Let's Get Real

It would be wishful-thinking to downgrade, as some in India, including our stock markets, have already beendoing, the chances of an US-UK invasion of Iraq just because of the strong opposition to it in the UN SecurityCouncil and the massive public demonstrations against it in many European capitals.

It is important to underline that the demonstrations only reflect the justifiable concerns over thesufferings, which the Iraqi people have already been undergoing and which are likely to be aggravated by a warand over what is perceived as the arbitrary ways of  the Bush Administration.  It would be incorrectto interpret them as support for the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, which is widely disliked not only in theWest, but also in many countries of West Asia.

It is also important to remember that the present US Administration, however much one may disagree with it,is determined to fight resolutely for what it perceives as the US national interests, whatever be the costsand casualties and whatever be the unpopularity it entails for the US in the rest of the world.

Once the war starts, no NATO member, possibly barring France, would like to project the appearance of adivided West.  They are likely to rally to the support of the US and the public demonstrations too mightlose their sting. Even if the demonstrations continue on the same intensity as now, they are unlikely  toinhibit the exercise of US power against the Saddam Government.

Hence, the question is not whether there would be a war, but when, for how long and what impact it wouldhave on India and other countries of Asia. Now that the Haj pilgrims in Saudi Arabia have started going backto their respective countries, the decks would be clear for the US and the UK to start their strikes anytimeafter February 28.  The timing of the beginning of the offensive would be dictated by the need for asmany dark nights as possible at the start and to complete the war before the harsh summer sweeps across WestAsia.

West Asian summer could affect the efficiency of the US and UK ground troops and the sand storms or dustwinds could pose danger to low-altitude air operations, particularly those involving helicopter gunships,which would play an important role in the assault to occupy Baghdad.  One would recall that the air-borneclandestine raid to rescue US diplomatic hostages in Teheran in the last year of the Carter Administrationended in a near disaster because of the failure to take into account the hazards from West Asian dust winds tolow-flying aircraft and helicopters.

How long the war would last would depend not only on the kind of resistance put up by the Iraqis, but alsoon what risks involving human casualties  the Americans and the British are prepared to undertake tobring the war to a quick end.  If the war does not end quickly, it could give a further fillip to publicprotests in the West and threaten the stability of the pro-US regimes in West Asia and Pakistan. The bravewarnings of suicidal resistance emanating from Iraq need not necessarily be a matter for concern for the US.Similar brave words uttered by Egypt, Syria and  Jordan before the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 could notstrengthen their will to resist the determined onslaught of the Israelis.

One saw the difficulties faced by the Iraqi Army against the Iranians in the 1980s despite its superiormaterial resources and  arms and ammunition and despite the support of the West in strengthening itsmilitary capability.  Its performance in the 1991 Gulf war was disappointing and the Americans shouldhave had no difficulty in occupying Baghdad if they had wanted to.

Would the Americans follow the cautious policy of the first Gulf war and their operations in Kosovo andAfghanistan, by relying initially on air and electronic warfare to damage the morale of the Iraqi forces andpeople before moving on the ground or would they start the ground operations in the beginning itself inconjunction with the air strikes?

It would be  difficult to answer these questions definitively, but it is very likely that this timethe ground operations would start much earlier than they did in Kosovo and Afghanistan.  At the verybeginning, the Americans are likely to start their hunt for  Saddam by relentless, simultaneous bombing of all places where he is known to take shelter even at the risk of large civilian casualties. Theircalculation would be that if they eliminate him quickly, the resistance of the Iraqi Army could crumble,making the passage of their troops into Baghdad easier and faster.

The war is likely to last for anywhere between three and eight weeks. Its impact for India and the rest ofAsia would be in the form of increase in POL prices, difficulties in their transportation, possible exodus ofIndians from the Gulf and a consequent drop in their remittances to India, dislocation of civil airlineflights, drop in earnings from tourism during the rest of the year, increased cost of imports of other goodstoo due to rise in transportation charges and the possible imposition of war risk insurance by shippingcompanies and increased vulnerability to terrorist attacks on soft targets. 

The Americans are likely to face greater difficulty in managing the sequel to the war than in winning thewar itself.  There would be greater terrorist violence in this region after the war and greaterinstability as the Americans try to cope with the post-war assertion of Shia and Kurdish aspirations inSouthern and Northern Iraq. The American occupation of Iraq, if it materialises, would see the beginning of anew phase of anti-US hatred and violence in West Asia, which is likely to spread to other countries in Asiatoo as it happened after the first Gulf war of 1991.   It is time to prepare contingency plans tomeet each of these risks, if we have not already done so. 

The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and presently Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Convenor, Advisory Committee, Observer Research Foundation (ORF),Chennai Chapter.