Europe Is Readying For A Russian War It May Fight Alone

Switzerland has just done something remarkable for a country that has defined its security through neutrality for generations. On September 18, its Federal Council approved a new security policy strategy based on resilience, protection and defence. The strategy names Russia’s war in Ukraine, hybrid threats and critical dependencies as challenges to the state, the economy and society.

The same day in Paris, Emmanuel Macron summoned party leaders to the Élysée, two days after a meeting of France’s Defence and National Security Council. He said the Russian hybrid threat had intensified in recent weeks and ordered a plan to protect critical infrastructure and defence-industry sites against drones and cyberattacks.

Germany is preparing its hospitals for war. These three developments show how far Europe’s threat perception has moved. European planning has widened from a Russian war in Ukraine to a confrontation that reaches European territory and European societies. All this has implications for India.

From Ukraine to Europe

The shift began with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and has accelerated over the past six months. European governments now treat Russia as a long-term threat spanning cyberattacks, sabotage, drones and conventional force.

The Leipzig/Halle airport incident was the turning point. On the night of August 4, an explosive-laden drone was found near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at the airport. On September 1, Germany attributed the attempted attack to Russia, quoting a drone configuration, components and explosives known from other Russian hybrid operations.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz later said Russia had planned the attack for months and aimed it specifically at Germany. Moscow denies involvement.

Germany has responded in kind. Its Lithuania Brigade is growing into a permanent combat formation of about 4,800 troops on NATO’s eastern flank, due to be fully operational by the end of 2027.

On September 14, the Defence Ministry confirmed compulsory postings to fill specialist gaps in the brigade after volunteer numbers fell short. Bundeswehr planning scenarios assume up to 1,000 wounded personnel a day arriving in Germany in a major NATO conflict, far beyond the capacity of its five military hospitals.

A March exercise rehearsed the evacuation of wounded from a simulated attack on Lithuania into German hospitals. This changes what European defence preparedness means. Germany is planning both to deploy forces and to sustain a major war through its civilian systems.

France is moving in parallel. Macron’s meeting placed the Russian threat before the leaders of every major party. The government has also been ordered to harden critical infrastructure and defence-industry sites. France is also deepening military cooperation with Ukraine.

Britain illustrates the maritime dimension. In late August, three Royal Navy ships and a Merlin helicopter spent 72 hours tracking the Russian destroyer Admiral Levchenko and the sanctioned cargo vessels it escorted through the North Sea and English Channel. Royal Navy activations to monitor Russian activity rose 25 per cent in the first eight months of 2026 compared with the same period in 2025.

British support to Ukraine is also moving deeper into Russia’s threat calculus. Ukraine has used British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles against targets inside Russia. On August 24, London agreed to share classified technical information so that Ukraine can produce the missiles domestically.

On August 27, Moscow warned that it could strike British military targets inside and outside Ukraine in response to Ukrainian attacks using British missiles.

On September 18, Russia summoned the British chargé d’affaires over drone and weapons supplies. It repeated that British facilities in Ukraine supporting strikes on Russian territory would be treated as legitimate targets. The escalation is spiralling. European military support strengthens Ukraine. Moscow then views European states as participants in the conflict, and European governments assume Russian threats and hybrid activity as confrontation reaching their own territory.

The hybrid battlefield

Many of these incidents are years old. The difference is in how Europe now views them. Sabotage, cyberattacks, arson, espionage, drone incursions and interference with critical infrastructure are now treated as parts of one strategic problem.

On September 16, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a counter-hybrid playbook and a European Security Council bringing together EU members with Britain, Norway, Ukraine and Canada.

Europe is redrawing the boundary between peace and war. Airports, railways, power grids, hospitals, defence factories and information systems now sit inside the security landscape.

The American accelerant

Washington’s behaviour helps explain the speed of this transformation.

European governments increasingly doubt that the United States will provide the military certainty it once did. Trump’s pressure on NATO allies to spend more has accelerated European defence budgets.

The Pentagon is also reviewing the US military presence in Europe, raising questions about future force levels and American priorities.

Trump’s ambivalence towards Ukraine is another factor. Washington continues to support Kyiv in important areas. It also presses for negotiations with Moscow and signals that Europe must carry more of its own security.

Seen from many European capitals, several of Trump’s choices therefore work in Russia’s favour. They bring greater uncertainty about the American guarantee, a heavier burden on Europe, and a less predictable American policy towards Moscow and Kyiv.

The evidence supports a convergence of effects between Washington and Moscow; coordination remains unproven. That convergence is reason enough for Europe to prepare for greater military self-reliance.

Washington offers a parallel on the economic side. Congress has built a durable sanctions framework targeting Russia and the largest purchasers of Russian energy, and Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on September 18.

Europe is moving towards greater military self-reliance while Congress hardens economic policy against Moscow. The two tracks run separately and converge in the same way.

India and the elephants

India now sits between these developments. Europe is becoming more security-conscious and more hostile to Russia, and this may affect its potential as a de-risking alternative. Washington, meanwhile, is raising the cost of India’s economic relationship with Moscow.

India will retain strategic autonomy because it has few alternatives, and the price of that autonomy is rising. Energy and defence diversification are becoming necessities, and both will be slow and costly.

The author is a Research Fellow at the Takshashila Institution and Head of the Defence Fellowship Program.