I have received a number of questions from readers with reference to my articleof March 3, 2009, on the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket teamin Lahore. I answer some of them in this article.
What are the similarities and differences when one compares the Lahore attackwith the earlier terrorist attacks in Kabul on February 11, 2009, and in Mumbai on November 26, 2008?
There are two similarities: First, the reversion to the oldmodus operandi (MO)of surprise attacks with hand-held weapons, includinggrenades. The reversion of jihadi terrorists to the old MO, which had been seenearlier in Iraq, Algeria and the Lebanon, is now being imitated in theIndia-Pakistan-Afghanistan region.
Second, a skilful exploitation of publicity opportunities for giving the terrorists a larger than life size image and the government a helplessimage. The governments of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan looked clueless andhelpless in the face of these attacks. The responses of all the threegovernments were similar-- to focus on the external dimension and try to coverup the internal dimension of a major security failure, which facilitated theterrorist attacks.
The differences are: First,in Mumbai and Kabul there were well-synchronisedmultiple attacks, but in Lahore there was a single target with nosynchronisation.
Second, in Mumbai one saw a mix of attacks on stationary (buildings) and movingtargets ( common people in different parts of the city); in Kabul theattacks were on stationary targets (government offices), but in Lahore theattack was on a moving target-- the convoy carrying the SL team to the stadium.
Third, neither in Mumbai nor in Kabul was an ambush involved, but Lahore was atypical urban ambush.
Fourth, in Mumbai and Kabul only hand-grenades were used, but in Lahore theterrorists also used rocket-propelled grenades.
Fifth, In Mumbai, all but one of the terrorists died. In Kabul, all theterrorists died. In Lahore, all of them managed to run away.
What are the differences in the agendas of the terrorists in the threeattacks?
In Mumbai, one saw a mix of an anti-Indian, an anti-Israel and an anti-Westernagenda. The anti-Indian agenda was to discredit the Indian government andits security apparatus in the eyes of the international community, includingforeign businessmen.The anti-Israel and anti-Western agendas coincided withthose of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
In Kabul, one saw a mix of an anti-Karzai and anti-US agenda. It was meant todemonstrate the capability of the Taliban and pro-Taliban forces to strike atgovernment establishments in the capital despite all the physical securitymeasures.
In Lahore, reliable evidence is yet to come, but one can already see ananti-government agenda marked by a desire to demonstrate the ability of theterrorists to strike wherever they wanted.
Was there also an anti-US agenda of a retaliation for the increasing Predatorstrikes on terrorist hide-outs by the US in the tribal areas? Possibly, but notyet certain.
Why did the terrorists attacked the SL cricket team?
The attack gave them global publicity, which they would not have otherwise got.All the TV channels of the world kept showing repeatedly the visuals of theattack.
Who could be the prime suspect?
Any of the terrorist organisations operating from sanctuaries in Pakistan--foreign as well as Pakistani.
What is the most typical of the MO in Lahore?
Frontal urban ambush on a moving, supposedly well-protected target.
Which are the organisations in Pakistan which have this capability?
The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), an off-shoot of theHUM, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), an anti-shia organisation, and theHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami(HUJI). Al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan havecarried out a number of suicide bombings through individual suicide bombers andvehicle-borne bombers in many towns including Lahore, but they have not so farcarried out a frontal urban ambush.
How about the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET)?
Since its formation in 1989, it has never carried out any act of terrorism inPakistani territory-- against Pakistani or foreign nationals. All its acts ofterrorism have been either in Indian or Afghan territory. It has not carried outtill now an act of frontal urban ambush even in Indian territory.
Does the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have a capability formounting its own act of terrorism in Pakistani territory?
No. It does not have.
Is it possible for the LTTE to act through Pakistani surrogates?
Yes. The closest ally of the LTTE in Pakistan is the HUM with which the LTTE hashad a long history of relationship relating to arms supply and drug smuggling. Ihad given details in my earlier article.
How about any contact of the LTTE with other organisations in Pakistan?
None has come to notice so far.
How about any contacts of the LTTE with the LET?
No evidence. The LET has been trying to develop a presence in the Muslimcommunity in the Eastern Province in Sri Lanka, which is strongly opposed to theLTTE. An LET-LTTE nexus seems unlikely.
Why should the HUM attack the SL cricket team? The argument of a quid pro quofor past assistance by the LTTE given in your earlier article does notsound convincing?
At present, one is speculating without evidence. If it turns out that the HUMhad a hand in it, either it might have carried it out at its own instance toexpress its continuing solidarity with the LTTE or at the instance of the LTTE,which has not been able to carry out any successful terrorist strike in SriLanka recently. As the LTTE is finally defeated and its terroristinfrastructure in Sri Lanka neutralised, it could try to keep the movement alivethrough acts of terrorism in foreign countries. Pro-LTTE members of the SriLankan Tamil diaspora and the terrorist organisations of the world with which ithas had fraternal ties such as the Hizbollah and the HUM would come inhandy.
The BBC has ruled out the possibility of either the direct or indirectinvolvement of the LTTE on the ground that many of the star SL cricketeers areTamils and it would not want them killed.
The LTTE had killed a number of prominent Tamils of Sri Lanka, who haddistinguished themselves in various fields. It has been using thousands of Tamilcivilians as human shields to protect itself from final defeat.Why should ithave qualms over the killing of Sri Lankan Tamil cricketeers? The LTTE is now adesperate organisation. It can do desperate things.
What else is known of the HUM apart from its past contacts with the LTTE?
The HUM came to the notice of the Indian intelligence for the first time in 1993when it supplied a consignment of arms and ammunition to the LTTE, which wasloaded into an LTTE ship at Karachi with the complicity of the Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI).
It came to notice in Kashmir in 1995 when it kidnapped some Westerntourists under the name Al Faran. It was after this that the US designated it asa foreign terrorist organisation in October,1997, under its then name of theHarkat-ul-Ansar.
Fazlur Rahman Khalil, its Amir, was a founding member of Bin Laden'sInternational Islamic Front (IIF) for jihad against the Crusaders and theJewish People formed in 1998. He was also a co-signatory of bin Laden'sfirst fatwa calling for a global jihad against the US and Israel.
When the US launched Cruise missile attacks on the suspected trainingcamps of Al Qaeda in Afghan territory in August 1998, following the explosionsoutside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, it was found subsequentlythat some of the camps destroyed were those of the HUM and not Al Qaeda.Itorganised the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar inDecember,1999. It was one the participants under the name HUM (Al Alami meaninginternational) in the kidnapping and murder of Daneil Pearl, the US journalist,in Karachi in January-February, 2002.
Shri P.Chidambaram, our Home Minister, has spoken very critically ofthe physical security provided to the SL team. Is he fair or justified?
No. In Mumbai, 16 police officers and 163 civilians died. In Lahore, sevenpolice officers died, but there are no reports of any civilian fatalities. Ontheir return to Colombo, the SL players have spoken appreciatively of the driverof the bus who stepped on the accelerator the moment the bus was sought tobe ambushed and sped into the stadium leaving it to the police to confront theterrorists. This speaks well of their reflexes.
What is the lesson coming out of Lahore?
Jihadi terrorism emanating from the sanctuaries in Pakistani terrirtory hasassumed a pan-sub-continental dimension equally threatening all the countries ofthe sub-continent-- Afghanistan, Pakistan, , India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Itis time these countries constitute a common counter-terrorism brains trust todeal with this threat jointly. Otherwise, they will continue bleedingseparately.
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B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai
