Fragile Transition

An apparent peace has come to Nepal, with fatalitiesdropping precipitously and the government-Maoist peace talks getting underway.Although, these developments should be a matter of relief, the conflict has farfrom ended and hopes of a tranquil future may be premature. Following the JanaAndolan (People’s Movement) against King Gyanendra’s ‘direct rule’,the pace of political developments in Nepal has been fast and furious.

May 17 will go down in the history of the Himalayan nation as a momentousday, as the House of Representatives (HoR) unanimously passed a proposal, tabledby Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, depriving the King of privilegesenjoyed by him and declaring the reinstated House ‘supreme’. The HoRresolution scrapped the provision of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the RoyalNepalese Army being held by the King, thereby depriving the King of his controlover the Army. The proposal also dissolved the King’s advisory council, theRaj Parishad Standing Committee and deprived the monarch of any authority toenact the law concerning Royal succession, which will, in future, be theprovince of Parliament. The name of the Royal Nepalese Army was changed toNepali Army, and "His Majesty’s government" was replaced by the "governmentof Nepal".

The proclamation also made the income and assets of the King taxable, whiledeclaring Nepal as a secular state. While the power of this revived Parliament– which was dissolved by the King in 2002, and whose term, in the normalcourse, would have expired in May 2004 – to pass a mere ‘resolution’ thataltered fundamental provisions of the Constitution is uncertain, and theconstitutionality of these provisions debatable, there has been no immediateevidence of any resistance or reaction from a demoralized and discreditedPalace. Supporters of the declaration, however, argue that the legitimacy ofthis Parliament now flows, not from the Constitution, but from the people’smovement.

That legitimacy, however, is neither unconditional, nor necessarily durable,and will come under increasing challenge if the conduct of the currentdispensation is not seen as just and demonstrably productive. Regrettably, earlydays suggest that the ‘democratic’ dispensation now in power is possiblysomewhat lacking in democratic sensibilities and respect for the rule of law,and may quickly exhaust the wave of presently overwhelming public goodwill.

This appears to be the suggestion of the early days of the restoredParliament and the Seven Parties Alliance (SPA) government, among the first ofwhose actions was the order for the arrest and detention, for a period of 90days, of five Ministers of the predecessor regime for their ‘role insuppressing anti-King protests’. That order has now been held as illegal byNepal’s Supreme Court, which, on June 4, 2006, directed the government toimmediately release three ex-Ministers who had separately filed habeas corpuspetitions before the Court (the remaining two did not appeal their internment,and presently remain in jail). Another set of the SPA government’s decisions,based on the recommendations of a ‘judicial commission’ set up toinvestigate the ‘suppression of the peoples’ movement’, that have a strongresidual destabilizing potential is the decision to remove from office a numberof senior government officials, including three top police officers of thecountry, and a number of other senior police administrators. A similarrecommendation for the removal of the Army Chief of Staff, General Pyar JungThapa, was, however, not acted upon (though early reports suggested that theCabinet had suspended him as well), presumably for fear that the Army may provesomewhat more recalcitrant than the Police.

It is useful, within this context, to remember that thecurrent democratic leadership in Nepal has an extended and disastrous record ofadministration and infighting, and is substantially responsible for the chaosthat now prevails in the country. Unless it has radically re-educated itselfover the past months, it can well be expected to discredit itself in the monthsto follow.

Moreover, as the King is swept into the sidelines, the ultimate winners inthe churning process presently underway are the Maoists and not theParliamentary parties or the present government. The new dispensation atKathmandu has allowed the Maoists to dictate terms and the Maoist roadmap topower is being substantially followed.

