Chasing A Chimera: India Juggling In International Relations

The tableau in Tianjin was striking. India’s Narendra Modi, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping, huddled together, projected the image of a loose axis of Eurasian powers ready to challenge the US-dominated world order. Coming at a time when US President Donald Trump has turned global trade on its head with his tariff war, the images beamed from the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) Summit in China caused ripples worldwide. Was this just a photo-op or the first signs of a geopolitical shift that could redefine Asia and Eurasia? What of India’s tango with China and Russia? Was it for real or an effort to signal to the US that it has other options and its strategic autonomy cannot be dictated by any other country?

Efforts to build an alternative to the West had always existed. The Cold War was the conflict between two diametrically opposite world views. The break-up of the former Soviet Union in 1991 led to the victory of capitalism and the West. Today, the US remains the only superpower. But Russia has not given up. Starting with Yevgency Primakov in the late 1990s, the idea of Russia-India-China (RIC) getting together was always on Kremlin’s agenda. RIC did not really take off, though Moscow is keen to revive it now. The SCO and BRICS are all part of an effort to present an alternative narrative to developing countries chaffing under a system that has failed to address their concerns. The Global South wants an alternative and is looking toward China and Russia to provide the leadership. India, which has been veering towards the US since the last 25 years or so, had not embraced either BRICS or the SCO with enthusiasm as they are regarded as anti-US groupings. Some felt that India was the fifth columnist in BRICS, with its public and repeated assertions that it was not interested in creating an alternative to the US dollar. Trump as is well known is scathing in his criticism of BRICS and has been threatening 100 to 200 per cent tariffs on countries that seek to weaken the US dollar. Russia and China are hoping that Trump’s 50 per cent tariffs on India could wean India away from the US. Both Russia and China have roundly condemned US tariffs against India.

Is India ready to play ball and back China and Russia’s efforts all the way? The stakes are high and New Delhi is averse to taking sides. It is more comfortable with dealing with a world dominated by several poles, a truly multipolar international order.

There are major differences between the three big powers. The notion of India, China and Russia offering an alternative to the Global South is more aspirational than assured. India and China remain at odds over borders and influence in Asia, while Moscow’s reliance on Beijing has tilted the partnership heavily in China’s favour. The present alignment looks tactical, born out of circumstance, rather than a shared strategy. If India and the US get a bilateral trade agreement done in the coming months, or if the Ukraine war ends and the balance of power reset, could the India-China-Russia axis hold?

India-China

Despite strategic mistrust, India-China ties are being pushed by necessity amid the volatility in the world economy. It’s not just about Trump’s tariffs, but India’s dependence on China for its manufacturing sector that is propelling the reset. All that Trump has done is to accelerate the process. As early as in June 2024, Chief Economic Advisor V. Anantha Nageswaran said in the annual economic survey that to boost its global exports, New Delhi can either integrate into China’s supply chain or promote foreign direct investment (FDI) from China. This was much before Trump was on the scene.

Since last October’s border patrol agreement that led to the restoration of patrolling rights for the Indian Army in Depsang and Demchok, the ground rules were laid out for trade and economic ties to be back on track.

Though India is today the fastest growing economy in the world with an annual GDP growth of 7.4 per cent, this is unfortunately not being translated into jobs. Data suggests that 12 million young workers enter the job market each year, and providing employment for them is a major headache for the government. India is facing what economists say is jobless growth, where economic expansion outpaces job creation, resulting in huge unemployment concerns.

India needs both trade and investments from China. “India’s dependence on China in the manufacturing sector is huge. Most electronic goods, including mobile phones, and medicines produced in India, significantly depend on Chinese intermediate products,” says Biswajit Dhar, a former JNU professor. “Decoupling our manufacturing from China is at the moment extremely difficult,” he adds. Investments from China are also crucial for Indian industry. With uncertainty in the US and European markets for Chinese investments, India may be an attractive alternative, so long as relations remain stable.

Chinese investments in the US are gradually coming down from 20 per cent before the COVID pandemic to just about 11.7 per cent now, Dhar points out. If India-China ties stabilise, Chinese companies will also look to invest here.

Indian manufacturers need rare earth minerals, tunnel boring machines, inputs for the pharmaceutical industry as well as for electric vehicles and solar panels. When China’s foreign minister Wang Yi was in India for boundary discussions with National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and bilateral talks with S. Jaishankar, he had promised to lift curbs on these exports to India. So far, it is not clear whether Wang has acted on his promise.

