A Tactical Engagement With Democracy

The Maoists have manoeuvred themselves to the centre of the democratic and political processes in Nepal, paralysed the Army, neutralized the King; and they have done this without the slightest dilution in their own capacities for violence, and with a significant expansion--including a dominant presence in the Kathmandu Valley--in their capacities for mass mobilization… The Maoist objective in Nepal is not the sharing of power. It is the seizure of power. This is the reality that will crystallize over the coming months and years.  

-- The Seduction ofProcess

For the past nearly six months since the Maoists joined thegovernment in Kathmandu--indeed, progressively since their 12-Point Understanding with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) in November 2005--a discourse of utter delusion has dominated analysis ofNepal's politics. A number of 'Nepal experts' claiming direct access, variously, to the King, to the Army Command, to the Maoist party bosses and (the unfortunate stragglers) to the decrepit leaders of the SPA, have been painting rosy pictures, staking their reputations on the imminence of elections in November 2007, and a consequent permanent resolution ofNepal's protracted troubles, furiously brushing every bit of contrary evidence under a carpet ofverbiage Diplomats and international organisations--'peacebuilders', all--have joined in the make-believe with great enthusiasm, The less privileged among commentators scavenge the daily news for leavings, discovering nuance and suggestion in the sundry public statements, postures and pretensions of various political factions and leaders. 

Behind all this--bare, obvious and assiduously ignored--are the ponderously shifting realities and imperatives of power. Never concealed, but widely neglected, was the simple truth that the Maoist engagement with democracy is tactical, not ideological--and could not be otherwise. 

The Maoist withdrawal from the interim government on September 18, 2007, (the party had fourministers in the cabinet, while one had resigned earlier, on August 2, over 'differences' with hiscabinet colleagues), and their announcement of an escalating campaign of protests and demonstrations, reflects their changing assessments of the equation of power within the country. Their'mass movement' commenced a day after the Maoist withdrawal from the government with a'door-to-door public awareness campaign', but will intensify progressively with rallies and protests organised by'our sister organisations', to culminate in a gherao (sit in) at all district administration offices on September 30, and eventually ageneral strike from October 4 to October 6, 2007. The final strike coincides with the ElectionCommission's October 5 deadline for nominations to be filed for the scheduled November 22 Constituent Assembly (CA) Elections. 

On leaving the interim government, the Maoists have clarified that they have not exited the'peace process' and remain committed to the 12-Point Agreement with the SPA. They have, nevertheless, made it equally clear that the scheduled November elections are unacceptable, and will be disrupted. Among others, Ananta, a'deputy commander' of the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) and a member of the Maoist Central Committee, reportedly declared: "All our sister organizations will be mobilized… to ensure the Constituent Assembly elections are unsuccessful."

It is interesting, in this context, to examine the dramatic shifts the Maoist position has undergone over the past months. The CA Elections were originally scheduled for June 20, 2007, on the basis of a "breathless timetable that creates the illusion of great and irreversible advances", and prior to this date, the Maoists were unqualified and enthusiastic advocates of early elections--the earlier the better. Their armed strength, their'influence' in rural areas, their capacities to exclude and intimidate cadres of other political formations across wide areas of the country, and consequently, their ability to rig an overwhelming electoral outcome in their own favour, were undiluted. 

The King had been emasculated, the Army confined to barracks, the restoration of Police Stations and Police Posts--withdrawn over the years under the fury of the Maoist armed onslaught--had been effectively obstructed, the countryside belonged to them, and the deal with the SPA had given them renewed entry into and sway across the Kathmandu Valley and other urban centres--from which they had been excluded by harsh counter-terrorism measures under preceding regimes. The legitimacy of an electoral process appeared attainable, without the attendant risks of the'untidiness' democratic processes bring with them. In effect, the authoritarian ideal of'one man, one vote, one time', seemed within reach. 

