Hindutva, as we all know, has stormed to power on episodic waves due to its potential for irrational and violent political mobilisation. It has advanced at a time when we see the long-term decline of the Congress and the Left parties and the rise of regional parties, which are run by the state’s local dominant caste-propertied groups. Since 2014, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) has captured the popular imagination of the Indian political discourse, essentially with its three components, as Yogendra Yadav points out—one, its brute centralised power through unconstitutional elements and para-state forces, two, its ‘electoral dominance’, though the whole legitimacy and fairness of the electoral process is questioned by the Opposition and, three, the ‘moral and ideological acceptance of the regime by the people’. The regime has, above all, facilitated the accumulation process of private capital, which has resulted in an enormous disparity, particularly in consumption, despite the fact that the economy is supposed to thrive on the idea of consumption. There have emerged, therefore, two serious crises—the accumulation crisis and the consumption crisis.