Bullets And Ballots

Guns still seem to do most of the talking in the battle of the ballots in India's Northeast. Come electiontime, the separatist rebel armies in this troubled frontier region jump into the murky world of electoralpolitics, backing or opposing particular candidates and political parties. Armed to the teeth, insurgentcadres roam about the countryside, mostly in the deep interiors, coercing voters or threatening andintimidating candidates. Their objective: to ensure that candidates of their choice win through, or at leastthat a government sympathetic to their rivals does not get elected. This is, indeed, ironic since theseseparatist rebel groups 'reject' the Indian Constitution and, consequently, claim that they do not 'recognize'elections held under the country's constitutional provisions.

Once again, the shadow of insurgency looms large over the elections on Wednesday, February 26, in three ofthe seven Northeast Indian States - Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya. The voters in these States would elect 60members each to their respective State legislatures. In Tripura, which shares a porous border with Bangladesh,the outlawed National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) is on a rampage, killing, abducting and intimidatingcadres and supporters of the ruling Left Front, led by the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM). The NLFTand its offshoot, the Borok Nationalist Council of Tripura (BNCT), are said to be responsible for most of the42 people killed between January 11 - the day the poll schedule was announced - and February 23.

In Nagaland, contrary to promises of non-interference in the polls by the rebels themselves, as well asrecent developments in the peace process, the situation has taken an abrupt nosedive. Rival factions of theNational Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), headed by Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN-IM), onone side, and by Shangnyu Shangwang Khaplang (NSCN-K), on the other, are engaged in mutual accusations ofelection-related violence and coercion.

The general charge is that the NSCN-IM cadres are 'openly canvassing' against the ruling Congress and itscandidates, while the NSCN-K is supporting the Congress camp. Kughalu Mulatonu, 'Deputy Information Minister'of the NSCN-K, telephoned this writer last week from one of the group's bases in Nagaland to say that NSCN-IM'kilonsers' (ministers) and cadres were canvassing in favour of the Congress, wearing police uniforms. He alsoadmitted that his cadres ambushed a vehicle carrying a group of NSCN-IM men in the district town of Zunheboto,north of State capital Kohima. One of the NSCN-IM cadres was killed and another wounded in that attack which,Mulatonu said, took place while the NSCN-IM men were engaged in 'undesirable election activity.'

Rebel groups in Meghalaya, by contrast, appear to be maintaining a relatively low profile thus far. Theonly direct election-related statement made by a rebel group in this State was by the Hynniewtrep NationalLiberation Council (HNLC) in its February 1 newsletter, which asserted: "Holding the State Assemblyelections under the Indian colonial system is rejected by the HNLC, and such an election can be said to benull and void." There are, at this point, no reports of any major interference in the poll process byeither the HNLC - which is active in the Khasi and Jaintia hills districts - or the Achik National VolunteerCouncil (ANVC) - which holds sway in the Garo hills, bordering Bangladesh.

The intrusion of separatist and insurgent groups in the constitutional electoral process is, in largemeasure, collusive, and is based on a history of declining standards in political leadership in the region asa result of which most political parties, both regional and national, have yielded to the imperatives ofexpediency to form opportunistic alliances with violent rebel groups to secure some illegitimate electoraladvantage. Deals are, consequently, struck on the election eve between political parties and insurgent groups,who lend their muscle and arms to the campaign in return for political patronage in the post election regime.The party that comes to power with such support is naturally bound to follow a policy of relative leniencyagainst the supportive rebel group - at least for some time - creating 'breathing space' for such groups toconsolidate their hold and expand their activities.

This time round, the NLFT has been accused of directly backing the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura(INPT), an ally of the opposition Congress party in Tripura. Both the NLFT and the INPT share a commonideology and project the same set of grievances - the restoration of the rights and privileges of the tribalsin Tripura, who have been reduced to a minority in their own land as a result of waves of migration fromBangladesh. The tribals, at one time a majority in the area, today comprise less than 30 per cent of Tripura's3.2 million population.

