The World After Sept. 11

I am sure I am not the only one to have been reminded inthe past months of some wise and prescient words of one of the most impressivefigures of 20th century America, the radical pacifist A.J. Muste. As the USentered World War II 60 years ago, he predicted with considerable accuracy thecontours of the world that would emerge after the US victory, and a littlelater, observed that "the problem after a war is with the victor. He thinkshe has just proved that war and violence pay. Who will now teach him alesson?"

Far too many people around the world were to learn thebitter meaning of these words. It is only in folk tales, children's stories, andthe journals of intellectual opinion that power is used wisely and well todestroy evil. The real world teaches very different lessons, and it takes wilfuland dedicated ignorance to fail to perceive them.

These are, unfortunately, leading themes of history. In hismajor study of European state formation, Charles Tilly observed, accuratelyenough, that over the last millennium, "war has been the dominant activityof European states," for an unfortunate reason: "The central tragicfact is simple: coercion _works_; those who apply substantial force to theirfellows get compliance, and from that compliance draw the multiple advantages ofmoney, goods, deference, access to pleasures denied to less powerfulpeople." These are close to historical truisms, which most of the people ofthe world have learned the hard way. The deference commonly includes the awedacclaim of the educated classes. Resort to overwhelming means of violence todestroy defenseless enemies with impunity tends to win particular admiration,and also to become natural, a demonstration of one's virtue; again, close tohistorical-cultural universals.

One normal concomitant of easy victories over defenselessenemies is the entrenchment of the habit of preferring force over the pursuit ofpeaceful means. Another is the high priority of acting without authority. Theincarnation of the God who comes to Earth as the "perfect man" withthe mission of eradicating evil from the world needs no higher authority. Whatis true of the most ancient Indian epics from millennia ago holds as well forthe plagiarists of today. The preference for force, and rejection ofauthorization, have been notable features of the last decade of overwhelming andunchallenged power and crushing of much weaker adversaries, in accord withpolicy recommendations. As the first Bush administration came into office, itundertook a National Security Policy Review dealing with "third worldthreats." Parts were leaked to the press during the Gulf war. The Reviewconcluded that "In cases where the U.S. confronts much weaker enemies"-- that is, the only kind one chooses to fight -- "our challenge will benot simply to defeat them, but to defeat them decisively and rapidly." Anyother outcome would be "embarrassing" and might "undercutpolitical support," understood to be thin. With the collapse of the soledeterrent a few months later, the conclusions became even more firmlyestablished, not surprisingly. These are, I think, some of the considerationsthat should be at the back of our minds when we contemplate the world afterSept. 11.

Whatever one's judgment about the events of the past weeks,if we want to reach a reasonable assessment of what may lie ahead, we shouldattend carefully to several crucial factors. Among them are:

1. The premises on which policy decisions have been based
   
   

2. Their roots in stable institutions and doctrines in very recent history, to a large extent involving the same decision-makers
   
   

3. The ways these have been translated to specific actions

I'd like to say a few words about each of these topics.

The new millennium quickly produced two terrible newcrimes, added to the gloomy record of persisting ones. The first was theterrorist attacks of Sept. 11; the second, the response to them, surely taking afar greater toll of innocent lives, Afghan civilians who were themselves victimsof the suspected perpetrators of the crimes of Sept. 11. I'll assume these to beOsama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. There has been a prima facie case fromthe outset, though little credible evidence has been produced, and there havebeen few successes at home, despite what must be the most intensiveinvestigations ever by the coordinated intelligence services of the majorpowers. Such "leaderless resistance" networks, as they are called, arenot easy nuts to crack.

An inauspicious sign is that in both cases the crimes areconsidered right and just, even noble, within the doctrinal framework of theperpetrators, and in fact are justified in almost the same words. Bin Ladenproclaims that violence is justified in self-defense against the infidels whoinvade and occupy Muslim lands and against the brutal and corrupt governmentsthey impose there -- words that have considerable resonance in the region evenamong those who despise and fear him. Bush and Blair proclaim, in almostidentical words, that violence is justified to drive evil from our lands. Theproclamations of the antagonists are not entirely identical. When bin Ladenspeaks of "our lands," he is referring to Muslim lands: Saudi Arabia,Egypt, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and others; the radical Islamists who weremobilized and nurtured by the CIA and its associates through the 1980s despiseRussia, but ceased their terrorist operations in Russia from Afghan bases afterthe Russians withdrew. When Bush and Blair speak of "our lands" theyare, in contrast, referring to the world. The distinction reflects the powerthat the adversaries command. That either side can speak without shame oferadicating evil in the light of their records... -- that should leave usopen-mouthed in astonishment, unless we adopt the easy course of effacing evenvery recent history.

