SEOUL
A marathon negotiation in Beijing stretching to the wee hours of the morning of February 14 produced a deal that promises to end North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program in exchange for diplomatic recognition and aid for Pyongyang. The agreement signed by six countries, however, left unanswered the fate of nuclear weapons and fissile material already produced by North Korea.
The surprisingly comprehensive agreement was made possible when the US gave in to a North Korean demand for bilateral negotiations, held in Berlin in mid-January. Unbeknownst to most of the world, the outline of this breakthrough accord had been sketched out in Berlin by US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim GyeGwan.
The meeting broke the Bush administration’s stated policy of keeping talks with the North strictly within the multilateral format. The fact that the talks were held away from China, with which North Korea’s relations had soured in recent months, could not have been a coincidence. It also occurred against the backdrop of worsening sectarian conflicts in Iraq and another looming nuclear crisis with Iran, developments that impelled Washington to look for milestone progress on North Korea.
A comprehensive outline was hashed out that met the North Korean demand for security assurance, energy aid, steps toward normal relations and lifting of banking sanctions, with North Korea agreeing to shut and seal its nuclear facilities. At the Beijing meeting, five months after North Korea tested its first nuclear device, Pyongyang was assured of massive energy aid from the US, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia.
In exchange, the five countries agreed to pave the way for Pyongyang eventually normalizing relations with Washington and Tokyo, its two leading critics, under a new security regime to be formulated with and guaranteed by the US to supplant the current armistice agreement in force since 1953.
In the words of senior South Korean diplomats, who have long supported a policy of conciliation, the agreement amounted to a win-win formula, a kind of "grand bargain" to ensure the survival of the Kim Jong Il regime while helping the US and South Korea achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Even though this trade-off deal appeared reasonable on the surface, the Joint Statement as read by China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei had ambiguities. One is the cardinal question of whether Pyongyang could be trusted to uphold this deal; the other one is whether Pyongyang will agree to surrender four or five atomic bomb devices suspected by observers or hand over its stock of plutonium.
For all its inadequacy, China took credit for brokering the deal. By insisting on continuing the talks into the early morning hours of the last day of negotiations, Wu subtly kept Kim Gye Gwan from walking out, according to Seoul diplomats. While the nub of the agreement was reached in Berlin, the successful conclusion during the late night meeting conferred upon China the glory of a major arbiter, a critical element for successful implementation.
On the surface, this deal resembles the 1994 Agreed Framework signed under the Clinton administration, by which the North received half a million tons of heavy oil each year in exchange for a pledge to keep the Yongbyon reactor "frozen." This accord collapsed in 2002, after the North was caught switching to a uranium-based weapons program.
Mindful of this fiasco, Seoul and Washington imposed two major conditions: a clear "shut and seal" requirement for the 5-megawatt Yongbyon reactor within 60 days of the agreement and a compulsory inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency for verification.
Provision of oil depends on denuclearization efforts: South Korea will deliver the first shipment of 50,000 tons once the reactor has been "frozen." The rest of the 950,000 tons worth of energy, in the form of electricity or fuel, will follow in an incremental way depending on the progress of denuclearization – from freeze to reactor "disabling" to verification.
In parallel with these movements, the North is required to eventually shut down its nuclear programs – dismantling its 5-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon, 50- and 200-megawatt reactors under construction, as well as the fuel-fabrication complex and radiochemistry laboratory. In the words of Christopher Hill, the Bush administration looks for total denuclearization, not reactor "freeze."
The distinction between the two is crucial in the weeks ahead as the North comes under suspicion for backtracking on its agreement. Already, Pyongyang’s official Central News Agency, announcing the Beijing deal, claims that it called for "temporary freeze," without mentioning the word "dismantlement." The deal is riddled with other questions: Can Kim Jong Il be trusted to implement this accord? Would this not nullify a huge investment mobilized over the past three decades at a ruinous cost to North Korea’s economy? If so, why would Kim risk losing leverage against the US and South Korea by giving up the nuclear program? Would the regime surrender plutonium already extracted? What about its uranium-based weapons program of which little is known? South Korean officials have no clues other than the belief that Washington received assurance from Pyongyang before signing this agreement.
The new US approach to the bilateral talks played a crucial role in reaching the deal. That being the case, it has raised the possibility of more flexibility on the part of the Bush administration in seeking resolution to the nuclear crisis. The Clinton administration’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had visited Pyongyang, and President Clinton was close to making a trip to North Korea in late 2000 when the election of Bush nixed that prospect. The recent agreement now holds the prospect of jump-starting normalization talks.
North Korea, too, was under pressure to strike for a breakthrough, with food and fuel shortages turning especially acute in recent months. For its part, China has quietly arm-twisted Kim for months, urging dialogue with Washington and Seoul.
Indeed, Kim should be impressed by the amount of aid. The energy, worth more than US$330 million by market price, and more food aid, will not only rehabilitate his shattered economy and boost his image, but the US decision to lift the financial sanctions over part of the US$24 million in the North’s accounts frozen by the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia will ease immediate financial crisis. According to Japanese reports, the US will release US$11 million considered untainted by money-laundering activities related to counterfeiting or drug-trafficking.
Moves are afoot to address other demands: Five working groups will be formed in the next 30 days to discuss issues ranging from denuclearization to oil provision, the US-North Korean diplomatic rapprochement to separate peace talks with Japan.
This latter group will consider Tokyo’s refusal to participate in the aid provision, so long as the North isn’t forthcoming on the issue of Japanese abductees over the past 30 years. It’s unclear if Russia would provide oil to its onetime ally, in view of a large amount of debt the North owes to Russia.
Despite the many questions hanging over the agreement, the birthday of Dear Leader Kim Jong Il – who coincidentally turns 65 on 16 February – might give North Koreans something else to celebrate – promises of fuel to heat their homes and a lifting of war’s shadow. What happens afterward will be largely determined by the man whose birthday they celebrate.
Advertisement
Shim Jae Hoon is a Seoul-based journalist and columnist. Rights: © 2007 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization
