-determination' in Nepalese dominated areas in Darjeeling and Sikkim.
In Bihar, there has been considerable expansion of Naxalite activities in the Northern parts bordering Nepal.In these areas, the MCC, which is active in Motihari, Sheohar, Sitamarhi, Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga, has alsodeepened linkages with the Maoists in Nepal. They have constituted a joint Indo-Nepal Border RegionalCommittee (INBRC) to secure their common objectives. There have been several reports indicating frequentcrossing over of Nepalese Maoists into Bihar for shelter since the crackdown against them in their country.They are also reports of training camps in the jungles of West Champaran district. Official sources indicatethat, while Naxalite violence between 2001 and 2002 showed a decline in the worst Naxalite hit States likeAndhra Pradesh and Jharkhand, Bihar's share in Left Wing violence is on the rise.
The MCC and the PWG have, to a great extent, resolved their differences and there are reports of a possiblemerger between the two groups. If the Naxalite groups are able to come together and fill the 'vacuum areas',their plan to establish a CRZ could fructify in the foreseeable future. Developments over the last two yearsare in conformity with the broad concept of an evolving CRZ. The setting up of a 'revolutionary corridor'would give a boost to Left Wing extremist groups and could make the Naxalite movement in India more violentthan it currently is. There is also some apprehension that Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) maycatalyze further destabilization by pumping arms into the projected area of the CRZ. Drug trafficking and thecirculation of fake currency through the border are already in evidence.
The ongoing peace process in Nepal is not likely to alter the situation drastically. The Nepalese Maoists havetended to maintain a staunchly anti-Indian posture, and have tended to argue that successive monarchs andNepal's political leadership have compromised Nepal's national interests vis-à-vis India. The fear of Indianexpansionism and India's 'hegemonic' image has figured prominently in speeches by Maoist leaders. It is,consequently, likely that the Maoists will continue their relationship with Naxalites in India even if theyreach a negotiated settlement in Nepal.
The problem is compounded further by the fact that the region over which the proposed CRZ is intended toextend, particularly the stretch from Nepal to Chhattisgarh, is marked by widespread poverty, unemployment,and lack of economic development, coupled with strong regional imbalances, very poor governance, the existenceof powerful traditional structures of exploitation and an under-equipped police force.
In many of these areas, the institutions of the state have virtually ceased to exist, or have, at best, anominal existence. Naxalites fill the vacuum and exploit the poor performance of the institutions ofgovernance on issues such as land rights, minimum wages, education and anti-corruption. In some areas theyhave assumed many of the tasks of the state and run a parallel administration. Any further crystallization ofthe idea of the CRZ can only aggravate the substantial security challenges that already exist in this wideswathe of territory, and has the potential to destabilize a much wider region
Sanjay K. Jha is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management whichruns the South Asia Terrorism Portal and brings out a weekly - South Asia Intelligence Review -courtesy which this piece appears here.
