The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) lost another important fieldoperative on January 5, 2008 when Col. Charles, Head of its MilitaryIntelligence organisation, was killed in what was described by it as a randomClaymore attack by Sri Lanka Army's Deep Penetration Unit in Pa'l'lamadu inMannaar. The vehicle in which he was travelling hit a mine, killing all thethree occupants of it.
The LTTE's description of the incident as a random attack was meant to conveythe impression that the mine, which struck his vehicle, was among those plantedby the Sri Lankan Army's Deep Penetration Unit in the area and was notspecifically directed at Charles.
The Sri Lankan Army was initially not aware of the death of Charles. On comingto know of it from the LTTE's announcement, the Army went to town in order toconvey an impression that it had inside information about the likely travel ofCharles in the area and had specifically targeted him.
This claim of the Army, meant to create nervousness among the members andsupporters of the LTTE, has not been independently corroborated.
The Deep Penetration Unit of the Army has been planting Claymore mines in theareas under the control of the LTTE for many years now. Some of these minesproved effective in achieving the Army's objective. Shankar, Nizam and Mano ofthe LTTE were killed by Claymore mines in 2001. Shankar was the founder of theSea Tigers and the Procurement Division of the LTTE and was in charge of settingup an air wing for the LTTE when he was killed. Mano was in charge of the LTTE'scommunications division in the Batticaloa area. Nizam was an importantclandestine operative in the Batticaloa area. In all these cases, the Army hadclaimed that its successes were due to inside information of their travel plansand route. In 2001, Thamilselvan, the head of the LTTE's political division, whodied in an air strike by the Sri Lankan Air Force last year, escaped beingkilled by a mine while travelling.
The death of Shankar was a particularly severe loss for the LTTE, but itrecovered from it. His death did not come in the way of preventing it fromacquiring an air wing. By using the South African contacts of Shankar, the LTTEwas able to procure the aircraft and get its pilots trained in South Africa.
However, Shankar's death caused difficulties in replenishing the LTTE's stock ofanti-aircraft ammunition and missiles. Shankar had reliable sources in SouthAfrica through him he was able to procure anti-aircraft ammunition and missiles.After his death, these sources dried up. This is one of the reasons why the LTTEfinds itself defenceless against the repeated attacks by the Sri Lankan AirForce.
The death of Charles could create major difficulties for the LTTE in theshort-term, but it might be able to fill up the void in the medium and longterm. He was very knowledgeable on the Katunayake airport and had planned andco-ordinated the LTTE's attack on the airport in 2001 along with Shankar. He wasreportedly in charge of planning and co-ordinating another attack to destroy thefighter planes of the Sri Lankan Air Force on the ground.
The Sri Lankan Minister for Nation Building, Mr. D. M. Dassanayaka, wasseriously injured in a Claymore blast near Ja-Ela junction, 18 km northeast ofColombo city, on January 8,2008, when he was proceeding to the Parliament. Hedied in hospital later. The incident took place near the Katunayake airport.
The initial speculation was that the attack was in retaliation for the death ofCharles, but it appears doubtful whether the LTTE would have been able to planand carry out a retaliatory strike within 72 hours of the death of Charles. Agreater possibility is that this had been planned and got executed as the LTTE'sriposte to the Government's action in abrogating the cease-fire agreementconcluded with the LTTE in 2002. It was expected that the LTTE would retaliateagainst the government's action by stepping up its operations in Colombo.
The LTTE, which had faced a number of set-backs in 2007, has started the NewYear with another major set-back. The death of Charles is likely to have anegative impact on the morale of the LTTE's supporters in Sri Lanka and abroad,but not yet on the morale of the operatives of the LTTE's fighting wings.
Since the beginning of 2007, the LTTE has suffered four major attritions--theattrition of the area under its control in the Eastern Province, the attritionof its capability for the clandestine procurement and transport of arms andammunition from abroad, an attrition of its dwindling cadre of experiencedoperatives and an attrition of the international support and understanding forits cause.
Determined and well-motivated insurgent and terrorist organisations often manageto get over the first three attritions. These attritions need not be irreparablefor the LTTE. But the attrition in international support and understanding mayturn out to be irreparable. This was evident when the international communityconfined its reaction to the abrogation of the cease-fire agreement by theMahinda Rajapaksa government to the expression of some pro forma criticismalone.
The LTTE still has a strong, but slowly diminishing reservoir of operationalcapability, which can still turn the present tide against it, but without areservoir of international support and understanding, its operational capabilityalone will serve little purpose.
While Prabakaran, the LTTE leader, still has at his disposal the services ofsome excellent and experienced operatives, he faces an acute shortage ofpolitical operatives, with lucidity and sound political judgement. Guns alone,however expertly handled, cannot prove decisive, unless there is a wisepolitical mind behind the gun.
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B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.