With Trump, blowing hot and cold on China, Xi Jinping is also keen to tap India’s huge domestic market. Trump’s unpredictability is forcing every country to hedge its bets. China is still negotiating a deal with the US. For India the Pakistan, the question looms large over ties with China. The fact that India’s deputy chief of army staff, Lieutenant General Rahul R. Singh, accused China publicly of helping Pakistan during Sindoor Operations remains a major concern. “Pakistan was the front face. China was providing all possible support… This represents a huge vulnerability and demonstrates China’s direct involvement in providing strategic military intelligence against India…”

India-Russia Trust and Political Comfort

Russia has always been India’s friend. It had stood with India at a time when the US and the West were not willing to give New Delhi the time of day. Pakistan was America’s friend in the region. India’s Ministry of External Affairs describes Russia as a “longstanding and time-tested pillar of India’s foreign policy”. There is trust and political comfort between the two countries. But there could be headwinds ahead. Should US-Russia ties collapse and Trump sides with Ukraine, New Delhi’s balancing act will be tested as never before. Trump is no Joe Biden. He goes for the kill. Biden’s pragmatism gave India room to hedge. Trump’s instincts are more in the George Bush mode after 9/11 when countries were asked whether they were ‘with us or against us’. There is no in-between position.

The question in Delhi is: How to tackle the geopolitical turbulence. It will be difficult to balance Washington and Moscow. Will India have to abandon an old friend and tilt further towards America? Distrust and suspicion of the US is back in India after the unfair targeting of India and Trump’s outreach to Pakistan.

“Modi’s warm interaction with Putin at Tianjin, the planned visit of Putin to India in December are signals to the US and the Europeans that our ties with Russia cannot become hostage to our close ties with the West,” says Kanwal Sibal, former envoy to Moscow and a retired foreign secretary. “The West has chosen to confront Russia on an issue of European security thinking they will inflict a defeat on it. They can choose to end that confrontation now that they are failing to secure their objective. Why drag India into the mess they have created? India wants peace, but securing it is not in its hands,” he adds.

The Trump tariffs have helped New Delhi to pull back from crossing over totally to the US camp. Many within the Indian establishment have welcomed what they see as a “course correction” by the Modi government. There are also differences within the administration, between those who think that India is better off by siding with America and others who believe that American embrace will stifle New Delhi’s long-cherished strategic autonomy.

Russia-China

China and Russia are strategic allies now, and since the Ukraine conflict and the souring of China-US ties, they are in a tight embrace, thanks to the shifting global equations. Yet, there is underlying suspicion and rivalry between China and Russia, which for the moment is being overlooked. India is well aware of this and confident that Moscow will not side with China against India.

For much of the Cold War, the two neighbours eyed each other with deep suspicion. There was a border clash in 1969 that nearly spiralled into a nuclear war. Old wounds run deep, large tracts of Chinese territory have been ceded to Czarist Russia under “unequal treaties”, and Beijing has never forgotten that. The hostility opened the door for Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing. The rapprochement and the opening up of the Chinese economy in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping led to the economic miracle in China and the coupling of the two.

Multipolar World

India, China and Russia as well as most of the developing countries are committed to a multipolar world where policies are not decided by just one or two countries, but there are several power poles.

“In a multipolar world, competition is as much economic as it is political or military. No single country can easily dictate the rules of trade, so states turn to tariffs and restrictions to defend their markets and bargain with both rivals and partners,” says Washington-based analyst Ali Mammadov. “Rather than driving fragmentation, US tariffs would be better seen as symptoms of a system where the liberal economic order is no longer uncontested. In this environment, middle powers gain influence not only through capabilities, but also by shaping the debates over the rules of how the world should be governed—though whether this influence endures will depend on how the global order ultimately consolidates,” he adds. However, he cautions that “a truly multipolar order is usually temporary and gives way to unequal distribution of power”.

The Trump tariffs have led to the multipolar debate getting much more traction. India, as a middling power with aspirations of a great power status, is comfortable in a multipolar space. China too publicly calls for multipolarity, but in Asia, China behaves as the big boss. New Delhi would have China also aim at an Asia where China, India, Japan are all parts of a pole. Recent developments have strengthened India’s resolve to diversify partnerships—an India-EU trade agreement is being worked out. India-ASEAN free trade pact is being reviewed and updated. India and the UK already have a trade agreement in place. There is likely to be greater trade cooperation with Canada. Brazil and the BRICS group are also there. President Lula is a great votary of a multipolar world. Brazil is being singled out like India with 50 per cent tariffs. India will continue to work with as many countries as possible regardless of the groupings they belong to.

Seema Guha is a senior journalist covering foreign affairs