The Same Old Musharraf

Najam Sethi, the distinguished Pakistani Editor, wrote in Lahore's"Friday Times" of May 18 to 24, 2001 as follows: " The Musharrafmodel seeks to covertly ally with the jihadi groups while overtly keeping themainstream religious parties out of the power loop.  This is to enhance andsustain its covert external agenda, while internally maintaining an overtlymoderate anti-fundamentalist stance for the comfort of the internationalcommunity whose economic support is critical to Pakistan's financialviability."

Has Musharraf become a changed man after December 13, 2001, as projected bythe "New York Times" (January 2, 2002) and decided to scale down theinvolvement of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the Pakistan-basedterrorist groups of Pakistani nationals forming part of his clandestine Army ofIslam---consisting of organisations such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), theLashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Al Badr? Is he reallysincere in his reported assurances to the US of his determination to curb theirterrorist activities from the Pakistani soil? Only time can tell, but Indiacannot afford to be taken in by reports of a "new Musharraf" and lowerits guard.

Pakistan's post-December 13 change of posture is exactly a carbon copy ofwhat it did after Bill Clinton placed it in a watch list of suspectedState-sponsors of international terrorism after coming to office in January1993.  It  did whatever Clinton wanted it to do, but after he removedit from the watch list, the ISI redoubled its involvement in terrorism.

A careful study of Musharraf's actions since September 11, 2001, inAfghanistan as well as vis-a-vis India shows the same lack of sincerity, whichhas always been the defining characteristic of his personality.  Hecontinues to be essentially a commando, who is adept at wriggling through trickysituations without giving up his over-all objective.

Till the terrorists struck New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001,Musharraf stuck to his policy of supporting the Taliban and bin Laden and makinguse of them for training the jehadi groups meant for use against India in Jammu& Kashmir and elsewhere and resisted US pressure to help in the arrest anddeportation of bin Laden.

Within 48 hours of the US incidents, he did a total volte face, whenconfronted with an US revolver held to his head.  On September 12, 2001,within 24 hours of the jehadi terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC,Musharraf, after consulting his Corps Commanders, ordered an emergency scram toevacuate from the Taliban-controlled Afghan territory, all Pakistani Govt.personnel, serving as well as retired, serving in the Taliban's militia, civiladministration and intelligence agency, and all jehadis belonging to theHarkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)and the Al Badr undergoing training in the training camps in Afghan territory.

Airports, including the one in Islamabad, were temporarily closed for trafficto enable the evacuation by air from Kabul and Kandahar of all senior Armyofficers, serving and retired, serving in the Taliban.  Under the UNsanctions, there was a ban on all flights to and from the Taliban-controlledterritory.  Despite this, Musharraf and his officers decided to take a riskby evacuating the senior officers by air.

All junior officers and civilian personnel were ordered to return to Pakistanby road as best as they could.  Similar instructions were issued to thejehadis undergoing training in Afghan territory, preparatory to their inductioninto Jammu & Kashmir.

The post-September 11, 2001,  visit of two high-level Pakistanidelegations to Kabul/Kandahar---one led by Lt.Gen.Mahmood Ahmed, the then DG,ISI, and the other by Mufti Shamzai of the Binori mosque, Karachi--- ostensiblyto pressurise  the Amir of the Taliban to hand over  bin Laden to theUS or to an European country within three days, was meant to gain some more timeto complete the evacuation of Pakistani Government personnel and the jehadis.

There was, however, no evacuation of the Pakistani students of the variousmadrasas in Pakistan, most of them belonging to Maulana Fazlur Rahman'sJamaat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI), who had been fighting along with the TalibanMilitia against the Northern Alliance troops.

They were asked by Musharraf to stay on and continue to assist the TalibanMilitia.  The junta was worried that the evacuation of the Pakistani Armypersonnel and any disruption of the Taliban's Militia set-up by US air strikesmight enable the Northern Alliance to re-capture Kabul and other territory lostto the Taliban since September, 1996.

This was one of the subjects discussed by the Corps Commanders' conferencebefore October 7, 2001.  The junta was worried that if the Taliban'sresistance against the Northern Alliance collapsed and the Burhanuddin RabbaniGovernment returned to power in Kabul, it would be strongly anti-Pakistan andpro-India, pro-Russia and pro-Iran.  It wanted to prevent this fromhappening.  The ISI-backed jehadi  organisations were asked to rushmore of their members to the front to join in resisting the Northern Alliance. Another possibility discussed by the Corps Commanders was Musharraf offering toPresident Bush to send his own troops to occupy Kabul and other areas after theywere liberated from  the control of the Taliban.

