Our War V/s Their War

It's our war versus their war. On July 13, when the Israeli cabinet decided to go to war in Lebanon, India was still recovering from the 7/11 attacks which claimed nearly 200 lives and injured over 700 sub-urban commuters who travelled every day by local trains to earn their living. In sharp contrast, Israel quickly jotted out several figures that led to the latest provocation from the Lebanon-based Hezbollah. The Hezbollah had attacked an Israeli military convoy, killing eight soldiers and kidnapping two men. This proved to be the "trigger" that sent Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his cabinet into a huddle and 24 hours later Israeli infantry moved out of its barracks to launch the Middle-East's version of the Global War against Terror (GWOT).

Just a week earlier, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had gone into a similar huddle with his cabinet colleagues. On their agenda was a similar situation that had gripped the Israeli government. "How do we respond to the latest terror attack?" the Indian cabinet asked themselves. Hours before the meeting, the Prime Minister had spent a considerable amount of time discussing with his security establishment on the kind and level of response that India must shape to continued acts of cross-border terrorism. With Secretary (R) PK Hormese Tharakan in tow, the man carrying the burden of effecting such a response, the meeting examined all the possibilities that India could exercise to send out a strong message – that India was not ready to take such terror attacks lying down. But, as sources within the security establishment told this correspondent, the Israeli way was a perfect example of what Indian will and cannot do as a response to terrorism.

But, on Monday, as the cease-fire came into effect, Israel almost seemed glad that they had been given an "honorable exit". A week ago, an Israeli friend, who is also one of the most respected political commentators and reporters wrote to me pointing out that the political scandal after the war was over would be immense. His summary was that the (Prime Minister) Ehud Olmert –(Defence Minister) Emir Peretz team had failed to deliver. Like all political masters, trying to shape an answer to terror attacks, they were trying to balance the political fall out at home as well as abroad and in this case, both Olmert and Peretz proved to be unsuccessful.

The war in Lebanon, when viewed in the context of troubled Middle-East throws up several issues, many of which are also relevant to India. Israeli claims that the present war is not a response to the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers but to a much deeper malaise. Israeli officials in their embassy in Delhi insist that their war against the Hezbollah is not the first. In 1978, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) lunched Operation Litani, named after the river that cuts through Southern Lebanon to try and contain Fatah-PLO "terrorists". In 1982, then defence minister Ariel 'Arik' Sharon, a known-hawk with the reputation of being the Israeli 'General Patton' sent in troops into Lebanon. Two years later, after many casualties, and having effectively destroyed the last semblance of a civil government in Lebanon, the Israeli troops came back with little to post as an "achievement." Between 1993 and 2004, the IDF went back and forth into Lebanon thrice – Operation Accountability in '93 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in '96 against the Hezbollah and finally the pull out in May 2000 right up to an international border that was drawn by the UN Security council.

But six years later, as the IDF went back into southern Lebanon, first a thrust of seven kilometers and, as of the Israeli cabinet decision on August 9, right up to the Litani River. This operation, insists the Israeli ambassador to India, Daniel Danielli, is a "just war" because Israel launched its attack from "their side of the international border". According to him this is war is not just about the kidnapping of two soldiers but also about the hundreds of rocket attacks that has been launched by the Hezbollah to "target Israeli civilian pockets". Israel also claims that the war has also helped reveal the "sophisticated war material that the Hezbollah has" and cites rockets with ranges up to 50 kms that have been rained on Israel to justify Operation Change of Direction.

In fact, the Israeli cabinet's decision to "expand the war" added another dimension to Israel's war against terror. After all, Israel has been the first one to push the envelope when it came to using innovative methods to combat terror. They sent in covert teams to hunt down those they suspected of being the brains behind the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin sent Israel's Special Forces to Entebee to rescue 103 passengers hijacked to the Ugandan capital. Israel also barely batted an eyelid when it came to contributing to the Iran-Contra affair for their self-interest. Similar diplomatic initiatives ensured that Israel was on better terms with apartheid-ridden South Africa and China when the rest of the democratic world balked at doing so.

The idea was that Israel would do just about anything to ensure its survival. In fact a key rationale that Israeli commentators offer for the rest of the world for the present war is that it has a miniscule population of just six million people. So when people die in terrorist or rocket attacks, its is viewed as a serious threat to its survival. As Israeli embassy officials in New Delhi insist, a key strategic aim is to make the Hezbollah realise that Israel will make it pay for each and every attack.

Which brings us back to India. At conservative estimates India has lost nearly 70,000 people, including security personnel, in nearly two-decades of cross-border terrorism. People have been killed or maimed, and if Kashmir is to be counted, terrorism and the state's response have led to several generations being systematically destroyed. Civil liberty, for the average Kashmiri ends as soon as he or she steps outside the door, ready for rounds of security checks that are demeaning at best, coupled with round ups and forced disappearances.

But, India's response has been mixed at best. On one hand India insists that the Kashmir issue, the key to cross-border terrorism, is a "bilateral issue". But after every major terrorist attack, Indian diplomats in Washington take pains to explain to their American counterparts the evil designs of Pakistan-based jehadi groups. That said, the response occasionally shaped by the security-establishment, has found little space from the political firmament.

If it comes to covert action, India has debated between losing, what a former R&AW chief calls, the "very thin moral ground that India has over Pakistan". His reasoning is that covert or overt action will deliver little. "At the end of the day it will boil down to the fact that both sides will have to sit down and talk. Any covert or overt action would mean the deaths of innocents," he says. But a serving intelligence official disagrees. "The jehadi psyche across the border understands only one language, A bloody nose. As long as Indian maintains restraint, it will continue to work towards destabilising India." His logic is simple. "Every attack means that the terrorist is now more confident of a bigger attack. If there were blasts in Delhi that killed 60 people, then the next one in Mumbai was more spectacular and killed more lives. And in a country the size of India it will be impossible to ensure foolproof security. So the only option left is to try and give them the bloody nose," he says.

During the NDA regime, officials within the security agencies say, there was a better understanding on security issues. But then, the NDA went through three major embarrassments. The systemic intelligence failure in Kargil and the hijack of IC 814 to Kandahar, coupled with Operation Parakram proved disastrous. While several options were closely looked at during the hijacking crisis, including bombing the airfield by the Indian Air Force which would fly from "friendly countries", none were exercised. Finally, officials travelled with then foreign minister Jaswant Singh while a team of anti-hijack specialists stayed behind in the aircraft.

So how should India respond to repeated terrorist attacks? India is no position to launch a conventional war like the Israelis have done. As General Pervez Musharraf stated in a meeting, if reports emanating from Pakistan are to be believed, "Pakistan is not Lebanon." What's more, a friend in Israel, a respected political commentator and reporter for a leading Israeli daily, wrote back that the war did not go very well. "The political fall out of the war," he says, "could be quite messy." If that is the case in Israel, then India with its fractious coalition politics can barely afford such options.

But an interesting statistic provided by the Israelis in the present conflict might have some lessons for us. Of the nearly 400 Hezbollah fighters killed in the war, Israeli officials claim that the majority of them were killed by their "elite units". The Sayeret Matkal and its naval commandos have been operating in Lebanon and some of their most spectacular raids have come from these "elite units". Could this possibly be an option for India – the covert option? Unfortunately, over two decades the Indian security establishment has systematically whittled down its covert capabilities. There is little or no political direction, and most available infrastructure has been left adrift.

The military, with its Rs 88,000 crore annual budgets has actually gone from bad to worse. It has been steadily losing its covert capabilities, and for a brief stint in Sri Lanka during IPKF operations when the Indian military had experimented with special operations. Since then, little thought has been paid to bolstering India's covert capabilities and marry them to India's intelligence services. Intelligence and credible special operations, most security experts agree, would be the ideal deterrent against non-state actors such as terrorists, as well as states which serve as the hot bed of terrorism.

Unfortunately, neither the military has displayed enough foresight to correct this, nor have the political masters shown an inclination to invest in acquiring such a capability. Most officials within the security agencies agree that post-1995, when the (Prime Minister Inder Kumar) Gujral Doctrine came into effect, India's capabilities for covert action have been watered down significantly.

While countries bordering India have their own fault-lines, none have been exploited adequately or in a focussed manner to India's advantage. Instead, most actions have been piecemeal and have failed to deliver any concrete results. With India's security apparatus caught in a time warp, it seems that the initiative is still with the terrorists.