Musharraf's Desperate Gamble

Pakistan's President Gen. PervezMusharraf is engaged in a desperate battle on three fronts--against thejudiciary, the people and the pro-Al Qaeda and pro-Taliban jihadi terrorists.

All these three fronts are of his owncreation and the outcome of the battle would have an impact not only  onthe future stability of Pakistan, but also on peace and security in thePakistan-Afghanistan region, which has been the spawning ground of Al Qaeda andpro-Al Qaeda terrorist organisations, which are active in different countries ofthe world. 

His proclamation of a State ofEmergency on November 3, 2007, was a panic attempt to pre-empt any adverseruling by the Supreme Court setting aside his re-election as the President bythe National Assembly and the provincial Assemblies of Pakistan on October 6,2007. While allowing the election to go ahead as scheduled, the Supreme Courthad ordered that the official announcement of the result and the swearing-in ofthe successful candidate would have to await its ruling on petitions filed bythe Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) and other opponents of Musharraf, challenging thevalidity of the special dispensation, which Musharraf had got  approved bythe rubber-stamp National Assembly in 2003.This dispensation allowed him to towear two hats as the President and as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). Thisdispensation was meant to circumvent the electoral laws under which a servingGovernment servant cannot contest an election. 

While proclaiming the Emergency, hehas suspended the Constitution and granted to himself special powers to amendthe Constitution through executive orders. He has removed from office ChiefJustice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury and other judges of the Supreme Court, whowere taking an independent line since March, 2007, and inducted other judges,who were perceived to be favourable to him and the Army.  The removal ofthese Judges followed their refusal to take a new oath under the orders issuedby him after suspending the Constitution. Their taking the new oath would haveimplied their approval of his unconstitutional actions. 

When the Supreme Court conditionallyallowed the election to the office of the President to go ahead as scheduled,Musharraf and his supporters presumed that the court appeared to be disinclinedto set aside the special dispensation. But, as the proceedings on the petitionscontinued, it appeared as if the majority of the judges was coming round to theview that the special dispensation was illegal. 

Thus, Musharraf was faced with twooptions in order to ensure his survival in power-- await the judgement and thenproclaim an Emergency if the judgement went against him or pre-empt thejudgement by proclaiming an Emergency. He apparently chose the second optionsince once the judgement was pronounced, it might have been difficult to have itset aside by an executive order since he would have legally ceased to be thePresident after the judgement.

After having made a pre-emptivestrike against the judiciary, he has made a pre-emptive strike against thepeople in order to prevent any public uprising against his blatantly illegal andarbitrary actions. He has ordered the arrest of a large number of his politicalopponents, placed the sacked Chief Justice, other non-cooperative judges andhuman rights activists under house arrest, gagged the media and given a freehand to the police to suppress any public demonstrations against his actions. 

There have been sporadicdemonstrations at Lahore, Multan and some other cities, mainly spearheaded bylawyers, who have been in the forefront of the campaign against Musharraf sinceMarch, 2007, but one does not as yet see the making of a public revolt ofuncontrollable dimensions. Such a public revolt is likely only if the variouspolitical and religious parties opposed to his continuance in power uniteagainst him. They have not been able to because many distrust Mrs. BenazirBhutto as much as they distrust Musharraf. He has exploited this lack of unityto weaken the opposition to him ever since there were growing signs ofdisenchantment with him since the beginning of this year. 

Whether there is a successful publicrevolt or not would largely depend on the attitude of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto'sPakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) and Mr. Altaf Hussain'sMuttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). The PPP has a large following in the rural areasof Sindh and in the Seraiki areas of Southern Punjab and the MQM in the citiesof Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur in Sindh. The MQM is unlikely to join anymovement to destabilise Musharraf, a fellow-Mohajir, who has brought it out ofthe dog house of political isolation and enabled it to come to power in Sindh aspart of a coalition. 

As she was doing even before theproclamation of the Emergency, Benazir continues to play a double game. While making strong pro forma criticism of Musharraf and his actions and callingfor a public rally and a so-called long march to demand the restoration of thestatus quo ante, she has been trying to keep undamaged the covert bridges whichshe had built up with Musharraf through the good offices of the US in order tofacilitate her return to power as the Prime Minister. If she gives a call for apublic revolt to demand his resignation instead of merely demanding therestoration of the status quo ante, it could have an electrifying effect onlarge sections of the people, but whether she would do so would depend upon thekind of signal she gets from the US, her benefactor and mentor. 

Like her, the US and the rest of theWestern countries too have been playing a double game--overt condemnation ofMusharraf's actions coupled with calls for a return to the status quo ante andsimultaneously an anxiety to prevent a mass revolt. In their perception, such arevolt might not only result in the overthrow of Musharraf, but might alsofurther endanger Western interests in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region at a timewhen Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and their jihadi associates have stepped up theiractivities against the NATO forces in Afghanistan and against the Pakistan Armyin the tribal areas of Pakistan. 

There has been considerabledisenchantment with Musharraf in Pakistan as well as in the West. The Pakistanipeople do not see his political exit as likely to presage a political disasterfor Pakistan.

