Since the beginning of this year, senior US officials—mainly in the Pentagon and the intelligence community, but not so much in the StateDepartment—have been openly expressing their concern over the increase in the activities of Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban from the Pakistani territory and the slackening of the Pakistani co-operation in dealing with them. These concerns have been expressed in Congressional testimonies and public statements. The new Congress, dominated by the Democrats, has also been increasingly vocal on this issue and has expressed itself in favour of linking continued economic and military assistance to Pakistan to the effectiveness of its actions against Al Qaeda and the NeoTaliban.
For the first time, US military officers at the field level in Afghanistan as well as in Washington DC have been discussing openly before Congressional committees and other fora the various scenarios where unilateral direct action by US troops in Pakistani territory in the tribal areas adjoining Pakistan's border with Afghanistan might become unavoidable. Among such scenarios projected by them are instances where there is an imminent threat to the lives of US troops in Afghan territory due to firing by the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda elements from Pakistani territory and hot pursuit of terrorists fleeing into Pakistani territory after killing American troops in Afghan territory. At the same time, they have ruled out unilateral direct action where there is no imminent threat to American lives. One scenario, which has not figured in thesediscussions—deliberately, one would assume— is what would they do if they get precise intelligence about the presence of Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri in Pakistani territory. They would most probably take direct actionunilaterally—either in the form of an air strike or a cross-border raid— without worrying about the sensitivities of Pakistan. Gen. Pervez Musharraf would certainly know this. If he doesn't, he doesn't know the Americans.
Interestingly, for the first time since 9/11, American analysts—mainly non-governmental now, but with governmentalinputs— have also started discussing the question "After Musharraf, Who & What". An article carried by theNew York Times recently on this subject illustrates the beginning of a change of thinking on the indispensability of Musharraf. In the past, the Americans had convinced themselves that there was no alternative to the continuance of Musharraf in power if they had to win the war against terrorism. In February 2002, I had addressed at Washington DC an informal meeting attended bygovernmental and non-governmental analysts on Pakistan and terrorism. I spoke very negatively of Musharraf and said they should not put all their eggs in the Musharraf basket. Nobody agreed with me during the meeting, but when I was leaving the meeting venue, an American official, who walked with me to the car, said: "Mr. Raman, we always believe that a known devil is better than an unknown devil."
Musharraf himself had managed to convince American policy-makers and non-governmental experts who contribute substantially to policy-making that after him, there would be a jihadi deluge. Even with him in power in Islamabad, the Americans are already facing the beginning of a jihadi deluge in Afghanistan in the form of stepped-up activities by the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda from their safe haven in Pakistani territory. Either Musharraf is unwilling or unable to stop it. Either way, it does not bode well for the US and its war on terrorism. Till September last year, Musharraf was viewed by American policy-makers as a major asset in their war on terrorism. Since he concluded his insidious peace agreement with the supporters of the Neo Taliban in North Waziristan in September, his continued dependability as an asset is increasingly being questioned in US military circles in Afghanistan and Washington DC.
In the Pentagon and in the Defence Intelligence Agency, where nostalgia for the good old days of fighting together against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, plays no role in policy-making, decisions are taken on a cool-headed calculation of what would bring victory or at least avoid defeat. They seem to have come to the conclusion that Musharraf is not helping them to win. Only in the Central Intelligence Agency and in the community of retired civilian intelligence officers, where nostalgia for the past is very strong, is the opinion divided. While the younger generation of post-1990 officers would have no qualms over dumping Musharraf, the pre-1990officers—some retired and some still in service— are fighting a rear-guard action to keep faith with Musharraf. They continue to propagate that Musharraf is the best bet in Pakistan. Some of them even argue that US should exercise pressure on India to address Musharraf's concerns relating to Indian activism in support of the Hamid Karzaigovernment in Afghanistan. According to them, the slackening of action by Musharraf is due to his sulk over the US failure to exercise pressure on India.
In the on-going debate on what should be the US policy— "All the Way With Musharraf" or "DumpMusharraf"?— the Administration faces a difficult dilemma. It is not yet prepared to dump Musharraf. At the same time, it dreads the dangers of a defeat in Afghanistan if it continues to persist with him. The Bush Administration cannot afford to have defeats in both the fronts of its war onterrorism— Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq it is hoping to avoid a defeat, even if it is not able to win outright. If it loses in Iraq, it will need a victory in Afghanistan to compensate for it.
Hopes that Musharraf would help in achieving such a victory are fading. Fears that he might actually be a hindrance have started appearing at least in the columns of newspapers.
The best option for Indian policy-makers in the evolving situation is to take a ringside seat and watch and avoid putting all the eggs in the Musharraf basket.
Advertisement
The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.
