Bihar Elections: Is This Nitish Kumar's Final Innings Or Will He, Again, Be Chief Minister?

As Bihar prepares for its legislative assembly elections on November 6 and 11, 2025, with results due on November 14, the state stands at a critical juncture. This high-stakes contest will determine whether Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, a veteran socialist, secures another term and a record 10th time as chief minister or cedes power to a younger challenger, potentially Rashtriya Janata Dal’s (RJD) Tejashwi Yadav, who could become Bihar’s youngest-ever chief minister. Kumar’s nearly two-decade regime has intertwined governance with caste-based social engineering, yielding incremental progress amid persistent underdevelopment.

Despite his image as a non-dynastic secular socialist, rising youth aspirations, opposition resurgence, and alliance flip-flops could fuel anti-incumbency. With 3.1 crore youth registered on the e-Shram portal for jobs—nearly the population of Kerala or Delhi—this article examines Kumar’s enduring appeal, Bihar’s identity politics, and the electoral dynamics shaping the 2025 polls, questioning whether “Sushasan Babu” (Mr. Good Governance) can navigate Bihar’s turbulent political landscape.

Bihar has been a crucible of Indian political transformation, from Mahatma Gandhi’s 1917 Champaran Satyagraha, which challenged the Britishers’ indigo exploitation, to Jayaprakash Narayan’s 1974 “Total Revolution” that toppled Indira Gandhi’s Emergency regime. Yet, Bihar lags behind in India’s developmental race, with governance deficits and caste-driven politics entrenching its image as a cautionary tale. Pre-2005, The New York Times journalist Lydia Polgreen described Bihar as “something between a punch line and a cautionary tale”, where “criminals could count on the police for protection, not prosecution… and kidnapping was one of the state’s most profitable businesses”. While scholars like Jeffrey Witsoe, in his work, Democracy against Development: Lower-Caste Politics and Political Modernity in Postcolonial India (2013), and A. N. Das, author of the classic, The Republic Of Bihar (1992) in his later writings, contest the “Jungle Raj” label, arguing it empowered marginalised castes, the economic toll is undeniable.

From 1980 to 1998, Bihar’s per capita income grew at just 1.1 per cent annually, compared to India’s 3.2 per cent, meaning Biharis needed 63 years to double their income—exceeding life expectancy—while Indians did so in 22 years. In 2019-2021, 33.76 per cent of Biharis lived in multidimensional poverty, surpassing Jharkhand’s 28.81 per cent, dropping to 26.59 per cent by 2021-2023, yet Bihar remains India’s poorest state. Low literacy, high infant mortality, and unemployment persist, even as other states reaped the post-liberalisation gains. Bihar’s stagnation stems from identity politics that has sidelined economic capacity-building for decades. The 2025 election has revived this debate, amplified by Prashant Kishor’s entry and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) critiques. Since Lalu Yadav’s 2005 ouster, though Kumar’s Janata Dal-United) (JD-U) and the BJP coalition has dominated the political scene, the alliance has been unstable—(JD-U) exiting the BJP in 2015, rejoining in 2017, leaving in 2022, and realigning in 2024—and this has turned development into a vote-mobilising tactic amid anti-incumbency whispers.

Bihar’s politics revolves around caste, unfolding in three phases: Karpoori Thakur’s unification (1960s-1980s), Lalu Yadav’s assertion (1990s-2000), and Nitish Kumar’s governance (2005-present). Each leader reshaped caste dynamics distinctly.

In the 1970s, Thakur, as chief minister, implemented the Mungeri Lal Commission’s job reservations, consolidating the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and the Most Backward Classes (MBCs). In an agrarian and feudal state, he challenged upper-caste—Bhumihars, Brahmins, Kayasthas, Rajputs—dominance, opening institutions to the marginalised. His brief tenures, disrupted by caste conflicts, empowered leaders like Yadav and Kumar.

Lalu Yadav’s 1990s regime ousted upper castes, dismantling their institutional control and opened resource competition to all castes. Criticised as “Jungle Raj” for lawlessness, it benefited Yadavs while relieving Dalits from exploitation. Yadav fused caste emancipation with political representation, making social justice a household term. His rhetoric gave marginalised groups a political voice, but prioritising identity over governance crippled the state’s capacity, leaving central funds unutilised.

Kumar’s era, starting in 2005, managed these tensions. He restored law and order and democratised caste politics. Reviving Thakur’s MBC focus, he aligned them with upper castes through welfare, security, and infrastructure. He expanded his coalition to women—via 50 per cent local governance reservations and prohibition—and Mahadalits, a newly-defined ultra-marginalised group. By 2010, 86 per cent of women cited improved safety as a voting factor, with 54.5 per cent female turnout versus 51.1 per cent male. Appointing 3.5 lakh contract teachers, half women, solidified their support.