As against this, the Westerncountries are grudgingly realising that he has become an embarrassment and aliability and hence may have to go ultimately. But they do not want him to goimmediately till a stable replacement for him is in position.  They wouldprefer him to be slowly eased out over a period of time by the normal politicalprocess and not removed abruptly by a public revolt. They look upon Benazir ascapable of providing such an alternative despite the fact that her pastperformance as the Prime Minister during two terms was unsatisfactory. Herprevious tenures as the Prime Minister saw the emergence of the Taliban and AlQaeda in Afghanistan, from where Al Qaeda spread its tentacles to the rest ofthe world. 

Musharraf's game plan is to have hisre-election as the President on October 6 validated by the re-constituted rubberstamp Supreme Court, amend the Constitution through an executive order tocurtail the independence of the judiciary and prevent its future interference inmatters perceived as likely to have an impact on political stability andnational security and then lift the Emergency and allow elections to theNational assembly and the provincial Assemblies to be held.  He is hopingthat the West would get reconciled to his unconstitutional actions if his gameplan succeeds and that Benazir would not rock his boat if he continues to danglebefore her the carrot of another term as the Prime Minister and if the USmanages to keep her under control. 

Benazir would have reason to fearthat her chances of becoming the Prime Minister again would diminish ifMusharraf were to quit. In his absence, all the Punjabi and most of thereligious parties might unite to prevent her return to office as the PrimeMinister. She needs Musharraf to return to power and Musharraf would need her tosurvive in power. 

The ultimate success of Musharraf'sefforts to survive in power and re-establish his credibility in the eyes of theinternational community would depend on his success in dealing with the jihaditerrorists. Despite American security assistance of over US $ two billion tofight the terrorists, he has hardly done anything worthwhile to neutralise theterrorists--apart from arresting some Al Qaeda operatives, who were living indifferent Pakistani towns and handing them over to the US.  The spectacularresurgence of the Neo Taliban and the resilience shown by Al Qaeda werefacilitated by Musharraf's inaction. 

They are now spreading death anddestruction not only in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, but also in largeparts of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-WestFrontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, where they have set up a de facto parallelState.  Battle fatigue is setting in the Pakistani para-military forces,who are bearing the brunt of the terrorist attacks. They are slowly losing thewill to fight their own co-religionists to serve what they perceive as purely USinterests.  From the tribal areas, the terrorists are now spreading theiractivities to non-tribal areas, including even Islamabad, Rawalpindi and othergarrison towns.  Initially they were attacking police officers. Then theystarted attacking Army and para-military officers. Now, they are attacking evenAir Force officers. Only Naval officers have not been attacked so far. 

The jihadi elements and the religiousfundamentalist parties view the total identification of Musharraf and Benazirwith the US' security interests as detrimental to Pakistan and Islam. If the twocome together in power at the prodding of the US, this is bound to provoke themto further step up their activities.  Whatever utility Musharraf andBenazir have in the eyes of the West would disappear if their coming togethermakes the terrorist situation even more difficult to handle than it is today. 

Two other factors would determine howthe situation evolves in Pakistan-- the attitude of the senior and juniorofficers of the Armed Forces.  Till now, Musharraf has been having thesupport of the Lt. Gens and above to his actions. Will he continue to have theirsupport if there is a mass revolt against him? Conventional wisdom holds thatthere is a strong esprit de corps and discipline in the senior leadership of thePakistan Army and that a General may not stage a coup against another General.This may be true, but even the Lt. Gens. and Gens, who are loyal to Musharraf,may be constrained to act against him and make him quit in a graceful manner ifthey are worried that the credibility of the Army as an institution is beingdamaged by his actions and by the public opposition to him. 

Such a situation could arise if thereis a mass agitation against him and the security forces are forced to open fireon their own co-citizens repeatedly. Such a situation could also arise ifterrorism gets out of control and if the senior officers decide that because ofhis close identification with US policies and interests, he would not be able tobring the situation under control.  It could also arise if the desertionsincrease from the para-military forces and soldiers start deserting even fromthe Army and senior officers fear a mutiny at the lower levels in protestagainst Musharraf making them kill fellow-Muslims to save American lives andinterests. 

The esprit de corps and disciplineare weak in the case of the officers of the rank of Maj. Gens. and below. They might be tempted to move against Musharraf to put a stop to his serving theUS agenda  and suppressing alleged jihadis to  please the  US,but they may not succeed without the support and guidance of at least some ofthe Lt. Gens. In 1995, Maj. Gen. Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi and some other juniorofficers had planned a coup against Benazir in co-operation with theHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), but they could not succeed because they hadvery little support even at the level of Maj. Gens and no support at the levelof Lt. Gens. 

The greatest danger for Musharraf andBenazir presently is an assassination attempt by the jihadis or by theirsupporters at the lower levels of the Armed Forces or the intelligence agencies.The would-be assassins have to be lucky only once to be able to get rid of them.If that happens, whoever succeeds them, will start marking the distance from theUS and its so-called war against terrorism. 

Nuclear-armed Pakistan faces anuncertain future. Musharraf and the US have to equally share the responsibilityfor the mess in Pakistan. Through their sins of commission and omission theyhave offered Pakistan on a platter to Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorists. Osama bin Laden could not have asked for more. He has reasons to be grateful toWashington DC.