How Different Are Islamic Societies?

Thereare two opposite visions that animate American scholarship on Islam and Islamicsocieties. In the days, months and years ahead, a great deal will hinge on whichof these two visions prevails in our foreign policy.

One projects Islam as an enemy that must be destroyed,or it will destroy us. This is the camp of warriors, led, among others, byBernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer. Their thinking is reductionistand ahistorical: they believe that Islam is fundamentally at odds with the corevalues of the West. These warriors urge United States to confront this menacenow, and contain it militarily before it threatens the West.

The second camp takes the view that Islamic societies are diverse, and eachcontains tendencies-religious, cultural and political-that pull in differentdirections. They do not think that political Islam rejects modernity: it seeksto indigenize modernity, to give it a local habitation and a name. This is thediplomatic camp, led, among others, by John Esposito, Richard Bulliet and RobinWright. They believe in engaging political Islam, and taming its force, amongother things, by adopting a more balanced foreign policy towards the Palestinianquestion.

It is worth noting that, in the world of scholarship, the warriors are aminority. However, together with their neoconservative allies, they enjoyconsiderably greater political and media clout than the diplomatic camp. Thisclout increased greatly after the end of the Cold War. And now, after September11, President Bush appears to be embracing their objective of waging pre-emptivewars against major Islamic countries. We know that in the present climate ofopinion, it would be all too easy to start these wars, but they may be harder tostop.

I will review some of the charges leveled by the camp ofwarriors against Islamic societies. I will examine whether Islamic societieslag in economic development, face a democracy deficit, and possess "bloodyborders," a phrase coined by Samuel Huntington. I will examine if thesecharges are supported by the evidence. And if they are true-can we place thesecharges at the door of Islam?

Economic Development

The Islamic world does face any number of seriousproblems: it would be foolish to deny this. What we need to determine is whetherIslamic countries have done worse, or much worse, than others with acomparable history in pursuing economic growth, promoting equality betweenthe sexes, developing free institutions, and keeping the peace with itsneighbors?

First, consider the question of economic development. Judging from their livingstandards in 1999, measured as per capita income in international dollars-takenfrom the latest World Development Report-it does not appear that Muslimshave done too badly. In several paired comparisons, Iran holds its own withVenezuela, Malaysia is well ahead of Thailand, Egypt is modestly ahead ofUkraine, Turkey only slightly behind Russia, Pakistan a little behind-andIndonesia somewhat ahead-of India, Bangladesh is somewhat behind Vietnam,Tunisia is well ahead of Georgia and Armenia, and Jordan is significantly aheadof Nicaragua. It may be noted that nearly all the comparisons concede thehistorical advantage to the non-Islamic members of the pair.

The results do not change if the comparisons are basedon a broader human development index. In a ranking that includes 162 countriesin 1999-taken from the Human Development Report, 2000-22 Islamiccountries occupy ranks between 32 and 100. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sudan ranklower down the scale, but still ahead of several non-Islamic countries inAfrica. Notably, the Arab oil-rich countries are the leaders of the Islamicpack. And incredibly, Saudi Arabia, the bastion of conservative Islam, spends7.5 percent of its national income on public education; this places it in thesame class as Norway and Finland.

The evidence does confirm the charge of a gender bias inIslamic countries. Nearly half of them show gender bias in their developmentindices. A comparison of the human development index with the same indexcorrected for inequalities between sexes-both taken from the latest HumanDevelopment Report-shows that 17 out of 36 Islamic countries suffer a lossof rank as we move from the general index to the gender-related index. Theselosses are highest for Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Sudan and Lebanon. Only Turkeyimproves its rank significantly, by four places.

The cultural determinism of the warriors extends todemographics. Observing the rapid growth of Islamic population, they attributethis to a cultural resistance to birth control. Once again, an examination ofthe evidence quickly dispels this charge. Between 1970-75 and 1995-2000, nearlyevery Islamic country experienced a decline in the total fertility rate: this isthe number of child births per woman over her lifetime. In several, the declinewas quite impressive. The fertility rates for 1995-2000 were 1.9 in Azerbaijan,2.3 in Tunisia, 2.6 in Indonesia, 3.2 in Iran, 3.3 in Malaysia and Algeria, and3.4 in Morocco and Egypt: compared to 3.3 for India and 3.6 in Philippines.These low rates for the Islamic countries are more remarkable because they wereachieved over periods much shorter than in Europe and Latin America.

Bloody Borders

We now turn to the matter about Islam's "bloodyborders." In his book, The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntingtonclaims that "Muslim bellicosity and violence are late-twentieth centuryfacts which neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can deny." In support of thisthesis, he offers a list of inter-civilizational conflicts on Islam's borders inthe 1990s. He also provides some quantitative evidence purporting to show thatMuslims had a disproportionate share in inter-civilizational conflicts during1993-94.

A more careful examination of the data tells a differentstory. Jonathan Fox, in the Journal of Peace Research (2000), has shownthat Islam was involved in 23.2 percent of all inter-civilizational conflictsbetween 1945 and 1989, and 24.7 percent of these conflicts during 1990 to 1998.This is not too far above Islam's share in world population; nor do we observeany dramatic rise in this share since the end of the Cold War. It would appearthat Huntington's "facts" about "Muslim bellicosity" fail toqualify as facts.

In any case, we have to be careful when we talk about"bloody borders." A hard look at the geography of civilizations soonreveals that the length of these borders vary strikingly, and that Islam's shareof such borders is disproportionately large. On the one hand, Islam's geographicsweep across the Afro-Eurasian landmass brings it into contact-both close andextensive-with the African, Western, Orthodox, Hindu and Buddhist civilizations.In addition, we must count the internal borders between often large pockets ofmajority Islam within non-Islamic countries and vice versa. It is my impressionthat if we added up all of these borders, Islam's share of borders might wellexceed the combined share of all others. A recognition of these facts might helpto place observations about Islam's "bloody borders" in a lessprejudicial perspective.

The Democracy Deficit

Finally, there is the charge of a 'democracy deficit' inthe Islamic world: attributed by cultural aficionados, like Samuel Huntingtonand Elie Kedourie, to an Islamic culture that is seen as hostile to democraticvalues.

The proof of this is found in the latest global rankingson freedom and democracy provided by the experts at Freedom House: as if suchcomplex matters could be ascertained by examining snapshots of countries at anyone point in time. There is a further problem with these rankings: they aresubjectively determined. Concerned about the biases this might introduce, theUNDP quickly discontinued their use in their annual Human Development Reportsafter using them once.

The cultural determinism of Freedom House is also on proud display in their mostrecent report. On the one hand, a quick review of the trends on democratizationreveals two waves of democratization-in the 1950s and 1990s-data which pointtowards powerful international forces regulating these movements. The first waveaccompanied the post-war dismantling of colonies; the second wave followed theend of the Cold War. If some countries, or block of countries, have notparticipated in these waves of democratization-or pseudo-democratizations forthe most part-this is attributed to cultural flaws. Thus, the latest FreedomHouse report declares that "the roots of freedom and democracy areweakest" in the Middle East (emphasis added).

Nevertheless, let us take a closer look at the latestnumbers provided by Freedom House. Their data for 2001 show that only 23 percentof the Islamic countries have electoral democracies; the comparable numbers are38 percent for Africa, 62 percent for Asian countries, 70 percent forpost-Communist countries in Europe and the CIS, and 91 percent for the Americas.There are some revealing patterns within the Islamic countries. Of the 16Arab countries and six Central Asian Republics, not one is democratic. When weexclude these two groups from the Islamic countries-about a fifth of world'sIslamic population-the proportion of democracies in the remaining Islamiccountries rises to 47 percent. It may be noted that, in some cases, the FreedomHouse classifications are questionable. If Iran and Malaysia were classified aselectoral democracies the last number would go up to 59 percent, quitecomparable to the number for Asian countries.

Is there any rationale for excluding the Arab andCentral Asian countries from the Islamic count? It turns out that in fact thereare several. Since the end of the Cold War, Western donors and multilateralinstitutions have used their financial leverage to encourage democratization inclient countries. However, there is one significant exception to this. Thesepressures are not applied to Islamic countries-mostly in the Arab world-wheredemocratization is likely to bring the Islamists to power. On the contrary, theArab despotisms-with the exception of the 'rogue states'-have receivedpolitical, moral and intelligence support from Western powers in the repressionof their mainly Islamist opposition.

There are other factors stacking the odds againstdemocracy in the Arab world. Not the least of them is Israel, a colonial-settlerstate, increasingly seen by Muslims as the military fist of the United States inZionist gloves. After the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, there is noother conflict that can match the Israel-Arab conflict in its durability or theway it has warped a whole region. The Israeli presence in the Arab heartlandmagnified the security imperative of the front-line Arab states, allowing themto build praetorian states with the capacity to suppress all forms of dissent.

In the Arab world, oil has been another negative factor.Of the sixteen Arab countries, nine are oil rich, and all but three of them havequite small indigenous populations. Their oil revenues and small populationshave allowed most of these countries to exempt their citizens from paying taxes.That is one more strike against democracy: a citizenry that pays no taxes lacksthe moral authority to demand representation.

In addition, eight Arab countries are monarchies, and all but two of them arealso oil-rich. These oil monarchies were either created by the British, or, inthe case of Saudi Arabia and Oman, they were supported and shored up by them,and, more recently, they have been maintained as American proxies ensuring thatArab oil remains in trusted hands. American commitment to these monarchies wasdemonstrated during the Gulf War.

As for the six Central Asian countries, we find that allof them are members of the defunct Soviet Union. They have been run, since theirindependence, by former communist bosses backed by Moscow. Russia maintains amilitary presence in these countries, or has strong ties to their military, withthe intent of sealing their southern borders against Islamist influence fromIran and Afghanistan. Thus, Russia now is playing the same role in thisregion-opposing democratization-that United States has played in the Arab world.

Yet Islam Remains A Problem

If Islam is 'normal', why is it still a problem forUnited States?
This problem is born of a tension between a great power, United States, and ahistorical adversary, Islam. United States enters into this contest with itsvast power, Christian evangelism, the constraints of domestic lobbies, energyneeds, and a vision of itself as a civilizing force. Islam enters the stage as afractured, wounded civilization, humiliated by two centuries of Westerndomination, divided into ineffectual political units, without a core state, richin oil resources it does not control, with a colonial settler state planted inits heartland that daily adds insults to its injuries. It appears that historyhas produced an explosive dialectic.

And now this dialectic, in its most recent convulsion,has produced a decentralized, secret, fanatical and violent Islamist enemywhich, because it cannot strike down its domestic tormentors, has decided toattack the more vulnerable United States. Having destroyed their only safehaven, and convinced that the Islamists who intend to perpetrate terror arestill lurking in the shadows, United States desperately searches forappropriate, accessible Islamic targets.

This is what is driving United States into the camp ofthe warriors. The warriors offer us easy targets: It's the Islamic world,stupid. Just get rolling and take it out-root, stock and barrel. In thepresent climate, this temptation will be hard to resist. It will be hard toresist because America's evangelism, messianism, and civilizing missionary zealhave been roused. Americans are also convinced of their overwhelming power toinflict damage, without taking any losses.

We might perhaps take a leaf from Israel. It too haslong enjoyed the same overwhelming superiority of power over the Palestinians.It too can rain down terror on the Palestinians. But it has achieved neithersecurity nor peace. In this contest, the greater responsibility for restraintrests upon United States. This burden lies with us because we are the greatestpower on earth-and this power lies in the hands of august persons, educated,civilized, privileged, and possessing an understanding of the world and theconsequences of their actions which the Islamist fanatics do not have. We mustpray for United States to carry this burden, and prove that is not only a greatcivilization-but it also cares for civilized values.

  Shaid Alam isProfessor of Economics at Northeastern University. His recent book, Povertyfrom the Wealth of Nations was published by Palgrave (2000).He may bereached at m.alam@neu.edu. Copyright: M. ShahidAlam.