On May 13, 2006, the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist ((CPN-Maoist)Chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ Prachanda, made public his Party’s roadmap fordialogue with the government. Its principal stages were:

• Declaration of a ceasefire;
• Finalisation of a code of conduct;
• Formation of a talks team;
• Release of political prisoners;
• Commencement of talks;
• Dissolution of the old Parliament, Constitution and government;
• Formation of interim guidelines and government by holding a political conference with representation from the political parties, civil society and renowned personalities from different sectors;
• Setting of electoral constituencies by ensuring representation from people of all classes, castes, sectors and genders;
• Holding of Constituent Assembly elections under reliable international supervision;
• Restructuring of the whole state structures including the People's Liberation Army and the Royal Nepalese Army according to the popular mandate expressed through the (Constituent Assembly) elections.

A ceasefire had already been announced by the government on May 3, and a25-point Ceasefire code of conduct was agreed upon on May 26; a three membertalks team was formed on both sides, and the first round of talks were held onMay 26. Some 467 Maoist prisoners were released, including two senior leaders,Matrika Yadav and Suresh Ale Magar. Conceding these Maoist demands has beenapparently painless on the part of the government, but the next ‘milestone’in the roadmap has thrown up differences.

In a Press Statement on May 29, senior Maoist leader Baburam Bhattaraireiterated the demand for immediate dissolution of the House of Representatives(HoR) and of the present government and called for the formation of an Interim government,and the replacement of the existing Constitution by an Interim Constitution. Thepolitical parties are unsurprisingly against such a move, as the dissolution ofParliament would mean losing the only vestiges of power that they have managedto secure over the years. Moreover, by refusing to concede this demand, the governmentwould seek to project itself as strong enough to resist Maoist pressures.

In a move that is bound to further increase friction, the government hasreportedly decided to revive the local governing bodies which were dissolved in2002. Maoist negotiator Dina Nath Sharma has warned that "the ongoing peacetalks would collapse altogether" if the government went ahead with thismove. "We are strongly opposed to the revival….If that happens, the talksmay collapse altogether," he pronounced ominously. Local DevelopmentMinister Rajendra Pandey said the Maoist warning made "the whole thingcomplicated".

It is not just the local bodies issue that hascomplicated matters. The Maoist machinery continues to operate in its usualmanner, though without explicit violence, but retaining its fullest capacitiesfor violence. Reports of massive extortion by the Maoists continue to pour infrom different parts of the country. Amid huge extortion threats by the Maoisttrade union wing, the All Nepal Trade Union Federation (ANTUF), one of thelargest joint venture companies in the country, Dabur Nepal Pvt. closed down itsmanufacturing unit at Rampur Tokani of Bara District between May 18 and 21. Areport from Dolakha district said that Maoists are continuing with thecollection of forced ‘taxes’ from various government and non-governmentorganizations. A meeting of Maoist District-level ‘government’ leaders alsopassed a proposal to this effect in May 2006, and made it mandatory forInternational NGOs and government organizations to register with theirparty. 

Similarly, the Maoists have extorted sums of money, ranging from NPR 10,000to NPR 150,000, from local businessmen at Phidim, District headquarters ofPanchthar. In Biratnagar, the Maoists have intensified their ‘donation’collection campaign, saying that they need money for staging a ‘democraticpeoples' assembly’ at Biratnagar. Maoist District Secretary, Sushil, speakingat a Press Conference in Biratnagar on May 15 said the Maoist cadres have beenurging people to provide donation ‘willingly’. A daily newspaper obtainedcopies of a letter sent by the ‘chief’ of the CPN-Maoist Special CentralCommand, Anant, on May 14, instructing over a dozen private banks to give NPR2.5 million each as ‘donation’. The letter, which was, however, not sent tothe two government-run banks, the Nepal Bank Limited and the Rastriya BanijyaBank, asked for financial support from the private banks to help ‘push thepeople’s movement to a new high’.

