Chinese Chequers

Romanticisation of our relations with our neighbours, a consequent readiness to make unwarranted gestures towards them, and a reluctance to defend our vital national interests in the name of "bhai-bhaiism"(brother-brother syndrome) have been the bane of Indian strategic thinking and policy-making.

The unfortunate results are strewn right across our history ever since we became independent in 1947. Inthe case of Pakistan, they could be seen  in the ill-advised action of Jawaharlal Nehru in taking theKashmir issue to the UN Security Council instead of letting our army expel the Pakistani invaders from theentire State; the Indus Water Treaty signed with Pakistan, which is a shocking example in the world of anupper riparian state voluntarily surrendering three-fourths of the waters of a river system to the lowerriparian state and agreeing to provisions which enable the lower riparian state to hold the upper riparian toransom; the failure of Indira Gandhi to force Pakistan to sign a formal  agreement with India on thefuture of J&K in return for the release of the thousands of Pakistani prisoners of war taken during the1971 war; the action of the I.K.Gujral Government in ordering the winding-up of India's covert actioncapability as an unilateral gesture to Pakistan, which has not been reciprocated till today; and the kabhigaram, kabhi naram ( "Sometimes hot, sometimes soft") policy followed by the present Government,which are misinterpreted in Islamabad as indicating a welcome (to Pakistan) woolly-headedness.

In the case of China, the results could be seen in our  failure to stand by the Tibetans in the 1950sand to protect our territories all along the Sino-Indian border; the Sino-Indian war of 1962; our failure toadequately strengthen the capability of our intelligence agencies to cover China so that India is not taken bysurprise again; the decision of the present Government to divert some of the new institutions created afterthe 1962 war to keep a better eye on China away from the purposes for which they were created; and there-emergence of the romanticising trait in our policy-making towards China as seen in the debate on theforthcoming visit of our Prime Minister, A.B.Vajpayee, to China from June 22 to 26.  

Our lotus-eating habit was seen again in the manner in which the Government undertook an exercise after theKargil war of 1999 to revamp our intelligence apparatus.  The exercise was almost totallyPakistan-centric and paid little attention to strengthening our capability vis-a-vis China .

More self-confident than in the past because of its growing economic and military  strength andinternational stature, would China forget what it regards as the historic wrongs of the past and prove itselfa benign force of the region?

The Chinese themselves have been keen to reassure the people of the region that they have nothing to fearfrom the new and strong China that is rising in their midst. But its reassuring words and demeanour have notcalmed the inner disquiet in the region because of the unpleasant reality that China has never been lacking inreassuring words.  What it has often been lacking is in matching action.

When China chooses to enforce its "historic claims to sovereignty" over a certain territory,whether it be in relation to India, Vietnam or the Philippines, it does not look upon it as an expansion oraggression against other countries. Instead, it views it as a justified action in self-defence undertaken inits own territory, which was unjustifiably under the control of others.

India has been repeatedly a victim of this dichotomy in relation to China's clandestine assistance toPakistan in the fields of nuclear and missile technologies -- actions hostile to India's interests, totally atvariance with its reassuring denials.

It is this trait of determination in action, which it looks upon as justified in its national interests,concealed behind a facade of feigned goodwill, which makes the countries of the region uneasy over the Chinaof tomorrow and which should make our policy-makers too equally uneasy. They are concerned not only over itsgrowing economic strength and military capability, but also over the increasing emphasis on Chinesenationalism as the cementing force to prevent a fate similar to that of the erstwhile USSR overtaking thecountry.

Managing China

In Chinese perception, the collapse of the Soviet Union could be attributed to Mikhail Gorbachev's mistimedpriority to political liberalisation without first achieving economic modernisation and prosperity and thefailure to substitute a new uniting force in the place of the dissolving communist ideology.  They aredetermined not to commit this mistake in China.

Keeping in view the Chinese sensitivities to anything appearing as external pressure or containment, theemphasis in policy-making in the region is not on how to counter the growing Chinese power, which is aninevitable reality, and the re-assertion of its nationalism, but on how to manage and moderate it so that itremains a force for the benefit of the region.

Managing the emerging Chinese giant has inevitably meant welcoming it to regional and international forafor greater interaction; and encouraging the flow of investments and trade to it in the hope that a Chinadependent on external elements for its prosperity, stability and strength would develop a stake in regionalpeace and stability and in maintaining harmonious relations with its neighbours.

Would a prosperous and self-confident China forget what it looks upon as the historic wrongs of the pastand focus more on the future? One hopes it would, but one should not overlook the Chinese trait of viewingmutual accommodation as eventual accommodation on its terms.

However, Chinese external policies are rarely static.  They keep constantly evolving, taking intoconsideration the changed circumstances of the moment and its dynamic perceptions of its national interests. Nowhere is the impact of such evolution on its policy-making  more evident than in respect of itsrelations with Pakistan.

The Pakistan Connection

Giving to the Pakistani armed forces a feeling of psychological parity with India and keeping Indiapre-occupied with Pakistan are still important objectives of Chinese policy-making in the South Asian region. It was these objectives, which have made China clandestinely help Pakistan in acquiring military nuclear andmissile delivery capability, disregarding Indian concerns and US threats to impose sanctions against Chinesecompanies.

It was again these objectives which made China help Pakistan in reinforcing the capability of its Air Forceafter that capability stood in danger of degradation following  the US sanctions under the PresslerAmendment since 1990.  It was again these objectives which made China organise an  emergency supplyof missiles, aircraft and military spare parts for Pakistan through the Karakoram Highway last year, afterIndia mobilised its troops and moved them to the Pakistan border following the abortive attack byPakistan-backed terrorists on the Indian Parliament House in December, 2001.

It is again these objectives which are behind China's recent decisions to help Pakistan in developing theGwadar port on the Mekran Coast in Balochistan in order to reduce its economic and strategic dependence on thevulnerable Karachi port; strengthening its naval capability to overcome the deficiencies noticed during themobilisation of last year; and making full use of its share of water under the Indus Water Treaty for hydelpurposes in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) in order to make it even more difficult for India than at presentto seek a review of the treaty in India's favour.

While China's core objectives to keep India confronted with a credible military threat from Pakistan inorder to reduce its strategic maneuverability and to hamper its efforts to catch up with the Chinese economyremain unaltered, its political stance on Indo-Pakistan issues has been evolving in a direction lessdetrimental to India.  It has been showing greater sensitivity to India's views and concerns on theKashmir issue.  The automatic reflex of the past of supporting Pakistan on Indo-Pakistan bilateral issuesis less evident now.

Positive Developments

There have been positive developments in India's relations with China since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Chinain 1988.  The Joint Working Group (JWG) on the border problem has been meeting periodically. Though theremay not have been any significant progress on substantive strategic issues of concern to India, the JWGmeetings and other bilateral interactions have led to important confidence-building measures on the border.

The two countries have not allowed the persisting border problem to come in the way of the development ofrelations in other fields.  Bilateral trade has increased four-fold  since the last visit of anIndian Prime Minister (P.V.Narasimha Rao) to China in 1993.  Subjects such as collaboration in thesoftware industry, other joint ventures and encouraging investment flows into each other's economy, whichwould have been avoided in the past on grounds of security, are now discussed with growing interest andfollowed up.

China's White Paper on Defence of 1995 referred to the 1993 Sino-Indian Agreement on the maintenance ofpeace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as an example of how bilateral problems could behandled rationally.

Tibet Question

Despite such positive developments, one should not overlook that Tibet continues to be a major area ofconcern to China.  It has been paying more attention to the economic development of Tibet.  Evenindependent reports speak of a change for the better in its economic landscape.  Investments forimproving the communications infrastructure, developing a tourism industry and improving the quality of lifeof the people have brought benefits to the people.

The economic prosperity has not helped the  Chinese to eradicate the influence of the Dalai Lama andthe Buddhist religion on the people. Despite this, at present, they  feel reasonably confident of theircontinuing hold over Tibet.  Their recent invitation to the representatives of the Dalai Lama to visitChina for talks is reflective of this confidence.

However, if the situation in Tibet deteriorates in the future threatening the Chinese position, thepresence and activities of the Dalai Lama and his followers in Indian territory could again become a majorissue of contention, leading to the Chinese re-kindling the border to exercise pressure on India.

So long as Tibet is not finally and totally pacified to their satisfaction with the Dalai Lama out of theway, China may not agree to any substantive progress on the border.  It would be inadvisable to believethat Chinese appetite for territory at Indian expense has been satiated and that it is only a question of timebefore an agreement is reached on the border with only minor adjustments from the LAC in various sectors.

Cautious Engagement

Media speculation speaks of a welcome change in the attitude of China towards accepting India's claim ofSikkim being an integral part of India.  One hopes this is true, but one doubts whether it could be. Itis not at all certain that the Chinese have reconciled themselves to the existing position in the Sikkim andArunachel Pradesh sectors.  Should anti-India political ferment develop in those areas in future due toalienation of the local population from the Government of India, the Chinese may be only too ready to exploitit to reinforce their claims.

The present policy of constructive engagement with China, which was initiated by Rajiv Gandhi, has evolvedsatisfactorily despite the temporary hiccups after India's nuclear tests (Pokhran-II) of May,1998, but thepositive results achieved so far should not lull us into thinking that we may have to worry less about Chinain the future. 

Chinese policies towards India and its neighbours, particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan andMyanmar, would and should continue to be of major concern to India's policy-makers, whether they openly admitit or not.

Similarly, India's policies towards China, and particularly Tibet, and its relations with the US wouldcontinue to be of major concern to China, even though it may not openly say so.  China has alwayssuspected that despite its overt policy of non-alignment, India had been over the years covertly collaboratingwith the USA to monitor China.  US media reports in the last decade of a possible India-US hand in theKhampa revolt of the 1950s  in Tibet and the details given in a recent book "Spies in theHimalayas" of an alleged joint project of the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and India'sIntelligence Bureau (IB) to keep track of nuclear and missile developments in China would have only added tothe Chinese concerns.

India need not be unduly worried over this. If continued co-operation with the US is considered necessaryin our national interests, we need not shirk from it, but without giving a wrong impression that we areganging up against China.

China does not heed our concerns over its clandestine collusion with Pakistan, which poses serious threatsto our security.  Why should we be unduly sensitive to its concerns over our co-operation with the US,which is motivated more by our need to protect ourselves than by any desire to hamper China's emergence as amajor power?

Our Prime Minister will be in China at two important points in its transition from a developing to adeveloped country aspiring to overtake Japan and catch up with the US by 2020, economically, militarily andtechnologically. Its aspirations of catching up with the USA militarily and technologically may remainpipedreams, but its catching up with the US economically is within the realms of possibility.

The first transition, which is already under way, is economic.  It marks the beginning of thetransition of the coastal regions of Guangdong, Fujian and Shanghai, which were the first to open up theireconomy to the outside world, from a low-tech (textiles, leather articles, sports goods etc) to a medium andhi-tech economy (computer hardware, software etc) and from a predominantly manufacturing to the servicessector.  It also marks the beginning of the transition of the interior regions of China (Central andWestern), which had till now not benefited from the opening-up, from a predominantly agricultural andmineral-producing economy to a manufacturing (essentially low and medium tech) economy.

The economic transition is also marked by a vigorous modification  of the manufacturing sector inorder to weed out unprofitable state-owned enterprises.  Before China opened up in 1979, most of itsmanufacturing industries were located in the interior areas for reasons of security. Thus, the modificationalready under way and the weeding out of the inefficient state-owned enterprises are likely to have socially amore destabilising effect on the interior and outlying provinces than in the coastal regions.

This economic transition is being accompanied by a transition in the quality and expertise of the politicalleadership, which would manage it. Between 1979 and 2002, when the opening-up of the coastal regions receivedpriority over that of the interior regions, the leaders, who were chosen by the party to manage this, came toBeijing after having made a name as successful political and economic managers in the coastal belt. Typical examples are those of Jiang Zemin, former President, and Zhu Rongji, former Prime Minister. They madetheir names as managers in Shanghai before being shifted to Beijing.

Many of the personalities of the new leadership, which assumed office in March last, seem to have won theirspurs as political and economic managers in the interior areas and understand them better than theirpredecessors.  A typical example is that of Hu Jintao, who has succeeded Jiang as the President and partychief. He pacified Tibet between 1988 and 1992 after the youth unrest of the middle 1980s. 

The new leadership is more oriented towards law and order and political stability than the preceding. It is as much wedded to economic reforms as its predecessors, but is expected to be cautious in implementingthem in the interior areas, lest there be uncontrollable unrest and  resulting instability.

In the past, Hu was known as a faithful follower of the party line and not as a policy innovator and alsoas an over-cautious man.  As a British analyst sarcastically remarked last year, he had never mistimed astep in his political career because he never took any.  That is how he managed to rise to the topdespite periodic speculation whether he would do so ever since Deng Xiao-ping reportedly chose him as the No.2 to Jiang. 

It remains to be seen whether he lives true to this reputation or breaks away from it and takes China togreater heights. 

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently,Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Convenor, Advisory Committee, Observer ResearchFoundation (ORF), Chennai