Taming The Tamil Tiger

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) remain as defiant as ever.  The LTTE's peace talks withthe representatives of the Sri Lankan Government, of which six rounds have already been held, continue toremain stalled since April, 2003.

This is due to its uncompromising demand for the re-location, if not withdrawal, of the Sri Lankan securityforces from Jaffna, where the LTTE apparently wants to set up the headquarters of its administration and forthe creation of an interim administrative structure in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, whichthe LTTE looks upon as the Tamil homeland.  It views  Jaffna as the capital of this homeland andwants it to become  the seat of de facto Tamil power even when the peace talks to legitimise this powerare being held.

The LTTE wants these two demands to be met even before the peace talks could reach a compromise politicalsolution on the future set-up of Sri Lanka.  It had taken to arms against Colombo in the 1980s in supportof its demand for an independent Tamil Eelam, but after the ceasefire agreement reached with the Governmentlast year to facilitate the talks, it  indicated its willingness to consider an ultimate politicalsolution falling short of absolute independence, if the solution provided for the kind of autonomy which wouldmeet the aspirations and needs of the Tamils and preserved their dignity, as a people culturally distinct fromthe majority Sinhalese community.

Velupillai Prabakaran, the LTTE leader, and Anton Balasingham, his UK-based adviser and leader of his teamfor the talks, have not spelt out so far in public what kind of autonomy they have in mind.  However,from their various statements, interviews, correspondence with the Government and their stance on variousissues during the six rounds held so far, it is not difficult to surmise the contours of the Tamil Eelam,autonomous, but not necessarily independent, which they are trying to achieve. These are: 

• The right of the LTTE to maintain the practically independent general, police, judicial and financialadministration which it has already set up in the Tamil territory under its control and its extension to theareas still under the control of the Government.
  
  It sees the peace talks as not between a legitimate State and a non-State actor, which had taken to terrorismto achieve its political objective, but as between two co-habiting States, one de jure and the other de facto,which should enjoy equal status in the eyes of the international community.
  
  
• Its right to maintain its army and navy for the protection of the new Tamil State entity to come out ofthe peace talks from internal and external dangers and the consequent need for the exclusion of the Sri LankanArmed Forces from this territory.
  
  
• The recognition by Colombo and the international community of its political supremacy in the Tamilhomeland, even though that supremacy might have been won through the force of arms and not through the ballotbox. 
  
  It apparently wants the conditions under which the other Tamil political formations and the Muslim minority would be allowed to participate in the running of the new State to be left to the LTTE to decide, without anysignificant role for the Sri Lankan Government in this matter.
  

In the LTTE's calculation, this could save the face of the majority Sinhalese community by not partitioning the country into two independent States and at the same time concede the political and cultural aspirations ofthe Tamils and protect their dignity by freeing them from the perceived subjugation under the Sinhalese.

These contours rule out from future discussions important questions such as the disbandment of the LTTEarmy and navy and the incorporation of their members into the Sri Lankan Armed Forces; de-weaponisation;merger of the LTTE administration with that of the Sri Lankan Government; and identification of the residuarypowers of the federal Government in the Tamil areas etc. 

Such questions always receive priority in the agenda of any discussions between a State and an insurgent orterrorist organisation as one had seen in the talks held by the Government of India with the Naga and Mizoinsurgents in India's North-East.

By unilaterally suspending its  participation in the peace talks due to its sulk over its exclusionfrom a meeting of the international donors held at Washington DC because of its continued designation as aforeign terrorist organisation under a 1996 US law, and by refusing to participate in the donors' conferenceheld at Tokyo on June 9,2003, because of the non-satisfaction of its demand for an interim administrativestructure, even if it has to be outside the Sri Lankan Constitution, the LTTE has blocked any forward movementtill its demands are met.

It is not worried over the possibility of continuing economic hardships for the Tamil people, whose welfareit claims to espouse, because of its rigid stand.  At the Tokyo conference, the participants reportedlypledged over US $ four billion as aid for the economic rehabilitation of Sri Lanka, but many such as Japan,which had taken the initiative in this matter, have made it clear that actual disbursements would depend onthe progress achieved in the peace talks.

One of the factors, which induced Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe to take the initiative for peacetalks with the LTTE was the need for foreign investment and aid flows to re-invigorate the Sri Lankan economy. The LTTE is calculating that the linking of the actual disbursements with the progress in the peace talkswould bring pressure on the Prime Minister to be more responsive to its demands.

The LTTE is demanding an interim administrative structure in the Tamil areas even at the present stage ofthe peace talks and  even before substantive issues are taken up on the ground that without such astructure, the benefit of the foreign aid flow would not go to the people.

The Prime Minister was reportedly not averse to the creation of a development-oriented interimadministrative structure in the Tamil areas with the management of which the LTTE would be associated. The LTTE has rejected this because it wants that the role of the interim administrative structure should notbe restricted only to economic development, but should also cover other aspects of governmental activitiessuch as maintenance of law and order, tax collection, judicial administration etc. Moreover, it wants that itsrole in such a structure should be one of leadership and not just  association with a structurecontrolled by the Government.  Effective leadership and control for the LTTE in such an interim structureare its sine qua non for its resuming its participation in the peace talks.

In his intervention at the Tokyo conference, Wickremasinghe assured the LTTE of a "significantrole" in an "efficient, transparent and accountable " provisional administrative structure,whose  powers would include rebuilding the war-ravaged economy, resettlement of people and the provisionof essential services.  He said that his government would consider calling a referendum to endorsechanges to the country's constitution that could be part of a final solution to the  conflict. He added:

"We will introduce constitutional reforms when we have negotiated a final political solution, which weare fully committed to take to the people of Sri Lanka through a referendum for the ultimate decision. "

He also said that since the new structure should safeguard the interests of all communities in the northand east, a Muslim delegation should join the peace talks when they resumed.  His assurances do not seemto have had any effect on the LTTE so far.

Prabakaran would have cause for concern from some of the interventions in the Tokyo conference, which madeit clear that the international community continues to be worried over its refusal to assure the communitythat it no longer believes in the use of terrorism as a weapon to achieve its political objective. 

Richard Armitage, the US Deputy Secretary of State, was particularly blunt in his warnings to the LTTE. He said that it still had a long way to go to prove that it was  a legitimate political force:

"The group that pioneered the practice of turning its sons and daughters into human bombs is going tohave to work hard to build trust and convince the world that it is capable of playing a legitimate role in thepolitical life of Sri Lanka,"

he warned.

Will the LTTE relent in its refusal to re-join the talks and tone down its blatantly unreasonable demands?It is not yet clear.  Ranil Wickremasinghe's failure to work out a road-map for the talks, inconsultation with the opposition and President Chandrika Kumaratunge, and his oft-exhibited over-anxiety toplacate the LTTE have placed the Government in a weak position.

The more the concessions he makes to the LTTE, the more recalcitrant it becomes, calculating -- oftenrightly -- that the more the psychological pressure it exercises on him, the more the concessions he would beprepared to make.

The invited role of Norway as the so-called facilitator and the self-assumed role of Japan as thebenefactor -- both interested in securing exclusive fishing rights from any future Tamil Government in theseas off the coast of the Tamil State -- have added to the recalcitrance of the LTTE. 

The suggestion of Norwegian experts to give de facto recognition to the LTTE  navy as a way out of itsfrequent clashes with the Sri Lankan Navy even after the cease-fire and the Norwegian Government's reportedpressure on Wickremasinghe to be more responsive to the LTTE's demand for an interim administrative structureclearly show that Norway has been acting more as an advocate of the LTTE's cause than as a neutral facilitatorwith no agenda of its own. President Chandrika Kumaratunge's recent criticism of the role of Norway cannot bedismissed as without basis.

The way the Sri Lankan Government and Norway have not paid adequate attention to the sensitivities of theMuslims of the Eastern Province and the growing anger of sections of Muslim youth over what they look upon asthe high-handed behaviour of LTTE cadres towards Muslims are giving rise to a radicalisation of the Muslimyouth. Since the Muslim-LTTE clashes in the middle of last year, an organisation called the Osama Brigade hascome to notice, but its leadership and membership are not clear.  There have recently been reports of theSaudi Arabia branch of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), a constituent of Osama bin Laden's International IslamicFront (IIF), setting up a presence in the Eastern Province. The allegedly  pro-LTTE role of Norway isviewed with increasing suspicion by the radicalised Muslim youth

Peace and the end to the bloodshed in Sri Lanka are important. This more than a year-long ceasefire hasdefinitely brought benefit to the people.  At the same time, unless Wickremasinghe is able to rally thesupport of all the political formations of the country behind his efforts for peace and sheds the image of aleader wanting peace at any price, the prospects for a durable peace would not be bright.

Recent reports from Bangkok of the arrest of some suspected LTTE cadres involved in alleged gun-runningshow that the LTTE is keeping open the possibility of renewed hostilities at an opportune time if it is notable to achieve its unreasonable demands at the negotiating table.  It is hoped that Wickremasinghe isequally preparing himself and his security forces for such a contingency.

This is not the time for lotus-eaters.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Convenor, Advisory Committee, Observer Research Foundation (ORF),Chennai chapter