Matters came to a boil in Birgunj, when traders and industries shut downoperations following demands from the ANTUF. The President of the BirgunjChamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) Bijay Sarawagi, declared, "We can’tpay taxes both to the government and Maoists." His Vice President SushilMittal added, "cadres of the Federation (ANTUF) enter the factory premisesforcibly, organize mass meetings and even manhandle promoters and seniorofficials. Industries simply cannot continue operation in such a situation."Operations were restarted only after the ANTUF and BCCI signed an eleven-pointagreement on May 23.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister K. P. Sharma Oli has expressedalarm at these various developments: "While the government has been expressingits firm commitment to the six-point agenda endorsed by the seven-party allianceand to the 12-point understanding reached with the Maoists to restore peace,what sort of negotiations do the Maoists want by continuing their extortions,intimidations and recruitment for their militia?" He added that armed Maoistsin combat attire were intimidating people, extorting one million rupees from theCommunist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) District level cadresand forcing them to attend Maoist functions.

Irrespective of any ‘agreements’ with the SPA orthe present government, however, extortion and intimidation will remain anessential part of Maoist activities through any phase of negotiations.Maintaining an army requires funds, and the Maoists have no intention ofdisbanding theirs. According to a 2004 study based on direct interviews withMaoist fighters, it costed Rs. 17,000 annually to provide one armed guerrillawith clothes and other basic necessities. During the hostilities in early 2002,a former Maoist district commander had estimated that the Maoists needed tospend about Rs. 10 million every month to keep the war going. Any impediment totheir systems of ‘revolutionary taxation’, would mean dismantling theirarmy, which would simply destroy the very basis of their power and theirnegotiating strength. If the talks fail to yield what they expect, the Maoistshave time and again demonstrated, the option of a return to the ways of war willbe kept open. A warning to this effect was sounded during a mass meeting atChakari in Makwanpur District on May 29, when Prachanda declared that a "violentstorm" of protests would sweep the country in case the talks fail.

The manifest Maoist disregard for the 25-point Ceasefire Code of Conduct wasalso visible when armed Maoist cadres turned out in military combat gear toexhibit their military tactics at Prakashpur in Sunsari District on May 29,2006. This display violated the clauses of the ceasefire code of conduct whichread: "Both sides shall refrain from mobilizing, displaying and using armedforces that would spread terror among the people" and "Both sides shall notbe present in combat dress while organising public meet, gathering, conference,ceremony or political activities."

The Maoists are evidently, and will remain, unwilling to give up arms. A callfor United Nations involvement in cease-fire monitoring, assistance indecommissioning of Maoist arms and ‘witnessing’ of the ongoing government-Maoisttalks has, consequently, gained momentum within the Nepali establishment andsome sections of the ‘international community’, though, officially, thecurrent government continues to reject UN mediation as ‘unnecessary’.

The Maoists, of course, have expressed themselves in favour of UNintervention in the past, though they have maintained a measure of ambiguity onthe issue since the advent of the SPA government, with the Party’s ‘chiefnegotiator’, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, declaring that the Maoists would ‘adopta flexible policy and not a rigid one’ in this regard. The UN option, in anyevent, may well be a recipe for further confusion and potential disaster, giventhe organizations spotty record in Rwanda, the Balkans and Sudan. Further, thirdparty intervention is no guarantee that the rebel army and militia would disarm,as is demonstrated in the case of Sri Lanka, where the presence of Nordicmonitors has failed to ensure that the rebels giving up arms and terroristactivities, or in the case of Northern Ireland, where de-commissioning ofweapons continues to be a sore point.

Despite the enormous optimism that has swept across Nepal in the wake of the‘people’s victory’ and the restoration of Parliament, the equation ofpower within the country remains immensely unstable. The King appears,presently, to have been emasculated, but just weeks ago, that was the visiblecondition of the now-triumphant SPA. The democratic parties appear to beabruptly more potent, but their power is substantially an illusion based onfickle popular perceptions. The Maoists appear to be accommodating of thedemocratic spirit, but continue to consolidate their political base and militarycapacities. Unless the Maoists are completely disarmed, and the politicalparties secure greater constitutional legitimacy and administrative control overthe entire country, the current ‘roadmap’ for peace may well be a shortdetour on the larger Maoist ‘roadmap’ for protracted war.

Ajai Sahni is Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for ConflictManagement. Saji Cherian is Research Associate, Institute for ConflictManagement. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal