But Why Now?

• The reported training of officers of the personal security set-up of Musharraf by Israeli experts in Israel . This training was started at the instance of the US , with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) playing the role of the facilitator.
  
  
• The reported role of Israeli physical security experts in advising Musharraf on strengthening measures for his security.
  
  
• The reported role of a jammer of Israeli design supplied to Pakistan through the US in saving the life of Musharraf when two attempts were made by elements from the Pakistan Army,Air Force and jihadi terrorist organisations in December,2003, to kill him at Rawalpindi .
  
  
• The reported role of Pakistan in facilitating the collection of intelligence by the US agencies regarding the nuclear establishments of Iran and the likelihood of this intelligence being passed on by the US to Israel to enable it to launch an Osirak-style raid on the Iranian establishments.

Pakistan and Israel have had and continue to have strong reasons for working towards a close relationship between the two. Pakistan mainly has three interests:

• To reassure Israel that it has nothing to fear from Pakistan 's military nuclear capability.
  
  
• To dissuade Israel from upgrading its military supply relationship with India .
  
  
• To persuade Israel to maintain a balance by agreeing to meet Pakistan 's military requirements too.

The dangers of a religious backlash would not permit Pakistan at present to establish a formal diplomatic relationship with Israel . However, Pakistan has other strong lollipops to offer to Israel , which the latter would not be able to resist:

• Offer of intelligence relating to Iran , Saudi Arabia and Syria
  
• Offer of intelligence relating to the Al Qaeda.
  

The Israeli interests are:

• The possible role which Pakistan could play, like Turkey , as a cat amongst the Islamic pigeons.
  
  
• The flow of intelligence regarding Iran 's nuclear establishments and the Al Qaeda. The hard intelligence, which Pakistan could give to Israel if it wants to, would be much, much more valuable for protecting Israeli lives and interests than any intelligence that India might be able to give. 

If one day there has to be a raid on Iran's nuclear establishments either by the US or by Israel or by the two acting jointly, the use of the Pakistani territory for facilitating such a raid would be helpful. An increasing comfort level between Pakistan and Israel could make this possible. 

One could ask: Pakistan and Israel could have better achieved their objectives by continuing to keep the relationship clandestine. Why did they have to make it open, with its attendant risks for the personal security of Musharraf? I would find it difficult to answer this question on the basis of available evidence. 

While Musharraf should be able to withstand any open backlash on this issue from the Pakistani fundamentalist organisations, his action in openly courting Israel runs the risk of aggravating threats to his security from the Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist organisations as well as from fundamentalist elements in the Armed Forces. 

Every country acts according to its national interests. So has Israel in moving closer to Pakistan . There is no point in India sulking over it. However, India would have strong grounds for unhappiness and unease, if Israel had not kept it informed in advance of its moves in this regard. 

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Distinguished Fellow , International Terrorism Watch Programme (ITWP), Observer Research Foundation (ORF), and Convenor, Chennai Chapter of the ORF.