An examination of the INPT's emergence easily exposes its roots and support base. It was formed early lastyear with the merger of three major tribal forces - the Tribal National Volunteers (TNV), the one-time rebelgroup that bid adieu to arms with the signing of the Tripura Accord in 1988; the Tripura Upajati Yuba Samity (TUJS),an influential tribal political party; and the Indigenous People's Front of Tripura (IPFT). Significantly, TNVsupreme Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl, a dreaded former guerrilla leader who signed the 1988 peace agreement, is thepresident of the INPT. He is a sitting member of the Tripura Assembly and is seeking re-election this timefrom the Kulai constituency in the insurgent-infested Dholai district. Both the TUJS and the TNV had earlierbeen allies of the Congress, and this alliance shifted to a relationship with the INPT when the three forcesmerged under its banner.

The IPFT emerged as a major tribal force in Tripura during the April 2000 elections to the Tripura TribalAreas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC). On that occasion, the IPFT ousted the ruling CPM from power inrural Tripura for the first time in decades, a victory that was projected as the first major step in tribalresurgence in the State. The CPM had, at that time, accused the IPFT of securing its victory as a result ofthe direct backing of the insurgent NLFT. This, precisely, is the charge that the CPM now levels against theIPFT-Congress combine.

The levels of violence in Nagaland are visibly lower as compared to Tripura, but the situation on theground is indeed messy. NSCN-IM leaders Swu and Muivah had stated during their visit to New Delhi in January,that their organization would neither participate in, nor obstruct, the election process in Nagaland. Similarviews were echoed by NSCN-IM leaders based in the State. A.K.Lungaleng, an NSCN-IM leader, had declared:"We are not getting involved in the elections, but we would like to tell the electorate to vote in a freeand fair manner and urge political parties not to indulge in electoral malpractice." Despite this,however, allegations of the rebel group engaging in coercive actions are flowing thick and fast. NagalandChief Minister S.C. Jamir has claimed that the NSCN-IM cadres were intimidating voters and directing them todefeat the Congress. The Congress party has accused Lt. Gen. (Retd) R. V. Kulkarni, head of the CeasefireMonitoring Committee in Nagaland, of remaining a silent spectator to the NSCN-IM's activities.

The situation is complicated further by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is desperately trying tomake an entry into the Nagaland Assembly (Nagaland has a 95 per cent Christian population). These leaders havebeen arguing that since the NSCN-IM wants the 'corrupt Congress' out of the State, the rebel group was boundto 'support us'. The BJP has been trying to take credit for increased momentum of the Naga peace process underthe leadership of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, to buttress its case. Such a thinly veiled demand forsupport from the NSCN-IM by a major political party on the eve of the elections is certainly a disturbingdevelopment.

The NSCN-IM's official position, of course, remains that it will not be involved in the Nagaland electionsin any way. However, in view of the fact that a solution to the longstanding Naga problem is now beingapproached at great speed, the NSCN-IM would obviously be keen to see that a government which is soft towardsthem assumes power in Nagaland.

The Congress - and Jamir in particular - is not likely to give the NSCN-IM the 'kid gloves' treatment if itreturns to power once again. As of now, consequently, Jamir's assurance that he was ready to relinquish powerfor the sake of peace in Nagaland has not cut much ice with the NSCN-IM. Moreover, Jamir's persistent demandthat not just the NSCN-IM, but all other Naga rebel factions must be involved in the peace process for anylasting solution to be reached, is a position acutely disliked by the NSCN-IM. The NSCN-IM considers itselfthe 'sole representative' of the Naga people, and claims a popular mandate to secure an acceptable peace dealwith New Delhi. The poll-eve heat in Nagaland is, consequently, just the beginning of more trouble in hand.

The author is Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, TheSentinel, Guwahati. Courtesy, South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal