On February 24, 2007, 400 gelatine sticks weighing about 50 kilograms were seized on the outskirts of Berhampur town in Orissa, while being transported to neighbouring Naxalite hitdistricts. This was only the latest in a continuous stream of seizures that reveal the systematic process of Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist) consolidation in thestate, despite the decline in visible violence by the rebels. 16 of Orissa's 30districts remain affected by Maoist activities: Sundergarh, Keonjhar, Sambalpur,Mayurbhanj, Deogarh, Jajpur, Malkangiri, Koraput, Rayagada, Gajapati, Ganjam,Nawarangpur, Kalahandi, Nuapara, Bargarh, Bolangir.
During year 2006, Maoists killed three civilians and four Security Force (SF) personnel while 16 Maoists were killed by the SFs. In 2005, Maoists had killed 13 civilians and one SF personnel while the SFs had killed one insurgent.
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Elections to the Gram Panchayats in Orissa during February 13-21, 2007, witnessed significant Maoist mobilisation and open calls for a boycott of the Panchayat polls. The Maoists distributed a large number leaflets, put up posters and banners and threatened the local people with dire consequences in case they participated in the election process. On February 12, the Maoists had triggered a landmine blast and injured three SF personnel in the Kalimela block of Malkangiridistrict. On February 13, polling in two Panchayats, Poplur and Kurmanur, was cancelled as the polling officials and SF personnel could not reach the polling stations due to obstruction by the Maoists. In the Redhakhol area of Sambalpurdistrict, the Maoists looted ballot papers and ballot boxes and openly conducted meetings to'persuade' people to boycott the polls. Similarly, at Baripada in the Mayurbhanjdistrict, Maoists attacked a polling booth and forced the polling officials to leave.
Attacks on SFs and government officials have been a regular feature in Orissa. Prominent incidents include:
February 13, 2007: Three police personnel were injured when CPI-Maoist cadres opened fire, targeting a police party accompanying election officials for the first phase of the three-tier Panchayat polls in the Kalimela Block in the Malkangiridistrict.
January 31, 2007: Three forest guards were killed by the Maoists while they were on duty near the forests at Kandhar village in the Dhenkanaldistrict.
January 26, 2007: One Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel was killed and two injured in a Maoist-triggered landmine blast in the Malkangiridistrict.
January 12, 2007: Police arrested five Maoists, including three women, from Rourkela in the Sundergarhdistrict. They were planning to attack the Rourkela Special Jail where a woman Maoist leader, Budhni Munda aka Shobha, was lodged. Police recoveredRs 1.5 million in cash, a laptop computer, Maoist literature, a city map of Rourkela with jails and security posts clearly marked out, and some weapon-making materials from their residence.
December 8, 2006: Two CRPF personnel were injured in a landmine explosion by the Maoists in the Rellatu area of Sundergarhdistrict.
December 1, 2006: Maoists killed an employee of the Revenue Department at Kalimela in the Malkangiridistrict.
October 30, 2006: Maoists entered into the Chadheipahada Gram Panchayat office in the Mayurbhanjdistrict, ransacked it and burnt the National flag there.
June 3, 2006: Maoists killed the officer-in-charge of Motu Police Station at a weekly market in the MV 88 village of Malkangiridistrict.
April 6, 2006: Armed Maoists attacked CRPF personnel and injured nine of them while they were traveling in the Samaleshwari Express at Kalunga Railway Station between Jharsuguda and Rourkela in the Sundargarhdistrict.
March 24, 2006: Approximately 200 armed Maoists shot dead three police personnel and took at least twogovernment officials hostage in attacks on a Police Station, an Orissa state Armed Police camp, the local Jail and a bank at Udayagiri in the Gajapatidistrict.
Most Maoist activity in Orissa took place in the districts bordering the neighbouringstates of Andhra Pradesh, Chhatisgarh and Jharkhand, all of which are severely affected by the insurgency. Significantly, eight of the 16 Maoist fatalities in Orissa in 2006 took place in the southern Malkangiridistrict, while seven occurred in the northern Deogarh district. The dense forest stretch between river Shaberi and Sileru in the Malkangiridistrict bordering Andhra Pradesh has emerged as the principal area of concentration for the Maoists operating in thestate. Other districts, including Sambalpur, Sundergarh and Mayurbhanj in the north and Gajapati and Rayagada in the south, also witnessed significant Maoist activity.
Though fatalities have remained low in Orissa, the real problem for the governmentis the spread of the Maoist ideology and influence and a corresponding retreat of governance. Intelligence sources indicate that marijuana (Ganja) cultivation in thestate's hilly terrain in Maoist-affected areas is helping generate substantial revenues, enabling the Maoists to acquire weapons and material to sustain their subversion. A cluster of southerndistricts, Gajapati, Rayagada, Koraput, Malkangiri and Kandhamal, has emerged as a hub of Ganja cultivation under apparent Maoist protection, with a parallel growth in Ganja plantation and Maoist activity. On February 11, 2007, police seized more than 100 kilograms of Ganja from twogovernment-run buses near Berhampur town in the Ganjam district and arrested nine persons. While one of the buses was on its way from Damanjodi in Rayagadadistrict to Cuttack, the other one was headed from the Maoist-dominated Motu area of Malkangiridistrict to the state capital, Bhubaneswar. Earlier, on February 6, 2007, fifteen kilograms of Ganja was seized and three persons arrested from a passenger bus in the Adaba area of Gajapatidistrict. Previously, on January 27, 2007, 80 kilograms of Ganja, which arrived from Gajapatidistrict, was seized from the Berhampur bus stand.