As part of his "unstinted" co-operation, Musharraf agreed to shareall available intelligence with the US and provide logistics and emergencyfacilities to the US Air Force in the Pakistani Air Force bases at Jacobabad inSindh and Pasni in Balochistan.  Not only that; he  emerged as thechief adviser to the US on how to wipe out the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, even inthe face of the strong opposition from the religious extremist elements inPakistan and placed the religious leaders, who opposed the co-operation, underhouse arrest.

Even while thus ostensibly co-operating with the US, Musharraf tried his bestto prevent the decimation of the Taliban.  The ISI leaked to the Talibaninformation about the entry into East Afghanistan of US-backed Abdul Haq, aPashtun leader long in the pay of the CIA, thereby resulting in his capture andexecution by the Taliban.

Musharraf urged the US to prevent the Northern Alliance from entering Kabul. When the Northern Alliance managed to occupy Kabul, he made a distinctionbetween moderate and extremist Taliban and wanted that the moderate Talibanshould be part of any new interim Government formed in Kabul.  He alsowanted that any UN force sent to Kabul to replace the Northern Alliance troopsshould consist only of contingents from Islamic countries and wanted a Pakistanicontingent to be included in it.  He did not succeed in pushing throughthese ideas.

While officially welcoming the selection of Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leaderclose to ex-King Zahir Shah, as the leader of the interim administration, heasked the ISI to undermine him.  The ISI planted stories in the Pakistanimedia describing Karzai as the CIA's man, as a close personal friend of KarlInderfurth, former Assistant Secretary of State, as a playboy with no politicalacumen or military experience and as prejudiced against Pakistan.

As an example of Karzai's perceived anti-Pakistan leanings, the ISIdisseminated the text of a testimony given by him before a Senate ForeignRelations sub-committee in July, 2000, in which he had described Pakistan as thegreatest problem for Afghanistan and said: "I call upon the internationalcommunity, and particularly upon the government of the United States, to look atAfghanistan from the perspective of Afghanistan and not that of its neighbours. The time to watch is over and the responsibility to act is long overdue."

To work towards undermining the position of Karzai in the Pashtun community,the ISI encouraged a group of Taliban leaders to ostensibly break with theTaliban leadership and revive a 36-year old organisation called Khuddamul Furqan,which had become inactive after the Taliban came into being in 1994.  Thegroup, while supporting the convening of a Loya Jirga to resolve the graveproblems confronting Afghanistan, has at the same time been critical of the Bonnaccord which led to the interim administration headed by Karzai.

At the instance of the ISI, Pir Ahmad Amin Mojaddedi, a respected religiousand spiritual figure, has been elected as the President of the Khuddamul Furqan. This movement, which describes itself as reformist  in the sense of wantingto rid Islam of corrupting Western influences, was founded by his late fatherMohammad Ismail Mojaddedi in 1966 and claims to enjoy support in the Pushtun-dominatedprovinces such as Ghazni, Logar, Paktia  and Khost.

Most members of the group were active in Mujahideen leader Maulvi MohammadNabi Mohammadi's Harkatul Iquilab-i-Islami during the jehad  against theSoviet  troops in Afghanistan.  It is reported that  Mohammadihimself, who was a staunch Taliban supporter and had merged his party with MullaOmar's movement, was unhappy with the ISI's action in promoting this group.

Three former top aides of Mohammadi, including Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, MaulviAbdul Sattar Siddiqui and Maulvi Abdur Rahman Ahmad Hotak, have been givenimportant posts in the Khuddamul Furqan.  Rahmani, who served as DeputyPrime Minister in the Burhanuddin Rabbani Government during 1992-96 and asDeputy Education Minister in the Taliban regime, has been  named the deputyleader of the Khuddamul Furqan for political affairs.  Siddiqui, who wasdeputy Chief Justice in both the Rabbani and Taliban governments, has beenappointed  as deputy leader for administrative affairs.  Hotak, whowas the  Deputy Information and Culture Minister in the Taliban regime, hasbeen designated as the deputy leader for collective affairs.  Abdul HakimMujahid, who served as the New York-based Taliban representative, has been madeincharge of the political affairs committee.  Another Taliban diplomatHabibullah Fowzi, who served both in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, would head thecommittee for organization and propagation.  Rahmatullah Wahidyar, who wasDeputy Minister for refugees' rehabilitation in the Taliban government, is thehead of the security committee.

Pir Ahmad Mojaddedi, who is a relative of former Afghan presidentSebghatullah Mojaddedi, has been living in a safe house of the ISI in Islamabadsince the early 1980s. Members of his family were captured by the Soviet troopsand were never heard of again.

After the fall of Kandahar, most of the Taliban leaders have taken shelter inthe mosques/madrasas of Balochistan and the NWFP with the complicity of theserving and retired officers of the Pakistani military-intelligenceestablishment.  Similarly, most of the surviving leaders and cadres of binLaden's Al Qaeda have taken shelter in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas(FATA) with the complicity of serving and retired officers and Mufti SoofiMohammad's Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).

On September 12, the UN General Assembly, by consensus of the 189 memberstates, called for international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts ofterrorism and to hold accountable the perpetrators of terrorism  and thosewho harbor or support them.  The same day, the  Security Councilunanimously determined, for the first time ever, any act of internationalterrorism to be a threat to international peace and security.  Thisdetermination laid the foundation for Security Council action to bring togetherthe international community under a common set of obligations in the fight toend international terrorism.

On September 28, 2001, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution1373 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  This established a body oflegally binding obligations on all  member states.

Its provisions require, among other things, that all member states preventthe financing of terrorism and deny safe haven to terrorists.  States willneed to review and strengthen their border security operations, bankingpractices, customs and immigration procedures, law enforcement and intelligencecooperation, and arms transfer controls. All states are required to increasecooperation and share  information with respect to these efforts.  TheResolution  also called upon each state to report on the steps it hadtaken, and established a committee of the Security Council to monitorimplementation.

Since September 11, 2001, the US has  taken the following steps:

* On September 23, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, froze all the assets of 27 foreign individuals, groups, and entities linked to terrorist acts or supporting terrorism and authorized the freezing of assets of those who commit, or pose a significant threat of , acts of terrorism.

* On October 12, the U.S. added 39 names to the list of individuals and organizations linked to terrorism or terrorist financing under E.O. 13224.

* On October 26, the U.S. enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, which significantly expanded the ability of U.S. law enforcement to investigate and prosecute persons who engage in terrorist acts.

* On October 29, the U.S. created a Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force aimed at denying entry into the U.S. of persons suspected of being terrorists and locating, detaining, prosecuting and deporting terrorists already in the U.S.

* On November 2, the U.S. designated 22 terrorist organizations located throughout the world under E.O. 13224, thus, highlighting the need to focus on terrorist organizations worldwide.

* On November 7, the U.S. added 62 new organizations and individuals, all of whom were either linked to the Al Barakaat conglomerate or the Al Taqwa Bank, which have been identified as supplying funds to terrorists.

* On December 4, the U.S. froze under E.O. 13224 the assets and accounts of the Holy Land Foundation in Richardson, Texas, whose funds are used to support the Hamas terrorist organization, and two other entities, bringing the total to 153.

* On December 5, the Secretary of State designated 39 groups as "terrorist organizations" under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the new USA PATRIOT Act, in order to strengthen the United States' ability to exclude supporters of terrorism or to deport them if they are found within US borders. The list of such designated organizations is called the "Terrorist Exclusion List." The HuM, the LeT and the JeM figure in the list.

According to a statement made by the British Government in the House ofCommons on October 15, 2001, the UK had till then  frozen 35 suspect bankaccounts, immobilising more than £63 million of suspect terrorist funds. France has announced freezing of suspected terrorist funds/assets worth PoundSterling 2.7 million.

On November 17, 2001, the International Monetary and Financial Committee ofthe Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) called on eachIMF member to freeze all terrorist assets within its jurisdiction and toimplement fully UNSCR 1373.  Members should publish monthly reports byFebruary 1, 2002, listing terrorist assets subject to freezing and the amount ofassets frozen.

How did Musharraf comply with the directives of the UN Security Council andthe IMF? After taking over as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCommittee on October 8, 2001, Gen.Mohammad Aziz called a meeting of all thejehadi organisations and briefed them on the various steps which the junta wouldhave to take in pursuance of the UN resolution and pressure from the US. Even before this meeting, the Al Rashid Trust of Karachi had transferred most ofthe amounts held in its name in different banks to new accounts in the names ofindividuals, who had not come to the adverse notice of the US.  Similaraction was taken by other jehadi organisations after the briefing by Aziz onOctober 8, 2001.

Pakistan-Afghanistan was the main epicentre of international Islamicterrorism inspired by bin Laden and the Taliban and there was a large flow offunds to various organisations in Pakistan associated with terrorism fromcontributors in Pakistan, the West, Saudi Arabia and other members of the Ummah. One would have, therefore, expected that the funds frozen in Pakistan would havebeen much larger than in any other country.