Dragon's Designs

Chinese military thinking and scenario building arebased on the assumption that future wars would be of very limited duration. Anycountry resorting to military means for achieving its objectives should be in aposition to achieve them  within the limited time-span available before theinternational community intervenes and puts a stop to it. Over-ambitiousobjectives would be counter-productive.

Chinese strategists envisage that China may have to initiate a militaryconflict only in respect of Taiwan if it tries to proclaim its independence.They do not envisage a scenario where China may have to initiate a militaryconflict with the US or Japan, but their military thinking takes into accountthe possibility that either the US or Japan or both together might initiate amilitary conflict with China. They do not apprehend a situation where Indiamight initiate a military conflict with China.  But do they envisage ascenario where China might have to initiate another military conflict withIndia—as it did in 1962—if there is serious instability in Tibet after thedeath of the Dalai Lama or if the current border talks between the two countriesdo not give them satisfaction on their claims to Arunachal Pradesh. They are notvery forthcoming on this question, but India has to presume that such a scenariocannot be ruled out so that it is not taken by surprise once again as it was in1962. They look upon their claims at least to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh—ifnot the whole of it— as irreducible.

In the Chinese view, military planning has two essential components. First,strategic capability building such as the modernisation of their armed forces,building up a capability for offensive and defensive information warfare etc.Second, strategic asset building like roads, railways, port development etc.While no part of their present capacity building can be characterised asspecifically related to India, their strategic assets building provide for thecontingency of a military conflict with India too. Examples: firstly, theirstrategic road and rail communications building in Tibet and in the NorthernAreas of Pakistan (Gilgit and Baltistan); secondly,  their acquiringstrategic use of  assets such as ports etc in Pakistan, Bangladesh and SriLanka; and thirdly, their military supply relationship with these countries,including their nuclear and missile supply relationship with Pakistan.

The totality of their military planning is almost completely directed towardsthe US, Japan and Taiwan. While they do not rule out a military confrontationwith Taiwan in the short or medium term, they expect any conflict with the USAor Japan to be in the long term, but feel they have to prepare themselves for itfrom now onwards. Conventional wisdom would dictate that if they build up theirmilitary capabilities with regard to the US and Japan, these would automaticallybe available for use  against Taiwan and hence, there would be no need forseparate building with regard to Taiwan. However, they do not look at it thisway. Since they envisage a military confrontation with Taiwan in the short ormedium term  and with the US and Japan only in the long term, militaryplanning with regard to Taiwan cannot wait till they strengthen their capabilitywith regard to the US and Japan. So, both capability buildings have to beundertaken simultaneously, instead of one following the other.

They do not envisage a situation where the US and Japan might intervenemilitarily on the land, in the sea and in air in the event of a Chinese invasionof Taiwan. However, they do apprehend their intervention—particularly of theUS—in space. Such intervention could come in two ways—neutralisation ofChina's assets such as communications and spy-in-the-sky satellites and placingthe space assets of the US and Japan at the disposal of Taiwan by sharing withit real time intelligence and early warnings.

Chinese planning in space has to provide for twocontingencies—strengthening their space assets and preserving them in time ofwar and damaging, if not neutralising, the assets of the US and Japan, withoutproviding the US with a casus belli for a more active intervention insupport of Taiwan on the land, in the sea and in air.

In respect of the first contingency, the US enjoys a tremendous advantageover China, which Beijing will not be able to match in the short and mediumterms.  Firstly, the US space infrastructure in the form of launchingsites, tracking stations etc has a wide geographic spread. China'sinfrastructure is largely confined to its territory. Secondly, it has beenestimated that the US scientists would be able to launch a communicationsor spy-in-the-sky satellite, place it in orbit and make it operational within 24hours of a requirement in this regard being projected to them by their armedforces. Thus, the US scientists would be able to replace their damaged ordestroyed satellites very fast. The replacement capability of the Chinesescientists is no comparison to that of their American counterparts. So, if theUS renders China's space assets non-operational  at the beginning of amilitary conflict with Taiwan, the Chinese Armed Forces might find themselveshandicapped with regard to real time intelligence, early warnings andbattlefield communications.