The Maoists are also moving into Orissa's coastal areas, mainly to Bhubaneswar and Cuttack. The CPI-Maoist, under the banner of front organisations like the Daman Pratirodh Manch (Resistance against Oppression Forum) and Rajnaitika Bandi Mukti Committee (Political Prisoners Freedom Committee) have staged several demonstrations in the heart of capital, Bhubaneswar, and these have been attended by significant numbers of tribals and Maoists. On January 10, 2007, Maoists put up a provocative banner in front of the main gate of the Ravanshaw College in Cuttack, a premier educational institution in thestate, threatening vengeance against the killing of Maoist woman 'Commander' Jyothakka and her husband by the security forces on the Andhra Pradesh-Orissa border on December 28, 2006. In November 2006, the Police had arrested a youth while he was distributing provocative Maoist leaflets on the same campus.
Since the Kalinga Nagar incident in January 2006, when 12 tribal people were killed in Police firing while protesting against a proposed steel plant project, Maoists have also consolidated their base among the tribals in the Jajpurdistrict. On January 2, 2007, nearly 4,000 Maoist supporters took part in a rally in Jajpur protesting against the Kalinga Nagar incident. The Visthapan Virodhi Janmanch (Displacement Resistance People's Front), another Maoist cover organisation for the tribals of Kalinga Nagar, has been opposing the steel plant project and has regularly organised road blockades on National Highway 200, the lifeline that links the mineral-rich Keonjhar and Jajpurdistricts with the Paradip Port. On February 1, 2007, Chief Minister Naveen Pattnaik held a meeting with the leaders of the Visthapan Virodhi Janmanch, but the meeting ended in failure.
On June 9, 2006, the Orissa government imposed a belated ban on the CPI-Maoist and seven of its front organisations, the Daman Protirodh Manch, Revolutionary Democratic Front, Chasi Mulia Samiti (Farmers and Labourers Association), Kui Lawanga Sangh [Kui (a tribal group) Youth Association], Jana Natya Mandali (People's Theatre Group), Krantikari Kisan Samiti (Revolutionary Farmers' Association) and Bal Sangam (Children's Association). These organisations were banned as Maoist fronts that were interfering in administration and undermining the maintenance of law and order.
During his visit to Bhubaneswar in December 2006, the Union Home Secretary, V. K. Duggal, expressed displeasure on the overall Maoist situation in thestate. Reacting to the state government's over-dependence on the para-military CRPF, he told officials that, "Central paramilitary force is only a back-up. The real fight has to be from thestate police personnel." He also remarked that Orissa was lagging far behind in sending its SFs for higher and specialised training. Apart from the Orissastate Armed Police (OSAP), as many as four battalions of the CRPF are deployed in Orissa to counter the Maoists. One battalion of the 1st India Reserve Battalion, which thestate has raised to tackle the Maoists, has been deployed in the southern districts of Malkangiri, Rayagada, Koraput and Gajapati, where there is a strong Maoist presence. Thestate is also raising the 2nd India Reserve Battalion to be deployed in its northern regions. In addition, thestate has also deployed 14 sub-groups of the Special Operations Group (SOG) at strategic locations to oversee anti-Maoist operations. In February 2005, the Orissa Police formed a Special Intelligence Wing to keep track of Maoist subversion. In its counter-insurgency strategy, thegovernment has initiated combined combing operations along the Orissa-Andhra border with the help of the Andhra Pradesh Police.
The Orissa government has also introduced upgraded training for its Special Forces, with specialisation in jungle and guerrilla warfare. It has also sent several batches of police officers for training in neighbouring Andhra Pradesh, and is planning to set up a training institute on the lines of Andhra Pradesh's'Greyhounds' Police Force. In November 2006, thegovernment of Orissa decided to recruit 1,652 retired Army personnel for deployment in the Maoist-affected areas of thestate and made a provision of Rs 50 million in the first supplementary budget placed in thestate Legislative Assembly for such recruitment. A provision of Rs 7.5 million has been provided for strengthening the secret services under the intelligence.
As part of its non-military strategy, the government has introduced reservation of elected posts in the Panchayat Raj (villageself-government) institutions in Scheduled Areas, as prescribed under the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act; deregulation of as many as 68 items of minor forest produce in order to provide economic benefits to the tribals; restoration of over 10,000 acres of land to tribals under a special drive; withdrawal of police/forest/excise cases against tribals; and focused efforts to improve health, education and communication facilities in the remote and backward areas of thestate.
In June 2006, the government also approved a comprehensive rehabilitation package for surrendering Maoists. The rehabilitation package consists of a payment of up toRs 10,000 on acceptance of surrender; payment up to Rs 20,000 for surrendering arms and ammunition; allotment of homestead land; a house building grant up toRs 25,000; Rs 15,000 for marriage assistance; interest free loans of up to Rs 200,000 from banks, with a subsidy up toRs 50,000 after repayment of 75 per cent of the loan; free medical treatment in governmenthospitals within the state; and cost of fees and textbooks for study up to the high school level. Thegovernment also proposed to withdraw cases involving minor offences against the surrendered Maoists.
But neither the proscription of the Maoists and their front organisations, nor the variousgovernmental programmes for upgradation of its forces and for relief to the people in affected areas are yet showing significant signs of success. While the proscription has led to some restriction on the open movement of the Maoists, it has in no manner created any hurdles in their ongoing efforts to consolidate their presence among the tribals – a significant part of their support base. With a stronginter-state network, a growing support base among the tribals and dense forests to hide in, the Maoist threat can only grow, unless thegovernment radically revises its strategies to deal with the problem and demonstrates a far greater sense urgency than has thus far been in evidence.
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Prasanta Kumar Pradhan is Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
