Making A Difference

The Border And The Ballot

Real and perceived dangers from the two neighbours, aftermath of the April border-skirmishes, and communal tensions are likely to figure crucially in the coming elections.

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The Border And The Ballot
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An extreme case scenario -- sudden border clashes with one of the twoneighbors (as happened last April) could jeopardize the coming election inBangladesh. And conceivably, the flash of simmering discontents, latentdistrusts, and the communal antipathy in the border districts, including theChittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), having perimeter with India and Myanmar, mayeasily sway the national poll.

The (April) encounter between the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and the IndianBorder Security Forces (BSF) killed 16 Indian and 2 Bangladeshi soldiers, andsince then the Indo-Bangladesh dividing line has not been the "border ofpeace." It has repeatedly grabbed national headlines -- because of anincreasing number of Bangladeshi civilians -- India calls them intruders --killed and injured mostly by the BSF.

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A few times over the last five months, there was tension and troopmobilization at several disputed points, which agonized the civilian population,and worked up the politicians.

The Bangladesh-Myanmar border also periodically erupts with the Rohingyasfleeing persecution; the hill districts are the "tunnels" of the contrabandgoods entering Bangladesh. A slice of Bangladesh’s borderline, the Cox’sBazaar/Teknaf front with Myanmar supplies illegal weapons, and a cache ofsophisticated weapons unearthed there recently not only shook up the armsunderworld but also managed to provide jitters to the entire nation.

Very recently, the Myanmar firing injured 10 fishermen inside Bangladesh’swater territory in the Bay of Bengal -- Dhaka lodged a protest with Myanmargovernment.

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Most of such border concerns will get a political voice during the election.

Asymmetry of Casualties

The asymmetry of casualties between the two neighbors since April is clear,and Bangladeshis in the border districts fear that India was out to take revengeupon them -- killing or injuring more and more civilians who, for one reason orthe other, stride on the Indian side of the line.

A senior bureaucratic level meeting on border disputes ended in a deadlock inJune -- it did not touch the old dispute over Padua, the epicenter of the Aprilturmoil.

Over the last ten years before the explosive episodes this year, 31Bangladeshis including 3 BDR personnel were killed at the Roumari front alone.In the last two years, about 50 border incidents killed 45 Bangladeshis. The ireand frustrations of the border residents are likely to influence their futurevoting, and may even influence others in the nation.

Geo-political composition of the border resentment

A new geopolitical composition has dawned upon the border people -- New Delhibelieves that Bangladesh is the safe haven for the Indian rebels that Dhakaresolutely denies.

Sheikh Hasina’s (Hasina) government had a strategic understanding with NewDelhi to deny logistics to the suspected terrorists absconding from India. Mostcomplaints of periodic Indian raids in to suspected safe houses, schools,madrassas and even mosques sometimes located well inside the perimeter receivedonly scant attention from Dhaka.

India suspects that the Bangladeshis on the border are either the potential"illegal migrants" or the abettors of trans-border terrorism andperiodically urges the Bangladesh government to go for the hideout raids toflush out the rebels.

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It is a tension filled time for the border people whenever the Indiansecurity forces try to "push in" the suspected migrants back into Bangladeshterritories.

Such frustrated people on the periphery are expected to empower themselveswith their right to vote, but it is not yet clear what kind of messagesdifferent parties have crafted for their audience there.

Group Dynamics

Hasina had a nearly open border policy; so those who benefited from smugglingor from legitimate trade across the line would possibly want her regime back.But they are not the only forces along the threshold.

The same opposition trajectory will not work to enlist discontents along theentire borderline with India and Myanmar. Evidently with New Delhi’s help,Hasina signed a peace treaty with Shantu Larma, the leader of the separatistShantibahini, but his bellicose rhetoric is turning the short-lived boom of thataccord into a bust.

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Meanwhile, the Bengali settlers protest the peace deal that apparently endedthe Chakma-led insurgency but relegated them into a permanent disadvantage. Theelection will give them a political opportunity to get even with the AL thatbrought them uneven peace terms with the tribals.

The disputed enclaves are also the hubs of smugglers, human traffickers andsuch other criminals as the gun and drug runners who operate in cahoots withpoliticians, criminal gangs, local bureaucracy and police in Bangladesh, Indiaand Myanmar. Sometimes the criminals prey on the civilians. They have money andmuscle power; the politicians could use both in the election.