All that, however, changed very rapidly after the EC declared that it was impossible to complete the "technical processes" for the CA Elections on the June schedule. The Maoists were abruptly confronted with the uncertainties of a real election in November 2007, with a progressive challenge to their armed thuggery by competing armed thuggeries--particularly in the Terai region in Southern Nepal, alongIndia's borders , a significant dilution of their influence in rural Nepal, incipient political activity by other parties, and growing discontent and dissent within the Maoist cadres and leadership. Most observers now agree that the scheduled elections would have made the Maoists just one--and not necessarily the dominant one--of many parties in the Constituent Assembly, a position that would deny them the possibility of hammering through a Constitution that would secure their objectives of absolute or near-absolute authority.

Unsurprisingly, there was a rising chorus within the Maoist leadership for a postponement of Elections to the Summer of 2008, and increasing emphasis on a number of'grievances', including, particularly, the conditions in the newly established Maoist'cantonments' to which an estimated 30,000 People's Liberation Army 'cadres' are currently restricted ( there are 28 camps across the country; most sources suggest that barely a third of the cadres in these are, in fact, members of the PLA, and the Maoists had'agreed', on April 18, 2007, to bring down their number to 17,000); and the absorption of the PLA'soldiers' into the national Nepali Army (formerly the Royal Nepalese Army, RNA). 

A 22-point 'Charter of Demands' was defined on August 20, 2007, including the demands for immediate abolition of the Monarchy and the declaration of a Republic in Nepal as a precondition to the CA Elections, and it was these two'prerequisites' for continuing in the government that were used as the principal justification for the eventual Maoist withdrawal. Maoist front organisations have argued that "The Maoists were left with no option but to launch a programme of strong protests to establish a Republic because Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala hesitated to express his commitment towards republicanism." It is, however, useful to see how the Maoist position has shifted on this count from its fundamental commitments in the various agreements with the SPA.

The 12-Point Understanding between the SPA and the Maoists (November 22, 2005) noted unambiguously:

It is our clear view that without establishing absolute democracy by ending autocratic monarchy, there is no possibility of peace, progress and prosperity in the country. Therefore, an understanding has been reached to establish absolute democracy by ending autocratic monarchy… (Emphasis added) 

Thereafter, the Eight-point Agreement of June 16, 2006, resolved, inter alia, to: 

• Decide issues of national interest having long-term effects through consensus.
• Guarantee the fundamental right of the Nepali people to participate in the Constituent Assembly elections without any fear, influence, threat and violence… 

Finally and crucially, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of November 21, 2006, which formed the basis of theinterim constitution and government, and defined the arrangements for the management ofarmed forces, weapons and the terms of the peace and relationships between the Maoists and various other political formations in the country, noted explicitly:

No rights of state administration shall remain with the King. Bring the properties of late King Birendra, late Queen Aishwarya and their family members under the control of the Nepal government and use it for the welfare purposes through a trust. All properties acquired by King Gyanendra by the virtue of him being the King (like palaces of various places, forests and conservation areas, heritage having historical and archaeological importance) shall be nationalised. Determine the fate of the institution of monarchy by the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly through simple majority vote. (Emphasis added) 

It is useful to note, here, that the King has been stripped of all administrative powers and his command over the Army. His assets have been frozen, and, while he continues to reside at the Nagarjuna Palace, five kilometres Northwest of his earlier residence, the Narayanhiti Royal Palace, all palaces, properties and assets, other than the wealth or property he had acquired before he became King, have been nationalised. Indeed, theKing's isolation and impotence are complete--though Maoist advocates and leaders continue to drum up the bogey of his potential to'distort' political and electoral processes in the country. 

To the extent that the fate of the monarchy, and hence, the creation of a Republic, were left to the authority of the'first meeting of the Constituent Assembly' (and rightly so, since the interim governmentand constitution have no electoral or constitutional mandate), the rising insistence, since mid-April 2007, on an immediate declaration of a Republic in Nepal is irreconcilable with the commitments accepted by the Maoists, including the commitment to consensual resolution of issues of national interest, and to the right of the Nepali people to participate in the CA elections without fear, influence, threat or violence. 

To understand, consequently, why the Maoists have taken the extreme steps of withdrawal from thegovernment, and threatened the disruption of the electoral process, it is necessary to'rewind' somewhat, to the circumstances within which the opportunistic alliance with the SPA was forged. 

At the time when King Gyanendra seized power in February 2005, the Maoists had successfully imposed an'ugly equilibrium' in which Kathmandu had lost its powers to govern in vast areas virtually across the country, but where the Maoists lacked the capacity to quickly neutralizeKathmandu's residual power. Two principal poles of power existed at this time--the Maoists, with their PLA, on the one hand; and the King and his RNA, on the other. The political parties, fractious, marginalised and discredited, were utterly irrelevant to developments in the country. With no easy victory in sight, the Maoist purpose was to disempower the King and to paralyse or undermine the RNA. This was the objective of the collaboration in the Loktantra Andolan (Democracy Movement) of April 2006, which ended KingGyanendra's 'direct rule', and of the succession of agreements with the SPA.

The gains of this strategy have now been exhausted. TheKing and the monarchy have been comprehensively discredited, and no political entity could seek their restoration within the system. The Army, confined to barracks, demoralised and directionless, is less a threat to the Maoists now than was the case before theinterim government took charge. The Maoist power, while it appears to have been diluted in the Terai, has, in fact, grown, with many parts of the country earlier outside their armed sway--including the Kathmandu Valley--having been targeted for mobilisation and recruitment over the past months. 

As for the Terai, the 'weakness' of the Maoists springs essentially from the imperatives arising out of their engagements in the'peace process', and the necessity of at least appearing not to engage in organised violence--the occasional (deniable) tactical strike notwithstanding. In a situation of a return to armed conflict, however, the riffraff of Madheshi groups, which is currently at the centre of all attention, will easily be neutralised by the better organised and armed Maoist forces. 

If this is, indeed, the Maoist calculus, the possibilities of their return to theinterim government and their endorsement of the current electoral process are remote, and contingent upon absolute capitulation by the G.P. Koiralagovernment--something that has been made the more difficult by the personal denigration of the ailing Prime Minister by a number of top Maoist leaders, and a proposed signature campaign on a demand for his removal on grounds of'failure'. 

Absent such an outcome, the Maoists can be expected to intensify a mass mobilisation that would seek to replicate the passions of the Loktantra Andolan in the streets, but, this time, led squarely by the Maoists, resulting in escalating disorders designed to engineer an eventual collapse of the present regime and, ideally, a transition of power to a Maoist regime or another unstable equilibrium with some political formations, more to the Maoist advantage that the present arrangement. 

In the absence of one of these scenarios, a return to arms would be inevitable, this time around under a weaker regime in Kathmandu, and an Army increasingly uncertain of its own role and of thecountry's future. It is useful to note that several officers and personnel are currently being investigated for'excesses' against the Democracy Movement, and demands for further inquiries into deaths and disappearances over the entire period of the conflict have already resulted in the drafting of a Bill to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to enquire into allegations of Human Rights violations by both the Army and the Maoists. 

Given the new legitimacy that has been conferred on the Maoists by their brief participation in thegovernment at Kathmandu, the Army will hesitate to take strong action against a group which may well be part of, or the entirety of, a future nationalgovernment.

The Maoist gameplan is simple. Everything that enhances their power will be embraced; everything that undermines or constrains their influence must be destroyed. It is only the astonishing strategic blindness that afflicts the global analysis of contemporary conflicts, and the enveloping proclivity to wishful thinking, that shrouds their intentions and allows the Maoists to exploit the ambiguities of a discourse that is altogether alien to their own totalitarian ways of thinking.

Ajai Sahni is Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]; ExecutiveDirector, Institute for Conflict Managemnt  Courtesy, SAIR.