This Is Not Democratic Dissent

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led four-party alliance has more thantwo-thirds majority in the Jatiya Sangshad (Parliament), and its leader BegumKhaleda Zia is the new Prime Minister of the country. Now all her energiesshould go into planning the future governance, but Khaleda's triumph, sweepingthough it is, does not convince Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the Awami League(AL), the recent ruling party.

Indeed, Khaleda faces a band of challenges that might make or unmake herpolitical fate. Hasina and her party boycotted the swearing-in ceremony of thenewly elected lawmakers on October 9. The AL wants the Chief ElectionCommissioner to trash the October 1 election, and order a fresh poll throughoutthe nation.

After abstaining from Khaleda's swearing in, the AL greeted the new regimewith the threat of a countrywide blockade. Hasina is stoking a hysteria againstthe election that brought her a resounding defeat. It may sound absurd but it isagain an opposition-boycott of the Parliament, and regrettably, it has beguneven before the Sangshad formally met.

Those who remember the 22-month confrontation, bitter impasse, widespreadanti-government rioting and a spiralling non-cooperation movement in 1994-96shudder at the prospect of a re-run of last time when Khaleda was the PrimeMinister. Hasina is drawing a ludicrous analogy between the election of February15  1996 and the October 1 poll this year.

By provoking a bureaucratic near-rebellion, the AL successfully toppledKhaleda's new government (in 1996), and it won the fresh election under anon-partisan cabinet that brought Hasina's party to power the same year. But itis already a hard sell for Hasina to rubbish the October 1 election. She islooking for some kind of protest to come out of the shadow of her defeat.

Many are frightful that Bangladesh might again plunge into a spate ofacrimony, destruction and destabilization as it happened in the not-so-distantpast. Already the AL and its cohorts have blamed that the goons, patronized bythe newly victorious parties, have taken the law into their hands. One strategicanalyst recently cautioned that the country is perilously close to civil strife,and I want to add that the brewing chaos is already a talking point against theBNP and its right wing partners even before they were sworn in. Khaleda promisedstern action against destabilization and communal violence -- she has alreadygiven a preview of her intended actions in her inaugural speech.

Hartal-driven unrest is a justified political expression againstdespotism, but it has no legitimacy as a political weapon against a spectacularelectoral victory supervised by a non-political authority and overseen by a hostof domestic and international observers.

Routinized use of hartal as a vehicle to challenge the government, aswe have seen it in the past, polarizes opinion and defies the institutionalnorms and democratic politics. "Annul the Election," Hasina's newbattle cry demonstrates the hollowness of competitive politics in Bangladesh. Itshows that there is some form of protest to match every occasion there -- evento drive against a stunning mandate of the people. Evidently, the businesscommunity was hoping for a return to a modicum of normalcy, but now it fretsover the looming acrimony over the election results.

The AL's 62 seats are substantially lower than the 146 seats, which the partyhad won in 1996. Contrary to many predictions, the two parties did not have aneck-to-neck contest in 2001. It is an unrealistic claim that the BNP and itspartners could get such a victory by unchallenged rigging.

Hasina is yet to explain fully her electoral logic in rejecting the October 1election. How could her party gain more popular votes in 2001 than the BNP(minus the alliance partners) if the election was so frantically rigged? Supposethere is re-polling, for which there is no conceivable reason, the presentelectoral map would not drastically reverse the substantive outcome. Even whenGeneral (retd) Ershad deserted the opposition coalition, the BNP-led alliancehoped to win a workable majority in a fair and free voting. Beyond a fewrhetorical claims, I did not see many forecasting the AL's total defeat.

One exception was the Daily Inqilab that predicted a victory in 160 to180 seats barely days before the election. Hasina's belligerence and threat ofstreet actions are designed to boost her followers' morale. She is facing aninternal challenge in the party -- it may become an anti-Hasina wave, although Ibelieve that Hasina's name still carries political weight for the AL.

Normally, the party leaders resign after such massive defeats. Possibly, theAL is not yet ready to dump her. In a recent meeting of the AL high command anddistrict level leaders, an open blame shifting did not spare her and other topleaders. It was clear that the grassroot leaders opposed Hasina's rejection ofelection lock, stock and barrel, and starting a campaign against the electionoutcome so soon after national voting.

The saner elements of the AL realistically warned her that it would bedifficult to challenge the new BNP-led government soon unless there was a grossfailure on its part. The AL leaders and their cohorts apprehend that Khaleda'snew government would go after them for charges of illegal activities. For thoseAL leaders who lost election -- there are as many as 27 former ministers andstate ministers among them, anti-Khaleda protests should start sooner thanlater.

Once an anti-government agitation is launched, the BNP administration wouldhesitate to start legal action against the AL leaders -- so runs Hasina'spolitical calculation. Her long term strategies and tactics are not clear; stillthe footstep of another standoff has put Khaleda on the intractable route ofpersuading the AL to join the Jatiya Sangshad. The AL's rejection of theelection results is the omen for anti-Khaleda protests in the near future.

I believe that the general political climate, so soon after the poll, isagainst any massive and prolonged movement. The public are willing to givesufficient time to the BNP-led government to put its house in order -- the ALfoot soldiers are still disarrayed; they will not  immediately respond tocalls for anti-government protest. October 11, the first day of the AL's"blockades" against the government were largely ineffective. Massive anti-government movements are difficult to start as we have seen in thepast. Only when and if Khaleda stumbles in office, Hasina would get a freshrallying ground against the BNP-led government.

Bangladesh is a deeply polarized nation, and its civil society is equallydivided; once lawlessness starts, it may take a deadly turn unless containedeffectively. The deeply scarred relationship between the BNP and the AL isbeyond repair; published reports testify that Hasina does not even returnKhaleda's telephone calls. One thing could lead to the other, and the new waveof optimism spurred by a successful election could easily evaporate in thestreet fights between the BNP-led alliance and the AL.

However, such a catastrophic scenario may not engulf Bangladesh. The AL hasnumerous seasoned politicians -- they are soul-searching for their astoundingdefeat. A bit of their wisdom would possibly fall upon Hasina, and she mightchange her uncompromising stance. Revenge seeking partisanship will fail to geta mass response to launch a big anti-government protest -- fits of arrogance anddirty tricks are not the inspiring ingredients for a popular movement.

Considering the recent election results, the AL has lost its grip on Dhakacity, the epicenter of agitational politics in Bangladesh. Hasina's mainstrength lies in several south-western districts. The geo-politics of protestmovements is not favorable to the AL at this moment of history. Mostimportantly, Hasina does not have any tangible issue against the newlyinaugurated BNP-led government.

Meanwhile, Khaleda should not stop calling Hasina on the phone to give up herevident boycott and join the Sangshad!

M. Rashiduzzaman teaches Political Science at Rowan University, Glassboro,New Jersey, USA.