Catching Them Young

On February 22, 2004, the leader of All Nepal National Independent Students' Union - Revolutionary (ANNISU-R),the Maoists' students wing, Kamal Shahi, stated that a decision had been taken in their January 10-11 partyannual meeting to raise a children's militia of 50,000 by April-May 2004. According to a report released byChild Workers in Nepal Concern Centre (CWIN), two-dozen children have died in the past six months of conflictin the country and around 950 children were abducted by the Maoist insurgents and taken to their varioustraining camps.

Since the collapse of the cease-fire between the Nepal Government and insurgents in August 2003, thecountry has been witnessing an increased frequency of abductions by the Maoists, of young school studentsalong with their teachers, for ideological indoctrination and military training of the children in theconflict-wracked Kingdom. Some reports indicate that over 30 per cent of the Maoist militia and army compriseschildren below 18 years of age. Most tragically, they have been used as cannon fodder and human shields inengagements with the state's forces.

The intensified conflict between the Maoists and the government's forces has resulted in large numbers ofchild soldiers being trained in camps in the Maoist strongholds in mid-Western Nepal. A report quoting theMaoist sources said secondary and higher secondary students in many villages were being trained in secretcamps, in line with the decision to increase the force strength of child soldiers. And the recent spate ofabductions, particularly in the Achham, Rolpa and Rukum districts, feed these camps. Some of the majorincidents of abduction of school children since the collapse of the cease-fire include:

• November 3, 2003: 29 students were abducted from Mugu district.
  
  
• December 5, 2003: 200 children were abducted by Maoist insurgents from two schools at Achham district inwestern Nepal.
  
  
• January 26, 2004: Maoist insurgents abducted at least 150 secondary level school students to participatein their mass meetings from Bannatoli Village Development Committee (VDC) area in the Achham district.
  
• January 29, 2004: Maoists abducted atleast 140 students from Achham district.
  
  
• February 2, 2004: Maoists abducted 65 students from different places in the Achham district.
  
  
• February 11, 2004: The Maoists abducted at least 700 people, primarily students and teachers, toparticipate in their 'anniversary celebrations' from the Bhaiswale region of Achham district.
  
  
• February 21, 2004: Maoists abducted at least 300 students and six teachers from a school at Holereevillage in the Rolpa district of western Nepal.
  
  
• February 23, 2004: Maoists abducted at least 200 people, primarily students and teachers, from fivedifferent VDCs including Thanti, Sodsa, Bindhabasini, Kuskot and Rishidaha in the Achham district.
  
  
• February 24, 2004: The insurgents abducted 44 school teachers from Sugarkhal in the Kailali district, sixgirls from Dhigomandu area in the Achham district and six other students from Nawalparasi district.
  
  
• February 25, 2004: Maoists abducted at least 60 school students from Birendranagar in the Rukum district.
  
  
• March 10, 2004: 14 school students were abducted from the Chimkhola VDC area in the Myagdi district.
  
  
• March 12, 2004: Maoist insurgents abducted at least 56 people in separate incidents, including 42teachers, from the Jogbuda area of Dadeldhura district.
  
  
• March 13, 2004: Maoists abducted 54 people, including 35 teachers, from Dadeldhura district and 19students from Baglung district.

Reports suggest that the abducted students have been inducted into the Special Peoples' Military Campaign,which is being implemented in the Maoists 'model districts' of Jumla and Jajarkot in the mid-Western region,where the state's power and presence is almost non-existent.

The training for child soldiers comprises three phases, which are conducted in 'base', 'model' and 'special'areas controlled by the Maoists. After selecting the target school in their stronghold areas, the Maoistsfirst encircle the school after the students have gathered in large numbers. Generally, the Maoists invite'volunteers' to their training camps, and then select students aged between 12 and 15.

Ordinarily, these students are initially abducted for the Maoists' political meetings, annual conferencesor any other special occasions, such as the announcement of the formation of an autonomous region or of a'People's Government'. At the same time, students aged between 14 and 18 are required to undergo militarydrills and arms training under the supervision of top Maoist leaders at the insurgents' training bases.

Though most of the abducted students are allowed to return to their homes after a couple of weeks, thetrauma of the forced ideological and military training they undergo continues to haunt many of them. They are,moreover, on call for operational duties, as and when required, and are often directly attached to the mainoperational force in their areas.

The Maoists variously use these young recruits as soldiers, sentries, messengers, cooks, porters andsuppliers. The preliminary training is sufficient for these children to handle light weapons including .303and .22 rifles, country-made socket and pipe bombs, etc., the weapons most widely used by the Maoistinsurgents.

Maoists have intensified the recruitment of children in their armed cadres to fight against the securityforces, and to create 'revolutionary zeal' among the young participants in the People's War. Observers suggestvarious reasons for children being preferred for soldiering: recruitment and maintenance of a child militia isrelatively cost effective; children can more easily be used in hazardous tasks like laying and clearinglandmines; children are also more psychologically malleable, easily motivated and manipulated, and display ahigh level of dedication and obedience.

Not all recruitment of children is coerced. As the United Nations Report on 'Impact of Armed Conflict onChildren' (1996) notes, "One of the most basic reasons for children joining armed groups iseconomic." For orphan children, joining armed groups is attractive and guarantees basic necessities likefood, clothing, and shelter. On occasion, poverty forces parents to offer their children to insurgent groups,in return for money. In many cases, parents' affiliations with the Maoists group results in their children'volunteering to join these Forces.

By and large, the Maoists prefer their 'students' policy' to be implemented through their 'students wing' theANNISU-R, which has played a major role in institutionalizing their cadre base within the student community,including minors. ANNISU-R Central Committee leader, Kamal Shahi, has accepted their ongoing arms trainingcampaign and the existence of a students' military force equal to a battalion in a regular army. The ANNISU-Rhas been active in implementing a campaign for 'one educational institution, one reformed militia', and boaststhat it will soon have a 50,000-strong student militia and 375,000 members.

At least 300 children have been killed in the Maoist insurgency since 1996. Young children in large parts ofthe country have simply stopped going to school, as the Maoists increasingly bring their activities into theschool premises. On February 18, 2003, two students were killed and another injured during a 'firingdemonstration' by the insurgents in a school in Baglung district. Terrorist attacks have not spared schoolseither. On September 8, 2003, in a serial blast in the Kathmandu Valley, one student was killed in a schoolcampus. Engagements with the state's Security Forces also inflict casualties. During a security forceoperation in a school in Madbhara in Doti district on October 13, 2003, for instance, four students and sixMaoists insurgents were killed.

There have been repeated calls by international human rights organizations and concerned citizens' groups todeclare the school areas as 'zones of peace', and to leave the students and children outside the bloody sphereof the current conflict. These pleas have, however, apparently fallen on deaf ears, and present indicationssuggest, if anything, a further intensification of the ongoing Maoist campaign to mobilize children -voluntarily or otherwise - for greater participation in their 'peoples' war'.

There are reports of large numbers of schools closing down all over the country, creating long-term risksof declining quality of human capital, greater unemployment, and a burgeoning army of the unemployed whichwill keep the manpower supply lines to the Maoist cadres alive. At the present juncture, unfortunately, apartfrom regular denunciations from various quarters, of the Maoist practice of recruiting child soldiers, thereappears to be no concrete set of policies or responses that can bring relief to this beleaguered country'sunfortunate children.

P. G. Rajamohan is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.