A Surrender That Never Was

Waves of anticipation, apprehension and frustration followed in quick succession in Tripura as the issue ofthe surrender of a faction of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) led by Nayanbasi Jamatiya (NLFT-N)emerged and disappeared within a week. In this short period, the subject raised enough heat and dust, leadingto expectations and signals that were interpreted to be the 'beginning of the end' of insurgency in thisperipheral state. There are, however, sufficient indications now that the 'surrender' has been a non-starter,as all lines of communication with the militants, waiting across the border in Bangladesh, have broken down.

In the first week of January, Nayanbasi appeared to have sent a letter to the state administration from a safehouse in the Comilla area of Bangladesh, across the international border opposite the Sonamura area of WestTripura district, expressing his desire to surrender and give up violence. The letter also included certainconditions, which the state government needed to address before Nayanbasi could decide on a formal surrender.These demands were:

1. A political position for Nayanbasi Jamatiya after he surrenders.
2. Amnesty for all the NLFT-N cadres.
3. A meeting with the Chief Minister prior to the surrender.
4. Amnesty for the Tripura state Rifles (TSR) renegade Rahid Mian.

It was, indeed, difficult for the state government to concede to these demands, especially the amnesty forthe renegade TSR personnel, who had earlier connived with the militants to kill three of his colleagues onSeptember 23, 2003, in the Shermun Tilla area in North Tripura district.

It is nearly twelve years now since the TSR 1st battalion rifleman Nayanbasi Jamatiya, a man from theTrishabari area under West Tripura's Teliamura police station, had fled his post at the Baramura Thermal PowerPlant with a rifle on March 23, 1992, following a dispute with colleagues on the previous night. Having joinedthe NLFT with the adopted name of 'Major Nakbar', Nayanbasi rose fast in the outfit's hierarchy, mostly due tohis skills in guerrilla warfare. Following his differences with the organisation's top leadership, Nayanbasiformed his own group in February 2001, even though it could never really outgrow the NLFT faction led byBiswamohan Debbarma.

With an estimated 250 cadres, of whom only 50 have access to some type of firearms, NLFT-N remained marginallyactive in the bordering areas of North Tripura and Dhalai district as well as Takarjala and Bishalgarh policestation areas in West district. Its only major ambush remains the August 20, 2002, incident in which a TSRvehicle was attacked and 20 security force personnel killed, with a large cache of arms and ammunition,including 18 self loading rifles, one light machine gun, one carbine and several grenades also looted, atHirapur under the Takarjala police station. Apart from this attack, NLFT-N was generally known for itslinkages with the criminal and mafia gangs of the border areas in Bangladesh.

What drove Nayanbasi to send feelers for surrender is still uncertain. There are, however, some indicationsthat in the aftermath of the military operations in Bhutan, in December 2003, India has been able to build upconsiderable heat on the Bangladeshi authorities to act on the militant outfits long harboured in thatcountry. Bangladesh had to act, albeit in a cosmetic manner, to show that the country is not really providingsafe haven to militants operating in India's Northeast. Nothing could have been wiser than to target a small,and hence least consequential, group like the NLFT-N under the circumstances. As a result, on December 28,2003, a number of hideouts of the outfit were reported to have been raided by the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) inSylhet and Maulavi Bazar districts, a crackdown which was led by the Commanding Officer of the 39R battalionof BDR at Dhalalpunji transit camp. Expectedly, not a single militant was arrested, since all of them had fledthe scene after being tipped off.

If the BDR was trying to send messages to India and the rest of the world, the raid perhaps proved to be alittle too much for the militants, who felt that the guarantees of protection they had long operating underwere possibly being diluted. Nevertheless, Bangladesh has been quick to react to Nayanbasi Jamatia's surrendermoves. Alarmed by the possibility of the NLFT-N cadres returning to India, BDR personnel raided Nayanbasi'ssafe house in the Comilla area, from where he reportedly had sent feelers for the surrender, in the secondweek of January 2004. The raid was intended to make Nayanbasi shut up. Nayanbasi, in his long years ofcourtship with his mentors in Bangladesh, knows too much about the BDR-ISI-criminal nexus, and there was theinherent danger that, once he started talking about his 'field experiences' in front of the Tripuraintelligence department, Bangladesh would have a hard time in explaining its 'we do not harbour any terrorist'stand.

There is also a need to look at a related and very interesting piece of intelligence making the rounds inAgartala, the state capital of Tripura. The BDR has apparently asked the terrorist groups operating in Tripurato abandon their present bases in Bangladesh and to take shelter in rented houses in residential areas. As aresult, over the past month, several groups have deserted their camps in Sylhet, Maulvi Bazar and Habiganjdistricts bordering areas of North Tripura and Dhalai districts, as well as the Khowai and Sadar subdivisionsin the West Tripura district. The All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) camp located at Satcherri in the Habiganjdistrict of Bangladesh, opposite the Simna area of Sadar in the West Tripura district, and the NLFT campslocated in Khasiapunji, Ranirgaon Bazar, Kurma, Naynarpar, Kandigaon and Kukijhuri have also been deserted. Onone instance, a terrorist camp at Kukijhuri in the Sylhet district had been burnt down by the BDR after theterrorists abandoned it.

NLFT-N's problems, however, do not start or end with the BDR. Nayanbasi's ability to lead the relatively smallband of 250 cadres has, of late, been questioned by many cadres who have surrendered. There are alsoindications that the outfit and its cadres have been suffering from a lack of direction resulting in aleadership crisis of sorts within the group. 

Part of the problem is believed to be Nayanbasi's obsession with women. His first wife Padmadebi Jamatya(35) works in the Tripura state government's social education department and lives in the Jampuijala area ofBishalgarh subdivision. Nayanbasi, after joining the NLFT, is known to have married Samirani Chakma (34), atribal woman of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh. Subsequently, he married a Muslim woman,Tahera Bibi (37), daughter of his main patron and Mafia don Abu Mia in Srimangal sub-district area inBangladesh's northeast. Tripura police sources reveal that, in order to solemnise his last marriage, Nayanbasiconverted to Islam.

The prospect of Nayanbasi's surrender does not appear to have generated much enthusiasm in Tripura's securityset up. In plain terms the surrender would mean that nearly 250 militants, only 50 of whom have some sort offirearms, would give up violence. By the state government's calculation, and going by the outfit's pastactivities, the NLFT- N is not considered capable of extraordinary violence. Further, the conditionalitieslisted by Nayanbasi are simply too prohibitive to be conceded by the Tripura government. The end result,consequently, would appear to be 'wait and watch' on both sides.

Bibhu Prasad Routray is Acting Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati. Syed Sajjad Aliis  Correspondent, Hindustan Times at Agartala. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Reviewof the South Asia Terrorism Portal.