Another fact with grim portent is that in both cases, theperpetrators insist on underscoring the criminality of their acts. In the caseof bin Laden, no discussion is needed. The US pointedly rejected the frameworkof legitimacy that resides in the UN Charter. There has been much debate overwhether the ambiguous Security Council declarations provided authorization forthe resort to force. It is, in my opinion, beside the point. To resolve thedebate would have been simple enough, had there been any wish to do so. There isscarcely any doubt that Washington could have obtained entirely unambiguousSecurity Council authorization, not for attractive reasons. Russia is eager togain US support for its own massive crimes. China hopes to be admitted to thecoalition of the just for the same reasons, and in fact, states throughout theworld recognized at once that they could now enlist the support of the globalsuperpower for their own violence and repression, a lesson not lost on theglobal managers either. British support is reflexive; France would raise noobjections. There would, in brief, have been no veto.

But Washington preferred to reject Security Councilauthorization and to insist on its unique right to act unilaterally in violationof international law and solemn treaty obligations, a right forcefullyproclaimed by the Clinton administration and its predecessors in clear andexplicit words -- warnings that we and others may choose to ignore, but at ourperil. Similarly, Washington contemptuously dismissed the tentative offers toconsider extradition of bin Laden and his associates; how real suchpossibilities were we cannot know, because of the righteous refusal even toconsider them. This stand adheres to a leading principle of statecraft, called"establishing credibility" in the rhetoric of statecraft andscholarship. And it is understandable. If a Mafia Don plans to collectprotection money, he does not first ask for a Court order, even if he couldobtain it. Much the same is true of international affairs. Subjects mustunderstand their place, and must recognize that the powerful need no higherauthority.

Thucydides remarked that "large nations do what theywish, while small nations accept what they must." The world has changed agreat deal over several thousand years, but some things stay much the same.

The atrocities of Sept. 11 are regarded as a historicevent, which is true, though not because of their scale. In its civilian toll,the crime is far from unusual in the annals of violence short of war. To mentiononly one example, so minor in context as to be a mere footnote, a Panamanianjournalist, condemning the crimes of Sept. 11, observed that for Panamanians the"sinister times" are not unfamiliar, recalling the US bombing of thebarrio Chorrillo during "Operation Just Cause" with perhaps thousandskilled; our crimes, so there is no serious accounting. The atrocities of Sept.11 are indeed a historic event, but because of their target. For the US, it isthe first time since the British burned down Washington in 1814 that thenational territory has been under serious attack, even threatened. There is noneed to review what has been done to others in the two centuries since. ForEurope, the reversal is even more dramatic. While conquering much of the world,leaving a trail of terror and devastation, Europeans were safe from attack bytheir victims, with rare and limited exceptions. It is not surprising, then,that Europe and its offshoots should be shocked by the crimes of Sept. 11, adramatic breach of the norms of acceptable behavior for hundreds of years.

It is also not surprising that they should remaincomplacent, perhaps mildly regretful, about the even more terrible sufferingthat followed. The victims, after all, are miserable Afghans --"uncivilized tribes," as Winston Churchill described them withcontempt when he ordered the use of poison gas to "spread a livelyterror" among them 80 years ago, denouncing the "squeamishness"of the soft-hearted ninnies who failed to understand that chemical weapons werejust "the application of modern science to modern warfare" and must beused "to procure a speedy termination of the disorder which prevails on thefrontier."

Similar thoughts are heard today. The editors of the NewRepublic, who not long ago were calling for more military aid for"Latin-style fascists...regardless of how many are murdered" because"there are higher American priorities than Salvadoran human rights,"now explain -- correctly -- that "Operation Enduring Freedom is not ahumanitarian intervention," so that "If we leave behind a country inchaos that can no longer serve as a base of operations against us, then we willhave accomplished a necessary objective," and should "lose theobsession with nation-building" to try to repair what we have done toAfghanistan for 20 years.

While few are willing to sink to that level, it remainstrue that atrocities committed against Afghans carry little moral stigma, forone reason, because such practices have been so familiar throughout history,even when there has been no pretext other than greed and domination. Andretribution knows no bounds. For that there is ample historical precedent, notto speak of authority in the holiest texts we are taught to revere.

Another aspect of the complacent acceptance of atrocitieswas described with wonder by Alexis de Tocqueville in his report of one of thegreat crimes of ethnic cleansing of the continent, the expulsion of theCherokees through the trail of tears "in the middle of winter," withsnow "frozen hard on the ground," a "solemn spectacle" ofmurder and degradation, "the triumphal march of civilization across thedesert." He was particularly struck that the conquerors could deprivepeople of their rights and exterminate them "with singular felicity,tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, and withoutviolating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the world."It was impossible to destroy people with "more respect for the laws ofhumanity," he wrote.

