The Return Of War

The two-day talks held betweenthe government of Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)at Geneva in Switzerland on October 28-29, 2006, ended without any conclusiveresult and without an agreement on future engagement. The outcome – or lackthereof – reaffirmed the fact that the dialogue remains essentially tacticalon both sides, and seeks principally to establish a facade to appease theinternational community.

The intent and orientationwere already well in evidence long before the meetings at Geneva. The governmentdefence spokesperson, Keheliya Rambukwella, had bluntly declared, on October 24,"We will be going for talks, not peace talks." On the other side and onthe same day, the political head of the LTTE, S.P. Tamilselvan, told media thatthe LTTE’s participation in the talks was in respect of the call by theinternational community. The talks were facilitated by Norway at the behest ofco-chairs of Donor countries, which, at their meeting on September 12, 2006, inBrussels, urged both parties to engage in talks to end the ‘undeclared war’.Geneva II, however, was an even more obvious failure than Geneva I (February22-23, 2006), where the two parties at least agreed to meet later, on April19-20, though that meeting never materialized.

According to preliminaryreports, the discussions collapsed on the issue of the closure of the A9Highway, which links Jaffna peninsula to the rest of the country. The LTTEclaimed that the ‘peace process’ was contingent on re-opening of thehighway, while the government said it was compelled to close the highway forsecurity reasons and that the LTTE was raking up the issue as it was not seriousabout discussing "core political issues." The government alleged thatthe LTTE were keen on re-opening the highway with an eye on the revenue itgenerated.

In reality, the talks neverprogressed in real terms with both sides sticking to their own intransigentpositions. While the government demanded that ‘core issues’ – democracy,multi-party system, pluralism, human rights, child recruitment, development ofthe North and East and devolution – be discussed within a time-boundframework, the LTTE emphasized that they would engage on ‘contentiouspolitical issues’ only after ‘immediate humanitarian needs’ – theopening of the A9 Highway being the most important – and concerns regardingthe protecting human rights had been first addressed.

Recent events have done muchto bolster the government’s perception of its strength, both militarily andpolitically. Colombo has secured significant advantages on the ground after itssuccesses in Mavilaru, Muttur, Muhamalai, Sampur and Jaffna, even as it hassecured the long elusive ‘Southern Consensus’ – for the first time in thecountry both the ruling party and Opposition have come together with the signingof the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)and United National Party (UNP) on October 23. The MoU is the result ofPresident Mahinda Rajapakse’s attempt to have a united South. After thesigning of the MoU the President stated, "We needed a Southern consensus.That was what the LTTE and the international community were asking for. We havenow achieved it." Under the circumstances, the government was disinclinedto allow significant movement to a renewed cease-fire agreement which wouldprovide the LTTE a respite and the opportunity to regroup. On the other hand,the LTTE had also secured a number of dramatic ‘successes’, particularly inits execution of a number of effective suicide attacks in the South, as well asby inflicting large casualties on the Sri Lankan Army forces in some of themajor conventional confrontations in the North. At the present juncture,consequently, neither the government nor the LTTE was ready for a ‘decisivewar’ or for ‘decisive talks’.

Unsurprisingly, the spiral ofviolence continues. 647 persons were killed in October 2006 alone, adding to 533killed in September. 3,560 people have already been sacrificed to the violencethis year (till October 28). The LTTE’s losses in conventional warfare havebeen significant since hostilities broke out in July 2006, with at least 1,746cadres killed, an estimated 15 per cent of its total cadre strength. The LTTEhas lost a total of 2,041 cadres through 2006 (till October 28). Progressivelycornered in the North, it sought to startle the government ahead of Geneva II byengineering a series of suicide attacks, the worst of which was the October 16attack that killed at least 102 Navy personnel at Habrana in the MataleDistrict. It has also inflicted severe blows on government forces in thefighting in the North. The worst single engagement for the SLA was on August 11,when the government lost 129 of its troopers in fighting at Jaffna. A total of505 Security Forces (SF) personnel have been killed since July 2006, and 701through the year.

The issue of reopening of A9highway, which was closed by the government in August 2006, is critical for theLTTE. By closing the highway, the government has stifled the LTTE economy, sincethis route was the main source of local income for the rebels, who patrol astretch of this road from Muhamalai to Omanthai in the Northern Province. TheLTTE levies taxes and tolls on goods, persons and vehicles passing through thisstretch of road. According to the Website of the Ministry of Defence of the governmentof Sri Lanka, "It is believed that the LTTE daily collects morethan (Sri Lankan) Rs. 900,000 in the form of illegal tax and other revenue inthis road. From Omanthai in the cleared area [area under government control], anaverage of 7000-8000 civilians and 1000- 1200 vehicles cross the stretch of landdaily. Records revealed that the LTTE extortions to be an estimated sum of Rs.200- 300 million from Jaffna bound cargo passing from its entry-exit point inPallai. The estimated illegal tax revenue for the LTTE from the goods sent toJaffna through A-9 road from June 01st to 19th is Rs. 65,721,821. LTTE alsoearned Rs. 285 million from goods to Jaffna, during March-April, on the festiveeve on the Sinhala-Tamil New Year."

As a counter, the government has sought to maintain the sea routes to Jaffna as the principal supply line,but the LTTE has declared that it would not allow government vessels to use thesea because the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) has not distinguished marine areascontrolled by the government from those controlled but the outfit. As onecommentator notes, while the "CFA had demarcated these areas on land, it hadnot done so in the sea, as it was then agreed that the sea was the exclusivepreserve of the Sri Lankan state. While banning the use of the sea, the LTTEoffered to open the land route or the A9 highway. But the government is not keenon taking the offer of the land route because of the fear that the LTTE mayhijack a part of the supplies or illegally tax the consignments en route."

Several changes have takenplace between Geneva I and Geneva II, infinitely compounding the situation, bothpolitically and militarily: The Sri Lanka Supreme Court’s October 16 rulingthat the temporary merger of the northern and eastern provinces, effected in1987 and extended annually, was "null and void and illegal" and thatthe President has no powers to effect a merger of provinces under EmergencyRegulation, and only Parliament could decide on the subject; the EuropeanUnion’s ban on the LTTE as a terrorist organisation; mounting fatalities –totaling 3,413: 788 civilians, 664 troops and 1,961 LTTE cadres in theintervening period; the emergence of the Southern Consensus; the government’smilitary gains, and the LTTE’s escalating campaigns of violence.Unsurprisingly, Geneva II achieved even less than the notional gains of GenevaI. Almost immediately after Geneva I, intelligence sources stated that alarge-scale LTTE war drill was in progress in the Kanjikudichcharu area ofAmpara District. This time around, the ground situation can be expected toworsen, unless international community is able to exert real and irresistiblepressure on both sides. If the mounting number of CFA violations is anyindicator – 3,737 by the LTTE and 280 by the government between February 22,2002 and August 30, 2006 – the ceasefire is over, and the country has returnedto real war.

Ajit Kumar Singh is ResearchAssistant, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal