Does US-Iran War Put India’s 2026 BRICS Balancing Act Under Pressure?

When leaders of the BRICS grouping gather in New Delhi on Saturday, India will be trying to do something that has become increasingly difficult over the past six months: keep countries with sharply different positions on the US-Iran war at the same table without allowing the conflict to define the grouping.

Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are all BRICS members. Yet Iran's retaliation has increasingly spilled into the Gulf, while Saudi Arabia has moved closer to Pakistan and Türkiye through the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. Pakistan, meanwhile, has tried to mediate between Washington and Tehran even as its new defence arrangement with Riyadh gives it a direct security commitment towards Saudi Arabia.

For India, this is more than a problem of drafting a joint declaration. New Delhi is hosting BRICS after signing the Bishkek Declaration at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, which condemned military attacks on Iran. At the same time, India remains strategically engaged with the US, Russia, Iran and the Gulf states, while Russia and China are increasingly challenging the US-led international order and Iran remains in direct confrontation with Washington. The question for the Narendra Modi government is how far it can maintain its long-standing policy of strategic autonomy when its partners are increasingly being pulled into opposing geopolitical camps.

The Iran war has changed the BRICS equation

The conflict that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran in February has steadily expanded into a wider regional crisis. Iran has targeted US military positions in the Gulf, while the UAE and other Gulf states have found themselves directly exposed to the consequences of the war. The Strait of Hormuz has also become central to the conflict, with disruptions to commercial shipping creating wider energy and economic concerns.

The grouping was already divided over the war before the leaders' summit. At the BRICS foreign ministers' meeting in New Delhi in May, Iran sought condemnation of US and Israeli actions, while the UAE pushed for condemnation of Iranian attacks. The meeting ended without a joint statement on the conflict, with members acknowledging “differing views”.

That failure matters because the disagreement is no longer simply between countries with different foreign-policy preferences. BRICS now contains countries that are directly affected by the same war and, in some cases, by each other's actions.

The Indian Express reported on Thursday that BRICS negotiators were still trying to bridge differences over the language on West Asia ahead of the summit. India, Russia, Brazil and Egypt have been involved in efforts to narrow the gap between Iran and the UAE, while Saudi Arabia will also be at the summit table.

Makkah Pact Creates Another Layer Of Regional Politics

The development outside BRICS is equally important.

On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, establishing a framework for closer military cooperation and mutual defence. The agreement provides that an armed attack against one member would be considered an attack against all three. The agreement is intended to institutionalise closer defence cooperation among the three countries.

The first Strategic Political and Defence Committee meeting under the agreement was held in Istanbul on August 31. The three countries agreed to further institutionalise the arrangement and establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general.

This creates a sharp contrast with BRICS. BRICS is a broad political and economic grouping that brings Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE into the same institutional framework despite their competing security interests. The Makkah arrangement, by contrast, is a narrower security mechanism linking Saudi Arabia with Pakistan and Türkiye at a time when Riyadh faces growing regional security concerns.

The two groupings therefore reflect different responses to the same crisis: BRICS keeps rival states inside one political framework, while the Makkah pact creates a security arrangement among countries responding to the changing threat environment. Saudi Arabia's participation in both also shows that these institutions are not mutually exclusive blocs; states are increasingly hedging across diplomatic and security frameworks.

Pakistan’s Mediator Role Is Becoming Harder

Pakistan's position illustrates that contradiction particularly well.

Islamabad has spent much of the year trying to maintain channels with both Washington and Tehran. In June, Pakistani mediation helped bring Washington and Tehran to a preliminary agreement after weeks of negotiations, with Qatar later helping bridge remaining gaps.

But Pakistan is now also part of a defence arrangement with Saudi Arabia.

That becomes particularly significant as the conflict increasingly affects Saudi territory through attacks by Iran-aligned groups. Reuters reported on September 9 that Pakistan conveyed a Saudi message to Iran asking Tehran to restrain the Houthis after attacks that injured 73 people and targeted an airbase and oil infrastructure. Islamabad has stressed that its defence commitments under the pact are focused on protecting Saudi territory, not combat operations inside Yemen.