This would provide a big strategic advantage to Taiwan. How to reduce it,even if China is not able to eliminate it totally? That is the questionpreoccupying Chinese scientists and military planners as they try todevelop their anti-satellite capability.  The Chinese have undertaken thistask ever since the 1980s. This has been receiving even greater attention sincethe Gulf war of 1991. The US has also been closely monitoring the Chineseefforts in this regard. A report on China's military power submitted by thePentagon to the US Congress in 2000 said, inter alia, as follows:"China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies, whichcould be used to develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. Beijing alreadymay have acquired technical assistance which could be applied to the developmentof laser radars used to track and image satellites and may be seeking anadvanced radar system with the capability to track satellites in low earthorbit. It also may be developing jammers, which could be used against GlobalPositioning System (GPS) receivers. In addition, China already may possess thecapability to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellitesthat are very vulnerable to damage by lasers. Beijing also may have acquiredhigh-energy laser equipment and technical assistance, which probably could beused in the development of ground-based ASAT weapons. Given China's currentlevel of interest in laser technology, Beijing probably could develop a weaponthat could destroy satellites in the future. Although specific Chinese programsfor laser ASAT have not been identified, press articles indicate an interest indeveloping this capability and Beijing may be working on appropriatetechnologies."

In a web posting dated April 26, 2001, in theWorldnetdaily.com, Jon Dougherty, an analyst of space-related developments,said:

"China is continuing to developanti-satellite weapons aimed at reducing a huge military advantage held over thePeople's Liberation Army by the United States. According to Jane's DefenseWeekly, China's ongoing anti-satellite effort is focusing on "co-orbitalspace weapons" and "a terrestrial laser, to be used for blindingsatellite optics.  "Chinese laser weapons development dates back tothe 1960s, as reported in 1999 by WorldNetDaily. Beijing's laser technology isthought to equal or surpass U.S. capabilities, analysts said then.  Also,quoting Asia arms experts and published Chinese reports, WND reported on China'santi-satellite development in January.  The Jane's report said China'santi-satellite weapons programs are said "to have benefited both from PRC(People's Republic of China) research and development" from the 1980s andbeyond, "and the transfer of Cold War-era space weapon technology fromRussia." WND said one of the new Chinese weapons is designed to"stick" to the body of enemy satellites so as to go unnoticed, thenrendering it ineffective through jamming when activated.

Anti-satellite programs, known by the acronym ASAT,are of increasing concern to U.S. military planners because of the Pentagon'sreliance on space-based command, control and guidance satellites. Civilianleaders are worried because of the damage ASATs could do to domesticcommunications and infrastructure-support satellites. Jane's said the Chineseare already ground testing their programs and will begin flight testing them in2002. One aspect of the ASAT program is said to be based on Soviet-developedco-orbital techniques that were perfected in the 1980s. "The kill mechanismof the PRC ASAT remains uncertain from published reports," Jane's said, butthe Soviet-developed system envisioned "a large orbital vehicle using afragmentation warhead as its kill mechanism —probably the most likelyapproach" for a Chinese ASAT weapon. The magazine Foreign Affairs said inthis month's issue that the U.S. also experimented with similar"rudimentary" ASAT vehicles in the 1980s. The magazine said bothWashington and Moscow had developed crude ASAT capabilities, but little furtherdevelopment —at least by the Pentagon —had been conducted since then.Echoing the details of the January WND report, Jane's said "there areunconfirmed reports that the kill mechanism [of the Chinese ASAT] is a micro- ornano-satellite capable of flying close to the target satellite or even attachingitself as a parasite. …" That vehicle, Jane's confirmed, "is alsoreported to have the option for the non-lethal jamming of a satellite as well asdestroying it.  "But, the weekly defense publication said, terrestrialoptical sensors "are likely to be able to detect" even such smallsatellite "parasites" in low earth orbit. China is known to be workingon such systems, but current micro-satellites which have an on-board propulsionsystem are intended only for space-based station keeping.  "None havehad the amount of fuel [onboard] to match the orbit of another satellite, letalone dock with a target," Jane's said.  Despite the uncertainty ofthe details of China's nano-satellite development, ASAT programs remain vibrantwithin the Chinese military nonetheless. The laser weapon concept has also beeninvestigated by the U.S. —tested even, against an old Air Force satellite lastyear —and is part of China's "asymmetric warfare" program, designedto develop cost-effective, technologically simple concepts of warfare to combatcomplex U.S. systems."

An article dated January 21, 2002, written by one Wei Long found on a Chineseweb site said as follows:

"A group of Chinese space scientists urged the government to accelerateacceptance of the proposal to develop an infrastructure in space and regarddeveloping the "space territory" as a national strategy, the Hong KongBureau of the China News Agency reported last Tuesday (Jan. 15). The group alsosuggested to claim access to space as China's "fourth territory". Inthe recently submitted consultation report "Building of China's Space-basedInfrastructure", space technology specialist Wang Xiji of the ChineseAcademy of Sciences (CAS) and three other Academy colleagues contended thatconventional ground-based space facilities would no longer meet futurerequirements, so they proposed the construction of a space-based infrastructure.

"The report said that "opening up ofouter space would require infrastructure in space; much like development ofland, sea and air which require ground facilities such as railroads, sea ports,power stations and airports.  "Wang elaborated on the concept:"The so-called space-based infrastructure refers to the engineering systemthat will be built in space, and used in developing and exploiting spaceresources and expanding the habitation space of humankind.  "Thesystem will consist of space vehicles and their ground supporting facilitieswhich would provide long-term stable functions and services. In fact, it is anintegration of space- and ground-based national development of strategicinfrastructure."

"The group of CAS space specialists alsoargued that by virtue of having "vehicles that take up positions in spaceand the ability to possess part of the space resources", a country wouldeffectively extend its three territorial claims —land, sea and air —intospace; thus the claim of the "fourth territory". Chinese spacescientists recognize that there is a fierce competition of space resources, butmost nations do not currently have the capability to be a participant. ThereforeChina should not miss out the opportunity to be part of the "spacecivilization".

"According to the authors of the consultationreport, China has "in effect a substantial capacity to enter, develop andexploit space. One of the reasons that China has not utilized its full capacityis restricted by a lag in the consciousness of the people and the nation."For a long time China has not given a serious regard to its capability todevelop, exploit as well as reap huge political, military and economic benefitsfrom the 'fourth territory'. Speaking from this sense, the concept andperspective of 'space territory' needs vigorous promotion in China. Developing'space territory' should be treated as a fundamental national strategy alongwith birth control planning and environment protection."

"The report recommends eight areas of space-based infrastructure:

• Discuss issues in building a high-speedinformation highway;
• Increase steadily the level of performance in meteorology infrastructure;
• Plan resource [Ziyuan series] satellites as part of the national earth-resourceinfrastructure;
• Establish a 3-D navigation and positioning infrastructure based on the existingtwin [Beidou series] navigation and positioning satellites foundation;
• Establish a national geographic information infrastructure based on the surveysatellite foundation;
• Planned development of the ocean [Haiyang series] satellites into an oceanobservation, monitoring and research infrastructure;
• Develop as quickly as possible a disaster and environment monitoringinfrastructure;
• Develop a comprehensive civilian information network suitable for use duringwartime.

"To implement the proposed space-based infrastructure, the reportsuggests to take a three-stage approach:

• Use effectively satellites that are on-orbit andunder development, and place them in the top tier of planning as a startingfoundation. This stage would mark a change in the direction of Chinese spacetechnology development: from primarily technology of entering space totechnology of utilizing space functions.
• Build and effectively use an elementarycomprehensive information network, which would provide effective support of thenational development of the space-based infrastructure. This stage would markthe completion of an elementary space-based infrastructure. Chinese spacetechnology development enters the phase of fulfilling urgent requirements andgradually adapting to national development.
• Develop sequentially the space-basedinfrastructure according to the blueprint. This stage would mark the initialachievement of the strategic development of China's "fourthterritory". The space-based infrastructure would have formed a definitescale and continue to develop to perfection."

A despatch dated October 6, 2006, of the All Headline News of the USsaid: "The Pentagon has confirmed that China has tested its anti-satellitelaser and jammed a U.S. satellite but wouldn't say which satellite was involved. The U.S. has 30 Global Positioning Satellites that it relies on for a number oftasks. That ranges from military uses such as targeting bombs and finding enemylocations to consumer uses such as automobile navigation systems and bankautomatic teller machines.  The Pentagon's National Reconnaissance OfficeDirector Donald Kerr acknowledged the incident to Defense News last week, butsaid it did not materially damage the U.S. satellite's ability to collectinformation. "It makes us think," Kerr said. The incident has sparkedworldwide concerns over the vulnerabilities of communications satellites and hasmade watchdog groups to re-consider if satellite problems are caused bymalfunctions, weather anomalies like solar flares, or targeted attacks. AirForce Space Commander General Kevin Chilton said, "We're at a point wherethe technology's out there and the capability for people to do things to oursatellites is there. I'm focused on it beyond any single event. "Thereports of Beijing's testing of the anti-satellite laser is likely to reignitethe debate over the U.S.' own anti-satellite program, Starfire, for which theHouse of Representatives attempted to block funding. The funds were reinstatedafter Air Force told lawmakers that the program would only be used fortracking."

If the reports that China had its old weather satellite destroyedon January 11, 2007, through a missile fired from the ground are correct, it hasthus proven capabilities for damaging or destroying the space assets of itsadversaries through laser directed from the ground as well as missiles firedfrom the ground. Does it also have the capability for using killer satellitesand parasites? Parasite satellites are launched in peacetime and activated whenwar breaks out.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.