Fissures Within

According to the Army report, Chief Minister Singh, in March2005, contributed rupees 50 lakhs to the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and afurther rupees one crore to the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF), thepolitical wing of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in June 2005. The Army,as evidence, has produced two receipts, allegedly issued by these groups,acknowledging the contribution by the Chief Minister.

Unfortunately, Ibobi Singh is not alone, and there is a longlist of politicians, including Chief Ministers, who have been similarly accusedof buying – or attempting to buy – peace with the militants. In the late1980s, the then Manipur governor, General K.V. Krishna Rao, accused ChiefMinister Rishang Keishing of contributing rupees 30 lakhs to the coffers of thethen undivided National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). Keishing’slinkages with the militants found mention in the report of another state governor,General V.K. Nayyar who accused him as well as another senior politician of the state,R.K. Dorendro of financing the NSCN. In December 2000, the union government hadasked the Manipur government to investigate the alleged links of at least five stateministers with militant groups. It had provided evidence that some of these ministershad not only contributed funds to the groups, but had also participated in thefunerals of militants killed in encounters and had provided militants withofficial vehicles.

In militancy-ridden Manipur, buying peace with the militantsis a common practice and is seen simply as a strategy of survival. The nexusbetween politicians and militants, seen partly as fallout and partly as cause ofthe protracted conflict, is even more common. As former Manipur governor VedMarwah expressed it, "There are hardly any politicians in Manipur of anystature who do not have links with the insurgent groups."

Seen from the other side, the 15 active militant groupsoperating in the state have minimal access to external funding, even though thesmall arms, explosives and narcotics trade provides a limited trickle ofresource. As a result, most of the outfits remain dependent on extortion fortheir operations. Unlike neighbouring Tripura, only handful of cases ofabductions for ransom take place in Manipur, but the extortion mechanism in the stateremains all-pervasive and a substantial portion of the money is collectedthrough ‘voluntary contributions’ induced by an omni-present threat, andsuch ‘contributions’ cover several government departments as well, at leastsome of which have been known to make ‘standard deductions’ from theirbudgets to meet their ‘obligations’ towards the insurgents.

However, while there is nothing astonishing about IbobiSingh’s payoff to the militants, the Army’s report to the centre and itsleakage to the press have brought the schism between the political class in the stateand the security forces out into the open. The Army and the political leadershipin Manipur have long been known to hold and voice diametrically opposite viewson the issue of counter-insurgency. The Army – whose presence in the state hasnot been particularly successful, and has been marred by several allegations ofhuman rights violation – insists that its operations are hampered by thelinkages between politicians and the militants. Politicians, on the other hand,have harped on a ‘political solution’ to the problem of insurgency, andinsist that the Army’s ‘high-handed’ approach has undermined thepossibilities of such a solution.

These differences had come to a head on August 12, 2004, withthe Chief Minister’s 2004, unilateral decision, in the face of strongresistance from the Army, to lift the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)from seven assembly segments in the greater Imphal area, subsequent to thecustodial killing of Manorama Devi. The Army continues to voice its opinion infavour of the re-imposition of the Act. Speaking on November 11, 2005, at Imphal,the GOC Eastern Command, Lieutenant General Arvind Sharma, advised the state governmentto re-impose the act citing an escalation of militant activities "where theDisturbed Areas Act has been withdrawn." [The Disturbed Areas Act is anenabling legislation under which the AFSPA become operational in areasdesignated ‘disturbed’. Absent such a designation, the AFSPA isautomatically suspended.]

The relations between the state political leadership and theArmy came under further strain after the Army suspended operations against eightKuki militant groups in September 2005. An announcement to this effect was madeby the union defence minister Pranab Mukherjee in Imphal on September 22. The stategovernment, however, saw little logic in this move, which, it claimed, ascribedundue importance to the highly fragmented Kuki groups. Reiterating thisposition, the Chief Minister had declared that, while the Army was free todeclare a ceasefire against the Kuki groups, the state Police would continuetheir operations against these outfits.

While the rest of the Northeastern states have shownsignificant signs of recovery from the multiple and decades-long militantmovements that afflict the region, Manipur continues to be affected by a highdegree of insurgent and terrorist violence. During the current year (as ofDecember 5) out of the 663 insurgency-related fatalities reported in theNortheastern states, 310 (46.8 per cent) have occurred in Manipur alone. Theenormity of these numbers becomes evident in view of the fact that the stateaccounts for just 6.3 per cent of the population, and 8.52 per cent of the landmass of the Northeastern region. state Government control in a majority ofManipur’s nine districts remains nominal, most civil administrativeinstitutions have collapsed, and developmental work is at a standstill. Withinsuch a scenario, a lack of harmony between the political leadership and theSecurity Forces is bound to have serious ramifications for the effectiveness ofcounter-insurgency operations, and this can only further strengthen the militantgroups.

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) continues to maintain apracticed silence on these developments, clearly reflecting a continuous andresolute lethargy, and a lack of will. The centre evidently believes thatinaction could be the best policy under the circumstances, and finds itselfconstrained not to disturb the ‘political stability’ in the state, known forits fly-by-night opportunistic politicians. Before Ibobi Singh took over as theChief Minister in June 2001, Manipur had created an unenviable record of sortsfor political instability. Between 1990 and 2001, the state was ruled by sevenchief ministers with varying tenures ranging from three months (RadhabinodKoijam) to about two years (Rishang Keishing).

The absence of a coherent policy response at the centre, andof a consistent counter-insurgency strategy in the state, combined with thepolitical propensity for inaction, errors on the part of the security forces,and an ill-founded conviction that militancy can be controlled throughunprincipled deals, have created an extremely favourable context of operationfor the militants. Despite the unfortunate and worsening trajectory ofdevelopments over the past years, there seems no sign of an emerging pattern ofresponse from any of the authorities that would suggest any foreseeableimprovement in the situation or relief for the careworn people of Manipur.

Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute forConflict Management. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal