Buying Time

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) wants to talk or at least that'swhat many people in Assam and outside appear to believe. A chain of events,which started with the issue of a formal letter of invitation by the PrimeMinister's office on December 7, 2004, however, has seen little beyond a hugenumber of press statements by the involved parties reiterating their commitmentto the peace process. The anticipation of a 'peace process' has, however,impacted directly on military operations against the rebel group, with a generalreduction of pressure following a request to this effect by the negotiator,writer Indira Goswami. Reports suggest, however, that ULFA has found itconvenient to use this period of relief to build up its arsenal and extend itsactivities.

ULFA 'commander-in-chief' Paresh Baruah has reportedly endorsed thenegotiation process initiated by Goswami, but his statements to the media remainmired in histrionics and follow an escalatory trajectory. There has been a greatdeal of formalism regarding the character of the formal invitation from the government,with ULFA insisting that it would not consider an offer of talks unless itreceived a letter "with official seal and signature". Six monthslater, after receiving the scanned version of the letter provided by theNational Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan to mediator Indira Goswami by e-mail onMay 24, Baruah said that a letter "sent through the internet" wouldnot suffice, insisting, "The original has not come as yet. We want a letterin the format in which we had sent our offer to the centre," a positionthat was reiterated on June 10 by ULFA 'chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa.

Quickly thereafter, ULFA has demanded the release of the group's arrested'central committee' members on the grounds that a 'quorum' needs to be completedto discuss the government's invitation. Four of ULFA's top leaders, including'vice chairman' Pradip Gogoi, 'advisor' Bhimkanta Buragohain, 'culturalsecretary' Pranati Deka and 'publicity secretary' Mithinga Daimari are presentlybehind bars.

And while ULFA continues to drag out the preliminaries to the negotiationprocess, it has never stopped doing what put it on the United states' list of'Other Selected Terrorist Organisations'. Since December 7, 2004, when the PMOhanded over the first letter of invitation to Indira Goswami, the outfit hasdetonated 50 explosions across the state. The most recent of these, on June 4,targeted a microwave tower in Guwahati city. Even as the mediator asked thesecurity forces (SFs) to stop operations against the group and wrote to theDefence Minister on the same lines, ULFA continued to target civilians andsecurity force personnel. On May 26, two bicycle borne ULFA terrorists killed aleader of the Congress party at the Dhekorgorah Block office in Jorhat district.On May 20, an Indo-Tibetan Border Police personnel was killed and four otherssustained injuries, when ULFA ambushed a bus transporting the SF personnel, atBorhat in Sibsagar district.

At the same time, ULFA is reorganising its units in its traditional strongholds,forming new 'battalions', and moving into hitherto unexplored territories, bothwithin Assam and in adjoining states. On April 20, the Police demolished awell-equipped camp of ULFA's newly-formed '27th battalion' in Karbi Anglongdistrict, an area where the organisation's traditional influence has been low.The camp was established in the first week of April and was led by a middlelevel cadre, Dandi Bora. On April 21, six ULFA leaders, including a woman'sergeant major', were arrested by the Army at Sesupani in Tinsukia District asthey descended into Assam from their Changlang camp in neighbouring ArunachalPradesh.  

Movements of ULFA cadres drawn from its '28th battalion' have been noticed inthe Jonai area of upper Assam's Dhemaji District and also in the Poba reserveforest area spread over a 100 square kilometres along the borders with ArunachalPradesh. Each of these is a territory that has remained untouched by the group'sterror and extortion in the past. Meanwhile, ULFA cadres continue to use theneighbouring state of Meghalaya's Garo Hills area for transit and as an armsdump. On May 14, Police recovered two universal machine guns, three magazinesand 60 rounds from an ULFA hideout at Masuk in West Garo Hills district. Anestimated 75-100 cadres are reported to be stationed in the District spread over3,714 square kilometres.

Intelligence sources indicate that several of ULFA's 'commanders', including LalDeka, 'commander' of the '109th Battalion', and Biju Chakraborty 'Lieutenant' ofthe '709th Battalion', are moving about their assigned areas in upper Assam, aswell as in traditional strongholds like Nalbari and Guwahati city. Movements ofseveral of the outfit's hit-men, including Hira Sarania, Drishti Rajkhowa,Prabhat Roy and Madhav Roy, have been reported from different parts of the state.

To compound the situation, ULFA has called for a plebiscite in Assam through apress statement of November 27, 2004; for international intervention on December13, 2004; and for US mediation to 'end Indian military repression', on June 2,2005. The ULFA leadership's commitment to the dialogue process is far fromclear. This was clearly confirmed by state governor, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) AjaiSingh, who stated, on May 20, "There is a question mark on the genuinenessof the ULFA leadership for a dialogue because earlier, whenever it spoke abouttalks, it did so for buying time to regroup." 

Obviously, governor Singh does not have any of chief minister Tarun Gogoi'spolitical compulsions. Gogoi, on the other hand, has been insisting that talkswith ULFA be initiated on the same lines as those with the National SocialistCouncil of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), and was, in fact, deeply critical ofthe US decision to put ULFA on its list of terrorists, arguing that such stepswere not conducive to the negotiating process.

Negotiating with the ULFA is an issue with huge political ramifications inAssam where insurgency has claimed 5,445 lives between 1992 and June 10, 2005.With the state going to the polls in 2006, any movement in this direction wouldbe politically rewarding for the ruling Congress party and for chief ministerGogoi. That explains Gogoi's eagerness to push forward any kind of process, hiswillingness to consider releasing the arrested ULFA leaders, and his trips toNew Delhi to convince the Prime Minister on the utility of these actions.Indeed, he has made little attempt to hide his game plan, and declared, on June9, "We do not want to stand between the ULFA and the centre. We just wantto sort out all the issues relating to the state before the Assemblyelections."

Apparent movement on the talks with ULFA is, consequently, crucial if theCongress is to cement its prospects in the impending elections. In a state wheredevelopment and governance have taken a severe beating, gains on the insurgencyfront are the only 'achievement' the incumbent party can take to the people ifit is to seek another term in power. In this, Gogoi has already garnered someadvantage, since ceasefire agreements have now been signed with all thesignificant groups in the state other than ULFA.

The United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD),the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF) and most recently National Democratic Front ofBodoland (NDFB) have all been brought to the negotiating table. If ULFA can bebrought into any kind of negotiation process, the people's hopes for peace wouldsoar. Gogoi's political compulsions are, consequently, obvious.

It appears that the ULFA leadership is aware of these vulnerabilities, andintends to exploit them.

Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia TerrorismPortal