Pakistan is therefore trying to perform two roles at once: mediator between Iran and its opponents, and security partner of Saudi Arabia. Its obligations towards Riyadh could make it harder to maintain the credibility needed to mediate if the conflict moves further into Saudi territory.

For India, this is relevant because Pakistan's regional role is expanding at the same time that New Delhi is trying to manage its own relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the US.

India Is Not Anti-Western — But It Is Not Simply Pro-Western Either

This is where the BRICS summit becomes particularly important for New Delhi.

India is not anti-Western. But neither is it simply pro-Western. That distinction matters because some of BRICS' most influential members — particularly Russia and China — have increasingly challenged the US-led international order, while Iran is in direct military confrontation with Washington. Their positions carry costs: Russia remains under extensive Western sanctions, China faces growing strategic and economic competition with the US, and Iran has been subject to decades of American sanctions and is now at war with the US.

India has chosen a different path. It has deepened its strategic relationship with Washington while maintaining defence and energy ties with Moscow, engaging Iran and strengthening partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It participates in BRICS and the SCO without accepting the idea that either should become an anti-Western bloc.

That is the logic behind New Delhi's strategic autonomy: working with different power centres without aligning politically or militarily with any one of them. But the Iran war is making that harder as countries India engages are no longer simply competing; some are directly confronting one another.

Bishkek Makes Tomorrow's Summit More Complicated

At the SCO summit in Kyrgyzstan last week, India joined other SCO members in adopting the Bishkek Declaration. The declaration condemned military strikes on Iranian territory as violations of international law and the UN Charter and backed Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Chatham House notes that India, Russia and China signed the declaration, and argues that New Delhi is likely to be cautious about allowing BRICS to produce a similarly pointed statement because of India's relationship with Washington.

India can support sovereignty, territorial integrity, civilian protection and dialogue without endorsing every position taken by Iran, Russia or China. But once those principles appear in a joint document, the geopolitical interpretation becomes harder to control.

The Bishkek Declaration has therefore raised the stakes for New Delhi's BRICS chairmanship.

The timing is difficult: India has just joined an SCO declaration condemning military strikes on Iran and is now hosting a BRICS summit where Iran will sit alongside Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which have been affected by the conflict.

If India pushes for strong language against US military action, it risks making BRICS appear closer to the positions of Russia, China and Iran in opposition to US military action. If it avoids such language, it could face criticism from members that want BRICS to challenge Western military and economic influence. Either way, New Delhi has to ensure that its own position is not mistaken for an endorsement of another country's geopolitical agenda.

What India Can Realistically Achieve

The most realistic Indian objective tomorrow may not be a sweeping BRICS position on the war, but consensus without alignment. India's sherpas are trying to find language around sovereignty, civilian protection, maritime commerce and de-escalation that members can accept. The Indian Express reported that New Delhi wants a consensus document despite divisions between Iran and the UAE.

That approach fits India's broader foreign policy. New Delhi can argue for dialogue and oppose attacks on civilians without turning BRICS into a military or ideological bloc.

The US-Iran war has therefore produced competing layers of diplomacy: BRICS brings Iran and its Gulf rivals together; the Makkah pact creates a separate security framework around Saudi Arabia; Pakistan is trying to mediate while becoming closer to Riyadh; and the SCO has already adopted language critical of military action against Iran.

India sits across several of these networks without fully belonging to any one camp. That has long been the strength of its strategic autonomy. But the calculations are becoming harder as Russia and China push BRICS in a more geopolitical direction, Iran remains in direct conflict with the US, and Saudi Arabia strengthens its security partnerships.

India does not have to choose a camp at the BRICS summit. But it does have to prevent the summit from choosing one for it. That may be the real test of New Delhi's diplomacy when the BRICS leaders meet on Saturday.