A House Divided

In April 2005, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen's (HM's)  Beerwah-area 'districtcommander' Yusuf Sheikh had mailed a letter to police officials in Srinagar. Itcontained a photograph of the severed head of Farooq Ahmad, an agent infiltratedinto the organisation six months earlier; the head itself was tossed in the dirtnear a city bus station soon after. In Sheikh's own case, the defiant gestureproved misguided - he was targeted for attention and shot dead inside of sixweeks - but the action did reflect the rise of a certain arrogant élan in theHM: a sign that it had begun to recover from the decimation of its senior fieldcommand in 2003-2004.

Now, as details emerge on the operation that led to the September 29, 2005,elimination of Ibrahim Dar, the HM's Srinagar-area 'district commander',something of a picture is starting to emerge of just what is going on inside thenumerically largest terrorist group operating in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

While Dar occupied a relatively low administrative role, his visibility inrecent months had far exceeded that of his organisational superiors. Thearchitect of an alliance between HM and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) cadre in Srinagar,Dar had organised a series of high-profile car bombings and suicide-squad (fidayeen)attacks in recent months. Starting with a March 23 explosion in the Sanat Nagarsuburb, intended to demonstrate the HM's possession of capabilities forderailing the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service, Dar's terrorist cell went on toexecute attacks on the city's Passport Office, Deputy Commissioner's Office anda military convoy passing by the well-known Burnhall School. Most of theseattacks, departing from traditional HM practice, used bombs manufactured fromcommercially-available chemicals, rather than military-grade explosives like RDX.

Investigators were intrigued by this change in course, since Dar's earlierterror enterprises had focussed on assassinations, not bombings. Having joinedthe HM in the early 1990s, after abandoning his efforts to obtain a Bachelor ofSciences degree, Dar was arrested for a 1996 murder. While in prison, heacquired for a mentor the senior HM 'commander', Hashim Javed Iqbal. Bothobtained bail after six years. Under Iqbal's tutelage, Dar then allied withSrinagar-based elements of the LeT and al-Umar to form the Save Kashmir Movement(SKM). An assassination-focussed organisation, the SKM killed several NationalConference cadre involved in the 2002 elections to the State Assembly. Soonafter, in March 2003, it eliminated the dissident HM 'commander', Abdul MajidDar, who had initiated talks with the Government of India. The SKM carried outfurther attacks in 2004, including the assassinations of DeputyInspector-General of Police Mohammad Amin Bhat and Maulvi Mushtaq Ahmad, theuncle of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq.Dar also targeted politicians who fought the February 2005 elections to theSrinagar Municipal Corporation.

In parallel with these precision killings, Dar tasked allied organisationswith executing larger actions of symbolic value, using fidayeen groups. Looseaffiliations seem to have first been forged with the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) forthis purpose, although they tapered off because of the JeM's internal crisis,ending finally with the 2003 elimination of its field amir, or 'supremecommander', Shahbaz Khan. By that year, however, the alliance with the LeT waswell entrenched. It survived the arrest that year of three of Dar's closestallies in that organisation, Feroze Ahmad Sheikh, Altaf Mir and ShamimullahKhan. One reason for this was that Dar himself escaped. With not a littleingenuity and effort, he succeeded in protecting his Srinagar networks both fromlocal attrition and the elimination of successive overall chiefs of the HM.Indeed, by 2004, the Lashkar-Hizb combine was considering a large scaleoperation targeting the Bombay Stock Exchange, which, however, was comprised byits penetration by Indian communications intelligence. Twenty three members ofDar's network, including his mentor Iqbal, were arrested.

For much of 2004, terrorist groups in Srinagar appeared to be in retreat: barfidayeen actions, rich in symbolic value but of little practical effect, theyappeared to be able to do nothing. Indeed, after the May 2004, elimination ofthe HM's 'supreme commander' for the Kashmir Valley, Abdul Rashid Pir, theorganisation even seemed unable to find a successor to take his job. In themidst of this chaos, however, Dar managed to keep going. His recent activitieshad, for obvious reasons, given the security establishment in Srinagarsubstantial cause for concern, especially since considerable care was beingtaken to avoid communications intelligence penetration of the kind which had ledto the destruction of the Bombay Stock Exchange cell. Aware, for example, thatIndian intelligence had penetrated their cellphone networks, members of the cellhad generally taken to communicating through couriers. Where talking wasnecessary, they frequently changed instruments and SIM cards, turned on theirphones only for brief periods at pre-decided times and used codes to make theirconversations seem innocuous.

Much of the intelligence generated during the J&K Police's operationtargeting Dar has affirmed long-standing speculation about serious internalproblems within the HM. Its recent emphasis on car-bomb attacks seems to havebeen the consequence of a shortage of weapons and cadre, the result of decliningsupport from Pakistan and improved anti-infiltration measures. As a result ofthese pressures, some field cadre of the HM were eager to open lines ofcommunication with New Delhi. Equal numbers, however, believed that a dialoguewould principally benefit politicians of the APHC rather than the armed groupand its cadre. Interestingly, the Muzaffarabad-based central organisation of theHM seems afraid of the consequences of freewheeling negotiation - one reason ithas not appointed an overall commander for the Kashmir Valley since theelimination of Pir. HM commanders within Kashmir have, for some time, beenstopped from communicating with the media, that task being solely handled by itsPakistan-based supreme leadership, reflecting an increasing paucity of trust andfears that field commanders may be increasingly inclined to seek a dialogue withNew Delhi.

What does the elimination of Dar mean for the future of the HM's bombingoffensive? While it will undoubtedly hurt the organisation, it is unlikely thatDar's killing will in itself bring an end to this campaign. For one, Dar'ssuperior - the Srinagar 'division commander', so far known only by the alias 'Jehangir'- remains alive. Dar's resourceful and tough south Kashmir counterpart, SohailFaisal, also continues to operate. More worrying, from the point of view ofForces operating in J&K, is the fact that Srinagar's urban terror cells seemto be increasingly sensitive to the capabilities and limitations of Indiancommunications intelligence. India will, most likely, have to upgrade itscommunications intelligence infrastructure significantly in years to come,notably the ability of forces operating in J&K to monitor encrypted internettraffic and hand-held satellite phone conversations. Most important, though, theabiding lesson of the hunt for Dar ought to be that the carefully-built humanintelligence networks that have worked with great success in J&K ought notto be allowed to wither away in the fond hope that peace is just around thecorner.

Praveen Swami is Chief of Bureau in New Delhi and Deputy Editor, Frontline.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South AsiaTerrorism Portal