Kumar’s tenure brought gains. Post-2005, in terms of GDP, Bihar’s economy grew from Rs 77,000 crore in 2004-05 to Rs 6.1 lakh crore in 2020–21. Infrastructure investments—roads, bridges and electrification—cut infant mortality from 48 per 1,000 live births in 2010 to 27 in 2020. Female literacy rose from 33 per cent in 2001 to 60 per cent by 2017. Per capita income reached Rs 68,828 by 2023-24, though India’s lowest. Life expectancy increased to 69.2 years, nearing the national 69.7.

Yet, these are incremental gains. Kumar’s failure to implement land reforms, attract private investment, or develop economic zones has fuelled migration. Populist policies constrained redistribution. Crimes surged—4,736 riots, 2,930 murders, and 11,822 kidnappings in 2022, a 23 per cent increase, as compared to the preceding year—converting the Yadav-era street conflicts to “institutionalised” corruption, with bridge collapses and policy failures. The 2024 Controller and Auditor General’s (CAG) report shows a fiscal deficit of 5.97 per cent of GSDP (Rs 44,000 crore), exceeding the four per cent limit, with public debt at 39.03 per cent. Bureaucratic reliance has entrenched corruption, undermining state capacity.

Rooted in socialist mentorship under Ram Manohar Lohia, Jayaprakash Narayan, Karpoori Thakur, and V. P. Singh, Kumar challenged Congress authoritarianism through the 1970s student activism. Representing Kurmis, he lost in Harnaut in 1977 and 1980, but won in 1985 with Janata Dal alongside Lalu Yadav, his then-mentor. But his ambition led to a split in 1994, leading to the formation of the Samata Party, which won only seven seats in 1995. His 2000 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) elevation made him chief minister, and he promised development over “Jungle Raj”.

Kumar’s clean image—no scams amid 36 per cent criminal candidates in 2010—contrasted Yadav’s fodder scandal. As a secular BJP ally, the JD(U) fielded 14 Muslims in 2010, winning several seats. Non-dynastic amid socialist nepotism, his engineering degree appealed to the youth. His social engineering included MBCs, Mahadalits, upper castes—32.28 per cent of MLAs in 2020—and women, with 32 per cent favouring him as a potential prime minister in 2014 versus 28 per cent of men.

The 2025 election is a test for Kumar’s resilience. Bihar’s youth, with 3.1 crore registered on the e-Shram portal, are demanding jobs and education. And then there are challengers like Prashant Kishor, Chirag Paswan, and Tejashwi Yadav who are positioning themselves as youth messiahs. Kumar’s “Paltu Chacha” nickname—due to his frequent flip-flops—has eroded his credibility. The JD(U)’s vote share fell from 16.8 per cent in 2015 (vs. the BJP’s 24.4 per cent) to 15.4 per cent in 2020 (vs. the BJP’s 19.5 per cent). Dissatisfaction doubled from six per cent in 2010 to 13 per cent in 2020, with Tejashwi edging Kumar.

The RJD’s Yadav-Dalit-Muslim base secured more seats in 2015. The Left’s 63.2 per cent strike rate in 2020 signals alternatives. The BJP’s demand for a 50:50 seat-sharing deal places Kumar’s next term at their mercy. Women—38 per cent with the NDA in 2020—and non-Yadav youth sustain him, but the BJP’s rising influence reflects shifting preferences.

From the 1970s agitator to 2024 “kingmaker”, Kumar’s pragmatism—evident in Union ministerial stints—questions ideological fidelity. Kumar’s saga blends socialist roots with pragmatic governance, yielding gains but not transformation. His social engineering sustains loyalty, but youth disillusionment, opposition resurgence, and the BJP dominance have fuelled anti-incumbency. Bihar’s wariness of newcomers, coupled with Kumar’s perseverance, may secure him his next term. The November 2025 verdict will decide whether this socialist veteran sails through or succumbs to generational change.

(Views expressed are personal)

Outlook’s November 11 issue, titled "Caste is the Biggest Political Party in Bihar," explores how caste plays multiple interconnected roles in seat-sharing and coalition-building in the land of the setting sun. It Appeared as 'Not Strictly Immoral'

Ravi Ranjan is Professor, Department Of Political Science, Zakir Husain Delhi College, University Of Delhi

Ankit Singh is a teaching assistant at the Department Of Social Sciences, Faculty Of Liberal Arts And Professional Studies, York University, Toronto