That is a fair enough description of what has beenunfolding before our eyes. For example, in the refugee camp of Maslakh, wherehundreds of thousands of people are starving, dozens dying every night from coldand starvation. They were living on the edge of survival even before thebombing, which deprived them of desperately-needed aid. It remains a"forgotten camp" as we meet, three months after Sept. 11. Veterancorrespondent Christina Lamb reports scenes more "harrowing" thananything in her memory, after having "seen death and misery in refugeecamps in many parts of Asia and Africa." The destruction of lives is silentand mostly invisible, by choice; and can easily remain forgotten, also bychoice. The easy tolerance of the "vivid awfulness" that Lamb recountsmerely reflects the fact that this is how the powerful deal with the weak anddefenseless, hence in no way remarkable.

We have no right to harbor any illusions about the premisesof current planning. Planning for the war in Afghanistan was based on theunchallenged assumption that the threat of bombing, and its realization, wouldconsiderably increase the number of Afghans at risk of death from starvation,disease, and exposure. The press blandly reported that the numbers were expectedto increase by 50%, to about 7.5 million: an additional 2.5 million people.Pleas to stop the bombing to allow delivery of food and other aid were rebuffedwithout comment, mostly without even report. These came from high UN officials,major relief and aid agencies, and others in a good position to know. By lateSeptember, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) had warned that morethan 7 million people would face starvation if the threatened military actionwere undertaken, and after the bombing began, advised that the threat of"humanitarian catastrophe" was "grave," and that the bombinghad disrupted the planting of 80% of the grain supplies, so that the effectsnext year could be even more severe.

What will happen we cannot know. But we know well enoughthe assumptions on which plans are based and executed, and commentary produced.As a simple matter of logic, it is these assumptions that inform us about theshape of the world that lies ahead, whatever the outcomes might be. The basicfacts have been casually reported, including the fact that as we meet, little isbeing done to bring food and other aid to many of those dying in refugee campsand the countryside, even though supplies are available and the primary factorhampering delivery is lack of interest and will.

Furthermore, the longer-term effects will remain unknown,if history is any guide. Reporting is scanty today, and the consequences willnot be investigated tomorrow. It is acceptable to report the crime of"collateral damage" by bombing error, the inevitable cost of war, butnot the conscious and deliberate destruction of fleeing Afghans who will die insilence, invisibly, not by design, but because it doesn't matter, a much deeperlevel of moral depravity; if we step on an ant while walking, we have notpurposely killed it.

People do not die of starvation instantly; they can surviveon roots and grass, and if malnourished children die of disease, who will seekto determine the immediate cause? In the future, the topic is off the agenda byvirtue of a crucial principle: We must devote enormous energy to meticulousaccounting of crimes of official enemies, quite properly including not onlythose literally killed, but also those who die as a consequence of theirpolicies; and we must take equally scrupulous care to avoid this practice in thecase of our own crimes, adopting the stance that so impressed de Tocqueville.There are hundreds of pages of detailed documentation of the application ofthese principles; again, I suppose, close to a historical universal. It will bea welcome surprise if the current case turns out differently.

And we should remember that we are not observing all ofthis from Mars, or describing the crimes of Attila the Hun. There is a greatdeal that we can do right now, if we choose.

To explore what is likely to lie ahead from a differentperspective, let's ask whether there were alternatives to the resort todevastating force at a distance, a device that comes naturally to those withoverwhelming might at their command, no external deterrent, and confidence inthe obedience of articulate opinion.

Alternatives were prominently suggested. By the Vatican,for example, which called for reliance on the measures appropriate to crimes,whatever their scale: if someone robs my house and I think I know who did it, Iam not entitled to go after him with an assault rifle, meanwhile killing peoplerandomly in his neighborhood. Or by the eminent military historian MichaelHoward, who delivered a "scathing attack" on the bombardment ofAfghanistan on October 30, not on grounds of success or failure, but its design:what is needed is "patient operations of police and intelligenceforces," "a police operation conducted under the auspices of the UN onbehalf of the international community as a whole, against a criminal conspiracy,whose members should be hunted down and brought before an internationalcourt." There certainly are precedents, including acts of internationalterrorism even more extreme than those of Sept. 11: the US terrorist war againstNicaragua, to take an uncontroversial example -- uncontroversial, because of thejudgment of the highest international authorities, the International Court ofJustice and the Security Council. Nicaragua's efforts to pursue lawful meansfailed, in a world ruled by force; but no one would impede the US if it chose tofollow a similar course.

Could the legitimate goals of apprehending and punishingthe perpetrators have been attained without violence? Perhaps. We have no way ofknowing whether the Taliban offers to discuss extradition were serious, sincethey were dismissed for the reasons already mentioned. The same is true of themuch later afterthought, overthrowing the Taliban regime, a high priority formany Afghans, much as for innumerable others throughout the world who sufferunder brutal regimes and miserable oppression.