There are farmers and stone merchants in the Tamabil areas -- many working asboatmen, truckers and the pebble collectors. The Padua tumult badly affectedthose people in April; they still face an uncertain future.

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Contentions about Padua are showing up in the election campaign in Sylhet andthe adjacent areas. More recently, the gravel gatherers in the northernBangladesh also came under the BSF fire. As of this writing, tension was risingon the Panchagarh front as the BSF shot and killed an Indian citizen suspectedto be a Bangladeshi intruder.

It is almost certain that India will build a fence along the Indo-Bangladeshborder, and actually the work has already started in some areas. The new fencewill change the way border people live and earn their living -- thoseBangladeshis who depend on sneaking into Indian territories for work worry aboutthe dire prospect, and expect their leaders to address these concerns.

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Lingering Resentments

Blood spilled, 18 soldiers lost their lives, many were hurt, and severalBangladeshi houses were torched by the retreating BSF as retaliation for thecasualties they suffered in Boraibari. But neither the government nor the ALleadership unequivocally sided with the BDR jawans for steadfastly defending theBangladeshi territories.

Hasina, for a while, did not make any decisive statement on the bloodyconfrontation. By most reckoning, the authorities in Dhaka were careful not toincur New Delhi’s wrath, which did not help Hasina politically with electiongetting nearer.

In the twilight hours of her power, Hasina removed Major General FazlurRahman and two of his associates from the BDR -- people suspect that Hasina didit under New Delhi’s pressure. Beyond the AL high command, few liked thatreshuffle. The Caretaker Government’s belated gallantry awards to the BDRsoldiers have not assuaged the anger generated by those border clashes.

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Shantu Larma & the next Election

Shantu Larma, Chairman CHT,  Regional Council (RC), and the mostprominent Chakma leader, does not like the voters’ list as it allegedlyincludes a large number of illegal settlers, a breach of the 1997 peace accord.With tribal backing, the AL candidates should win in the hill districts, butbecause of Shantu Larma’s tantrums, factionalism and personal rivalry amongstthe tribal leaders, the AL is divided.

But that is merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Kidnapping, robbery,extortion, murders and political killings have rocked the lives of the hillpeople as well as the Bengali settlers. Such grievances may gain momentum in theelection campaign not only inside in the CHT, but in the neighboring districtsfrom where most Bengalis migrated into the tribal areas.

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India and the Minority Issues

India and Bangladesh politics interweave deeply, and most of Bangladesh’s2000 plus miles of land border is under the shadow of the giant neighbor -- thisyear India is again an issue -- implicitly as well as explicitly -- in theBangladesh election.

I read a book recently in Dhaka (RAW in Bangladesh, written inBengali). With a mere dash of supporting evidence, the author charges that theRAW, the Indian intelligence arm, is active in Bangladesh. The ways India treatsits border with Bangladesh and that RAW is dabbling into politics are acombustible speculative debate raging in Bangladesh -- all the more so when theelection comes.

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There are easily excitable communal issues in the border districts (and otherparts of the country as well) including the CHT that may inflame the electionclimate. The disputed voters’ list could add fuel to the fire.

A national daily recently cited such names from the voter’s lists (inKhulna) that had ceased to be local residents for many years, and settled inWest Bengal.

In July an Indian website reported that the right wing groups in Bangladeshand the ISI operatives are allegedly conspiring to ignite communal tensionsalong the Indo-Bangladesh border, as the election gets nearer. It could bespeculative. But scattered reports of communally inclined violence have comefrom several parts of Bangladesh.

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The CHT has a potentially dangerous configuration -- the tribals arenon-Muslims and the settlers are almost all Muslims. The acrimony in the hilldistricts that accumulated since the peace accord in 1997 has already come tothe fore.

Only last week, there were new peaks of conflict -- the Council of the HillPeople (led by the settlers) urged the Caretaker Government to dissolve the CHTRegional Council, try Shantu Larma, and to hold election under a neutralauthority.

On the eve of the election, the simmering discontents in the borderlinechallenge the civil society, political parties, their leaders, and the powertriumvirate -- President, Chief Advisor and the Chief Election Commissioner.

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M. Rashiduzzaman teaches Political Science at Rowan University, Glassboro,New Jersey, U.S.A.

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