Keep The Pressure On

In the wake of the terrorist attack by 10 Pakistani members of theLashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Mumbai from November  26 to 29,2008, India has touse three yard-sticks to decide on the genuineness  and adequacy of anyPakistani co-operation. These are:

• Does its co-operation help in bringing to justice the operatives of the LET in Pakistan and any others, who were involved in the planning and execution of the terrorist strike?
  
• Does its co-operation help in a better reconstruction and understanding of the terrorist  strike in order to find out answers to some important questions such as why the terrorists targeted Israeli and other foreign nationals, for example? The answers to such questions will be available only with the master-minds of the LET in Pakistan. Ajmal Amir Kasab, the surviving Pakistani perpetrator, now in the custody of the Mumbai Police, may not be privy to the objectives of the LET.
  
• Does the Pakistani co-operation help India in preventing any more terrorist strike mounted from Pakistani territory--by the LET, the other anti-India terrorist organisations and Al Qaeda by eradicating their terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory and destroying their capabilities?

A careful study of the Pakistani media reports would show that Pakistanhas been more forthcoming now than it was since 26/11 and has been keen todemonstrate to the international community that in investigating the case"Pakistan means business" as Malik repeatedly emphasised. One shouldnot grudge conceding that there has definitely been a shift from a position oftotal denial of the involvement of anyone in Pakistani territory to partialacceptance of the conclusion of Indian and Western investigators that theconspiracy for the terrorist attack originated in Pakistani territory and thatthe key answers to various questions coming to the fore during the investigationare to be found in Pakistan, which only Pakistani investigators can do.

At the same time, there was an undisguised attempt by Malik to project theconspiracy as trans-national and not uni-national only in Pakistan. Herepeatedly said that only a part of the conspiracy took place in Pakistaniterritory. To underline the trans-national dimensions of the conspiracy hereferred to the role played by some members of the Pakistani diaspora in Spainand Italy and to Pakistan's suspicion of a role by some elements in India asseen, according to him, from the fact that the perpetrators had used SIM cardsprocured in India.

Pakistan's attempt is to project the conspiracy as mounted by non-Stateelements of which the Pakistani intelligence agencies had no inkling  tillafter the attack. There has been a reluctance on the part of Indian analysts toaccept that all the recruitment, planning and training could have been carriedout by the LET in Pakistani territory without the Pakistani intelligenceagencies becoming aware of it. Malik has prepared the ground for meeting thisargument if and when it acquires force by pointing out that if the intelligenceagencies of India, Italy and Spain had missed noticing the preparations beingmade in their territory, how can they blame the Pakistani agencies for similarlymissing them.

There were two significant points in the press briefing of Malik. Thefirst is  the absence of any reference  to Indian allegations that agroup of 32 potential perpetrators was trained by the LET initially inPakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK)  and subsequently in Karachi before 10 ofthem were finally selected and sent to Mumbai by sea. The second is his repeateduse of the word "alleged" while referring to the role of the LEToperatives, who have been detained and against whom investigation has beenlaunched in pursuance of the two First Information Reports (FIRs) registered bythe Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). He did not use the word"alleged" while referring to those whose involvement Pakistan claimsto have unearthed. This would indicate a possible attempt by them to show theirinvestigation against some LET operatives as warranted by the Indian"allegations" against them and not by any evidence so far uncovered bythe FIA. Thus, while registering two FIRs against the LET operatives named byIndia, they have kept open the possibility of giving a free chit to the LETafter the international pressure and interest subside and releasing theiroperatives on the ground that  the investigation did not bring out anycredible evidence against them.

This was exactly the same modus operandi (MO) which the Pakistanis had followed  after the thwarted attack by a group of terrorists belonging tothe LET and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) on the Parliament House in New Delhi inDecember,2001. Musharraf banned these organisations on January 15, 2002,arrested their leaders and ordered an enquiry into their activities. A fewmonths later, the arrested persons were got released by courts on the ground that the investigation did not bring out any evidence of wrong doing againstthem.

While we are right in welcoming the changed Pakistani stance-- even if it beonly a change in tactics-- as seen on February 12, 2009, we should avoid nursingillusions that the seeming change in the Pakistani stance marked a watershed inPakistani attitude to anti-India terrorism. We have to wait and see whetherPakistan really means business this time, or is it merely pretending toco-operate while not sincerely co-operating as it has always done in the past--whether against anti-India terrorism or against  the Neo Taliban ofAfghanistan or with regard to the investigation into the kidnapping and murderof Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, or the investigation into the proliferationactivities of A.Q.Khan or the investigation into the involvement of Rashid Rauf,a British citizen of Pakistani origin, in the conspiracy to blow up someUS-bound planes in 2006.

Welcome the seeming change in its stance, but avoid over-assessing itssignificance and keep the pressure on Pakistan. That should be our operatingprinciple.

Pakistan's new stance does not respond to the remaining two questions posedin Para one above. There are no indications at all that it is having secondthoughts about the wisdom or inadvisability of continuing to use terrorism as a strategic weapon against India and that it might now act against the anti-Indiaterrorist infrastructure in its territory and the role of the ISI in keepingthis terrorism sustained. Threats of new terrorist attacks against Indian andforeign targets in Indian territory mounted from Pakistan remain as high asbefore.

There has been a debate as to why this sudden change of stance by Pakistan onFebruary 12, 2009. In this connection, the visit of Richard Holbrooke, the USSpecial Representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan, to Islamabad from February 9to 11, 2009, and the first telephone call of President Barack Obama to PresidentAsif Ali Zardari on February 11 have been cited by many analysts. There are twoother elements, which also need to be noted. The first was the brutal beheadingof a Polish engineer working in Pakistan by the Pakistani Taliban on February 6.There has been a wave of anger and revulsion against Pakistan in Poland eversince the Taliban announced his beheading. The anger in Poland against Pakistanis as intense as the anger in India after 26/11. The second is the Mumbai-styleattacks on the offices of the prison department and the Justice Ministry inKabul by the Taliban on February 11 which has set off concerns that the Mumbaiattack is already having a copy-cat effect. These are likely to have increasedthe pressure on the Pakistan government to show that they really mean businessin going after terrorism and they are not playing games with the internationalcommunity. One has to wait and see what further action the Pakistani authoritiestake in the weeks to come. This is the time for keeping up the pressure onPakistan.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.