R-Day Special: Friction Between Governors And States Exposes Unresolved Fault Line In India’s Constitution

Seventy-six years after the adoption of the Constitution, one of India’s longstanding federal issues, the role of Governors, has resurfaced. The debate intensified last week in opposition-ruled states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Karnataka, where Governors refused to read the customary policy addresses of elected governments during the opening sessions of state Assemblies. This move has revived the controversy over the limits of gubernatorial authority and the Centre’s influence in state administration.

Tensions between Governors and state governments have grown noticeably since the Modi-led NDA came to power. While disagreements are not new, the refusal to deliver the policy address, a key constitutional convention, marks a serious escalation, raising concerns about weakening federal norms.

The Constituent Assembly had witnessed intense debates on the role, powers and mode of appointment of Governors. Some members argued that Governors should be elected, asserting that this would align with democratic principles. However, the Assembly ultimately accepted Dr B.R. Ambedkar’s view that an elected Governor would create two competing power centres within a state. Ambedkar was unequivocal in his assertion that the Governor has no independent authority and is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

Despite this clarity, the office of the Governor became controversial soon after the Constitution came into force. In 1959, the then Kerala Governor, B Ramakrishna Rao, advised the Union government to dismiss the elected Communist government led by E M S Namboodiripad. This set a precedent for political misuse of the office. The trend deepened during Indira Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister, when Governors’ reports were frequently used to dismiss opposition-led state governments.

Before, during, and after the Emergency, Article 356 of the Constitution was repeatedly invoked to dislodge politically inconvenient state governments. Governors, often seen as compliant with the Centre, played a central role in this process. The indiscriminate use of President’s Rule became a tool to settle political scores rather than a constitutional safeguard.

This practice was eventually curbed by the Supreme Court in its landmark 1994 judgment in S R Bommai vs Union of India. The court ruled that the imposition of President’s Rule is subject to judicial review and that the majority of a government must be tested on the floor of the House, not determined by the Governor’s subjective assessment. Importantly, the judgment underscored that federalism is part of the Constitution’s basic structure and cautioned Governors against acting as agents of the Union government.

Yet, despite judicial and constitutional guidance, the Governor–State conflict persists in new forms—delays in granting assent to Bills, withholding approval for appointments, sitting on files for prolonged periods, and increasingly, public interventions in policy matters. The recent refusal to read policy addresses has only sharpened these tensions, prompting fresh questions about the neutrality and constitutional propriety of the office.

“It is true that the Governor is bound to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. But there is a constitutional discretion that Governors can employ,” said P S Sreedharan Pillai, former Governor of Goa and Mizoram. He argued that the controversies in Kerala and Tamil Nadu stem from the ideological positions of the Communist and Dravidian parties. “Both have historically and ideologically opposed the idea of a unitary Indian nation. If a state government pushes a divisive agenda, the Governor is not bound to read such a statement in the Assembly,” he said, adding that the current standoff arises from ideologically driven policy statements adopted by state governments.

Articles 87 and 176 of the Constitution mandate the President and Governors to address Parliament and state legislatures at the beginning of the year. In Tamil Nadu, Governor R N Ravi—who has been locked in prolonged political and ideological confrontation with the DMK government—said he refused to read out the policy address citing factual inaccuracies in the text prepared by the government. Raj Bhavan also contended that the national anthem was not played at the beginning of the Assembly session.

“Governors are acting like BJP spokespersons,” said DMK national spokesperson Salem Dharanidharan, alleging that the moves were politically motivated and aimed at destabilising elected governments in opposition-ruled states. “You don’t see such issues in BJP-ruled states. These actions are being carried out at the behest of the BJP and the Union government,” he added.

In Kerala, Governor Rajendra Arlekar refused to read certain portions of the policy statement prepared by the Left government, which were later read out by Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan. The Governor alleged that the omitted portions contained “half-truths” and later sought video recordings of the Chief Minister’s address from the Speaker of the Assembly.

“Governors do not have an independent role,” said constitutional expert and former Lok Sabha Secretary-General P. D. T. Achary. “The Constitution requires them to read the policy statement approved by the Council of Ministers. They cannot exercise executive power on their own. Article 176 makes it clear that the Governor must address the legislature and set out the government’s policies. Failing to do so breaches the Constitution,” he explained. “Such actions violate the federal structure and are unconstitutional. Governors are overstepping the limits clearly set by the Constitution,” added Achary.

In Karnataka, Governor Thaawarchand Gehlot, following a similar pattern, refused to read passages critical of the Union government and walked out of the Assembly without waiting for the national anthem to be played.

“There is a clear pattern indicating that certain Governors in opposition-ruled states are acting at the behest of the Union government,” said Supreme Court advocate and columnist Kaleeswaram Raj. “Governors have no independent discretion in matters of governance. This is unambiguously stated in the Constitution. They cannot add to or omit portions of statements prepared by the Council of Ministers. Governors are not elected representatives and do not possess independent constitutional legitimacy to exercise such discretion,” he said.

Kaleeswaram Raj added that the issue extends beyond Assembly addresses to the handling of Bills passed by state legislatures. “The Supreme Court, in the Tamil Nadu government’s case, had laid down a timeframe for Governors to grant assent to Bills. However, the subsequent response to the Presidential reference diluted this position, which was unfortunate. Actions by Governors that run contrary to the elected will of states are deeply damaging to federalism as envisaged in the Constitution,” he said. There have long been allegations that the Union government has used the office of the Governor to browbeat opposition-ruled states.

Over the decades, several commissions have been appointed to review and streamline the appointment and functioning of Governors, the most prominent being the Sarkaria Commission, constituted in 1983. In its 1988 report, the commission recommended a comprehensive overhaul of the institution, including the appointment of Governors in consultation with the concerned state governments. It also proposed the establishment of an Inter-State Council to institutionalise Centre–State dialogue. However, these recommendations were never implemented in letter or spirit.

In 2007, amid changing political and economic circumstances, the Union government appointed a commission headed by former Chief Justice of India Madan Mohan Punchhi to re-examine Centre–State relations. The Punchhi Commission reiterated the need for restraint in the exercise of gubernatorial powers and underscored the importance of federal balance. Yet, despite successive commissions and detailed reports, the office of the Governor continues to bedevil Centre–State relations—more than seven decades after the adoption of the Constitution—particularly in opposition-ruled states.