With Allies Like These...

It’s hard to know whether US President George W. Bush’s visit to Pakistanis a desperate act to shore up an ailing ally, a cheerleading trip to spur onthe American anti-terror campaign, or a simple photo opportunity on the road toIndia. No matter. When President George Bush arrives in Islamabad he will find adeeply troubled government and a country suffused with discontent. Pakistan’sgovernance problems are significantly affected by its relationship with the USjust now – and it’s President Bush’s job to help craft a long-termsolution to southwest Asia’s security problems and Pakistan’s own stability.

The American-led anti-terror campaign lies close to the heart of Pakistan’smany woes. Despite almost 70,000 Pakistani troops deployed near the Afghanborder, the Pakistan government’s seeming impotence in fighting militancy –which the US uses to justify its own clandestine border operations – appearspolitically ham-handed, tactically incompetent, diplomatically awkward,remarkably inconsiderate of public opinion and thus, oddly complicit with AlQaeda supporters. US bombing campaigns along the border with Afghanistan leavecivilian fatalities and public disapproval in their wakes. To Pakistanivillagers, it looks as if a foreign army is waging war on their territory.

Gathering and analyzing intelligence are not public sports. Pakistan and theUS claim that their most successful collaboration is in sharing information –and say no more. The current global climate of distrust and fear, and a long,troubled diplomatic history with the US, call for both governments to handletheir alliance carefully and above all, sensitively. Instead, both traffic insecrecy, duplicity and dishonesty in dealing with their own citizens, and in sodoing, foment further distrust among their own citizens. The wages of thisshadowy war tax Pakistan’s clumsy political system more than it can bear.

A renewed local insurgency in Baluchistan is stoking the fires of nationaldiscontent. Bush’s advisors have no doubt told him the province is a unrulyplace whose old-fashioned guerrillas score points against the central governmentwhile they skirmish among themselves – and hence, today’s battles, likethose of old, will fade away with little cost to Islamabad. Such optimism wouldbe unwarranted. It’s true that tribal politics can be nasty – but it’salso true that Islamabad has never treated Baluchistan as a full partner in itsunwieldy federal system, whether in the distribution of natural gas revenues orencouraging political participation.

What Baluchistan has been good for, sad to say, is its astonishinglypermeable border with Iran and Afghanistan – good for war, smuggling,corruption and rebellion. Indeed, the porous border areas between Pakistan andAfghanistan have always helped define security policy for both states. But allroads run in two directions: Baluch insurgents found refuge in Afghanistan inthe 1970s, Pakistan supplied the Afghan mujahidin in the 1980s throughBaluchistan, refugees have ranged freely across the mountains and plateaus inall directions, and today, weapons travel toward Pakistan to fuel insurgencyanew.

Although Pakistan and its allies express support for the idea of closing thePakistan-Afghan border, success has been limited: Weapons and militants continueto move, even when revenues from black market activities shrink. This is whyAfghan President Hamid Karzai is so keen to keep the borders closed and step upthe hunt for Al Qaeda. But with army installations now insurgent targets, it’seasy to see how Islamabad – and potentially, the US – might wrap thesesecular Baluch nationalists under a broader terrorist flag.

What a mistake. As the anti-terror campaign holds larger meaning for Pakistan’sdomestic politics – it’s equally about the fundamental, if ignored, role ofcitizens in making policy – so Baluchistan continues to remind Pakistan’sgovernment, and should remind the US, that tribal and ethnic identities providea political vocabulary when national identity and enfranchisement are absent.

That fragile national identity, framed by almost six decades of unresolveddebate about the country’s political structure, has left society open to manycompeting visions of its future. Little wonder, then, that Islamist parties canso easily provoke disturbances by renting crowds to protest policies or events.It is also easy to turn all the people’s anger –whether about Danishcartoons or a missile attack on suspected Al Qaeda – against General PervezMusharraf’s principal backer , the US.

Pakistan keeps edging toward the moment when it won’t be able to governitself, but recovers almost miraculously from each moment of crisis. Musharraf’smilitary government is demonstrably weak, even as the military enriches itselfon the backs of civil society, takes over civic institutions and cumulativelyunravels the country’s frayed social compact. As a result, more than 35% ofPakistanis are profoundly poor, borders are inadequately defended and citizenscannot redress grievances against the government, militant groups, foreigninterlopers or allied armies.

Musharraf has had many opportunities to correct these ills -- but hasn’t.He has pilloried opposition politicians when they criticize military rule, giventhe army free rein in civic life, and diminished vital civic institutions,including courts and legislatures. Musharraf has failed to reconcile the army’sshallow modernism and the increasingly recondite sectarianism of militant – ifofficially powerless – political parties. It’s an uneven match: Pakistan’sIslamist parties are more often loud than correct and generally fare poorly inelections unless they cooperate with the military.

President Bush will soon step onto this disputed landscape. If pastexperience is a guide, he will see Pakistan solely through the focused lenses ofthe anti-terror campaign, view the military as the only effective nationalinstitution – what a military government always says -- and thus limit hisvision of a future, constructive US-Pakistan relationship. If he does so, hewill misread this complex country, and the US and Pakistan will miss anopportunity to correct course for their relationship and for the Pakistanistate.

Although Pakistan’s present predicaments are neither solely the result ofthis complicated alliance nor only the outgrowth of tired and misguided militaryrule, it has become the joint responsibility of the President and the General toturn their alliance to domestic poltiical good. To Pakistan’s profounddetriment, this never happened when Field Marshal Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khanand General Zia ul Haq ruled from the 1960s through the 1980s. Following hisillegitimate seizure of power and subsequent misrule, Musharraf’s brokenpromises to cede power to civilian rule have indelibly marked his tenure, too.This time, the first step – small as it may seem in the shadow of globalterror – is a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s governance.

Little in Pakistan, and in its region, will improve until the militaryunderstands that the time for its rule has passed. Under no circumstances shouldthe US force, or appear to force, a change of regime. But if Bush seeks astable, well-grounded, respected alliance between the US and Pakistan, he willhave to push for an elected, representative government that can negotiate suchan alliance, fulfill its mission, and salvage security for the entire region.